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This report presents a European view of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) based on independent research 
and analysis by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre to inform the debate at the Euro- 
pean level.
We first introduce AI as a generic term that re-
fers to any machine or algorithm that is capable 
of observing its environment, learning, and based 
on the knowledge and experience gained, take in-
telligent actions or propose decisions. Autonomy 
of decision processes and interaction with other 
machines and humans are other dimensions that 
need to be considered. 
Although many of the methodological develop-
ments in AI date back more than 50 years, the 
reason why we now pay so much attention to AI 
in general and machine learning (ML) in particular 
is that the recent advances in computing power, 
availability of data, and new algorithms have led to 
major breakthroughs in the last six to seven years. 
The many applications of AI/ML have started to en-
ter into our everyday lives, from machine transla-
tions, to image recognition and music generation, 
and are increasingly being exploited in industry, 
government and commerce (see Chapter 2).
It is likely that we are only at the beginning of this 
process because the development of ubiquitous sen-
sor networks, the IoT, will increase exponentially the 
sensing capabilities of AI, the volumes of data on 
which to train the algorithms, and their reach in soci-
ety through decisions and actions.  
The opportunities are many, and in some cases 
not yet foreseen. There are also many challenges, 
however. Among them, current ML algorithms display 
some of the characteristics of a black box: we ac-
cess the inputs and outputs but do not understand 
fully what happens in-between, and how certain 
outputs, including decisions and actions, are de-
rived. This calls or a greater effort to understand 
their theory and to develop explainable and ac-
countable algorithms. We also need strong evalua-
tion frameworks that can assess not only the per-
formance but also the quality of AI and build trust 
in this disruptive technology (Chapters 2, 6 and 10).
The overview of the global and European AI land-
scape shows that there is an intense competition on 
AI taking place world-wide with three main leaders: 
the USA, Europe, and China (Chapter 3). Each region 
has about one quarter of all key players1 in the AI 
field, including both research and industry, but has a 
distinctive different mix of players: while Europe is 
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well balanced in the number of research and non- 
research players, the USA has approximately three 
times as many industrial/corporate players as re-
search ones, and China has about six times as many 
research players as industrial ones. The strength of 
the corporate world in the USA is also indicated by its 
dominance in the number of start-ups (almost half 
of the total worldwide) and venture capital (more 
than one third of the total). China, on the other hand, 
is making a strong effort to turn research research 
into patents, and accounts for almost 60 % of the 
world total. It has also put in place a strongly coord- 
inated approach to AI, including government policy, 
industrial applications and research with the object- 
ive of becoming the world leader in AI by 2030. This 
is an ambitious but achievable target (Chapter 5).
Europe is currently well positioned in the quality 
of its research production, with more than 30 % 
of all papers on AI published in top scientific jour-
nals, just behind the USA (33 %), and is consid-
erably ahead of China. Key areas of strength in 
Europe on which to build upon are automated and 
connected vehicles and robotics. 
We note that many European countries as well as 
the EC are developing strategies and programmes to 
guide the development of AI, with shared concerns 
over the need for an agreed ethical framework and 
applications that clearly benefit European society 
and uphold the European values enshrined in the 
Treaties (Chapter 4). The High-Level Expert Group 
established in 2018 by the European Commission 
is elaborating a framework for subsequent develop-
ments linked to these values. We also note the high 
level of awareness that data is crucial to the devel-
opment of AI, with policy documents at both nation-
al and European level putting strong emphasis on 
the need to share data better among all the stake-
holders: the public sector, industry, and the public. 
Finding the right way of doing it is challenging, as 
analysed in Chapter 12 of the report. 
After the overview and analysis of the AI global and 
European landscapes we discuss AI from multiple per-
spectives to add some depth and explore synergies. 
As we highlight at multiple stages in this report, a 
key characteristic of the European way to AI has 
to be a strong ethical framework. There is con-
sensus on this principle, and we report (Chapter 4) 
on many initiatives at both national and European 
levels to develop ethical guidelines to frame the 
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development of AI. We review the main dimensions 
that such guidelines should consider and highlight 
the potential implications of AI at the level of indi-
viduals and society. We conclude that to build and 
retain trust in AI we need a multi-layered approach 
that includes the critical engagement of civil so-
ciety to discuss the values guiding and being em-
bedded into AI, public debates in different fora to 
translate these values into strategies and guide-
lines, and responsible design practices that encode 
these values and guidelines into AI systems, so that 
they are ethical-by-design (Chapter 6). 
 
In reviewing the European legal framework for AI, 
particularly with respect to the fundamental rights, 
data ownership, and intellectual property, we note 
the tensions between protecting rights of individuals 
and firms and encouraging innovation with trying to 
maximise openness and transparency. We conclude 
however that Europe is well placed to establish a 
distinctive form of AI that is ethically robust and 
protects the rights of individuals, firms, and society 
at large. For example, the General Data Protection 
Regulation, opposed by many during preparation, is 
now perceived as a European asset and is inspiring 
similar approaches outside Europe. Extending this 
notion, we should consider the high standards of the 
European legal and regulatory landscape in a similar 
way to those in environmental quality which are an 
asset for Europeans and their future generations to 
build upon, not a barrier (Chapter 7). 
From an educational perspective, we observe 
(Chapter 8) that AI has potential positive impacts 
on shortages of skills, learning, and teaching. 
Three crucial points stand out from the review: 
firstly, the need to understand better how the in-
teraction with AI impacts human intelligence in 
cognitive capacities in both adults, and even more 
importantly, children. Secondly, we need to think 
beyond current needs and practices, and consider 
how AI is likely to change the relationship between 
education and work, and human development. 
Thirdly, we highlight possible risks related to AI in 
education, particularly privacy and ethical ones. 
In this chapter, we also provide an initial overview 
and geographic distribution of the academic offer 
of study topics related to AI. This is relevant to 
the discussion in chapters 12 and 13 on possible 
strategies to start preparing society, and the most 
vulnerable regions, to the challenges that AI will 
bring.
The potential impact of AI on the labour market and 
inequality raises concerns in the media, research 
and public debates. We analyse the literature and 
evidence available to date on the potential impacts, 
both positive and negative, with respect to work, 
growth, and inequality. In relation to work, we find 
that neither theory nor evidence are very conclusive 
at the present time. AI could complement and en-
hance human activity, replace an increasing num-
ber of routine tasks, or both. Studies measuring 
the share of jobs at high risk of automation exhib-
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it a high variety in their findings depending on the 
definition and level of granularity at which tasks 
and occupations are defined (Chapter 9).
Another area of uncertainty is the extent to which 
AI has the potential to spur economic growth. 
When considered as a general-purpose technology, 
AI could spread across many jobs and industrial 
sectors, boosting productivity, and yielding strong 
positive growth. To the extent that ML gener-
ates new insights from data, it may also con- 
tribute to the production of new ideas and innov- 
ation itself. Economic growth models are starting 
to explore various scenarios but there is no empiri-
cal evidence yet that favours one or the other. 
  
When it comes to inequality, we find that AI can 
affect unfavourably the distribution of income 
through many channels. The most discussed con-
cern job polarisation, (i.e. increased demand for 
high-level, highly paid jobs on the one hand and 
low-level, poorly paid jobs on the other), reduc-
tion in job quality at the lower-skilled end, and 
also greater difficulty for lower-skilled workers to 
adjust to change and find new jobs, with longer 
periods of unemployment than those with higher 
qualifications and skills. These potentially negative 
consequences on the labour market have a geo-
graphical footprint, as regions and subregions 
that are already experiencing greater difficulties in 
terms of unemployment and low level of skills are 
likely to be the ones suffering most, if no action 
is taken. We clearly need to monitor closely and 
research the multiple impacts of AI on the econo-
my in the coming years. We also need to consider 
a more proactive strategy to build the resilience 
of regions across Europe with a particular regard 
to the most vulnerable ones. We return to this in 
Chapters 12 and 13. 
When it comes to cybersecurity, AI is a double-edged 
sword: it can be greatly beneficial to increase the 
security of devices, systems and applications, but 
can also empower those who seek to attack sys-
tems and networks and thus become an advanced 
tool in the arsenal for cyber-attacks. Moreover, the 
robustness of AI against malicious action itself be-
comes an issue, posing the most immediate danger 
for the security of cyber-physical systems, in which 
AI will be increasingly deployed. There are lines of 
research focusing on understanding the specific vul-
nerabilities of AI and related attacks, and ways of in-
creasing AI robustness and interpretability and safe-
ty by design. We also need shared, large, high-quality 
datasets to train and test algorithms, and agreed 
frameworks to evaluate them (Chapter 10).
We discuss at several points in the report that the 
major progress we are seeing in the development of 
AI is linked to the rapid advances in computing and 
in data availability. With respect to computing, we 
are starting to see a paradigm shift due to the rec-
ognition that the increasing energy consumption of 
data centres and data transfers will become unsus-
11
Executive summary
tainable in the era of the Internet of Things and 5G 
networks. Data traffic and processing loads are likely 
to be unprecedented when billions of additional de-
vices will be connected to the internet, sensing the 
environment, and constantly sending and receiving 
data. With this in mind, we are seeing a trend to-
wards more decentralised frameworks of edge and 
fog computing where processing is done closer to 
the sensors capturing and displaying data, includ-
ing mobile phones and tablets. Industry has started 
moving in this direction but there is still a window 
of opportunity for European investment, regulatory 
frameworks, and standards to shape these develop-
ments so that they benefit Europe (Chapter11).
With respect to digital data, we review its key eco-
nomic characteristics including economies of scale, 
of scope, and non-rivalry. The first two point to an 
increase in the concentration of data, and hence 
information and power, in the hands of a few actors 
in the internet economy, while non-rivalry creates 
potential tensions between opening access to the 
data so that society benefits the most, and restrict-
ing access so that the data holder benefits most. 
These tensions are reflected in the legal framework, 
as discussed earlier, and make the development of 
data strategies in an open and globalised environ-
ment a particular challenge. We argue, however, 
that if we apply the lessons of successful internet 
companies to the European public sector and de-
velop ecosystems based around public platforms, it 
is possible to create large pools of shared data that 
are semantically well structured and labelled, and 
can fuel new AI applications in different domains. In 
this way we can open access to the data, develop 
the market, serve the public, and enrich the data 
commons at the same time (Chapter 12). 
We conclude our multi-perspective analysis of AI 
focusing on the concept of resilience which is use-
ful to frame a European approach to AI addressing 
different phases: prevention, anticipation, prep- 
aration, but also adaptation and transformation to 
bounce back from the effects of a shock. Seen from 
this perspective, AI could not only be an engine for 
growth and change in Europe but also become 
an opportunity to bootstrap social and economic 
development in peripheral regions, leveraging the 
richness of European diversity and culture to the 
full (Chapter 13).  
We put forward some elements of a possible ap-
proach centred on the network of Digital Innova-
tion Hubs. There are already several hundred hubs 
which are expanding rapidly with a target of one 
for each region in Europe. The Communication on 
AI (EC, 2018a) foresees a specialised subset of 
these hubs on AI to facilitate access to technology 
and know-how to public administrations and firms, 
SMEs in particular, in combination with the planned 
AI-on-demand-platform. We suggest putting these 
hubs at the centre of local ecosystems comprising 
public administrations, local enterprises, education-
al and training establishments, and civil society. 
These ecosystems could create local pools of shared 
data among the key actors so that the AI skills de-
veloped/upgraded locally could be put to good use in 
developing algorithms and solutions based on local 
data to address local needs. Each European region 
has its own specific mixture of priorities in relation 
to its environment, economy, demography, health, 
and so on. Therefore, this approach could provide 
an excellent opportunity to harness local creativity, 
culture, and knowledge of the territory to create so-
cially relevant and people-centred AI and develop di-
verse and inclusive AI systems (Chapters 12 and 13).
From this multi-disciplinary analysis, we draw the 
following conclusions:
We are only at the beginning of a rapid period of 
transformation of our economy and society due to 
the convergence of many digital technologies. AI is 
central to this change and offers major opportunities 
to improve our lives. 
There is strong global competition on AI among the 
USA, China and Europe. The USA leads for now but 
China is catching up fast and aims to lead by 2030. 
For the EU, it is not so much a question of winning 
or losing a race but of finding the way of embracing 
12
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the opportunities offered by AI in a way that is hu-
man-centred, ethical, secure, and true to our core 
values. 
The EU Member States and the European Commis-
sion are developing coordinated national and Euro-
pean strategies, recognising that we can only suc-
ceed together. We can build on our areas of strength 
including excellent research, leadership in some 
industrial sectors like automotive and robotics, a sol-
id legal and regulatory framework, and very rich cul-
tural diversity at both regional and subregional level. 
It is generally recognised that AI can flourish only if 
supported by a robust computing infrastructure and 
good quality data: 
• With respect to computing, we identified a 
window of opportunity for Europe to invest 
in the emerging new paradigm of computing 
distributed towards the edges of the network 
in addition to centralised facilities. This will 
also support the future deployment of 5G and 
the IoT. 
• With respect to data, we argue in favour of 
learning from successful internet companies, 
opening access to data and developing interac-
tivity with the users rather than just broadcast-
ing data. In this way, we can develop ecosys-
tems of public administrations, firms, and civil 
society enriching the data to make it fit for AI 
applications responding to European needs. 
We should embrace the opportunities afforded by 
AI but not uncritically. The black box characteristics 
of current ML make them obscure even to special-
ists. AI systems are currently limited to narrow and 
well-defined tasks, and their technologies inherit 
imperfections from their human creators, such as 
the well-recognised bias effect present in data. We 
should challenge the shortcomings of AI and work to-
wards strong evaluation strategies, transparent and 
reliable systems, and good human-AI interactions.  
Ethical and secure-by-design algorithms are crucial 
to build trust in this disruptive technology, but we 
also need a broader engagement of civil society on 
the values to be embedded in AI and the directions 
for future development.
This social engagement should be part of the effort 
to strengthen our resilience at all levels from local, 
to national and European, across institutions, indus-
try and civil society. Developing local ecosystems of 
skills, computing, data, and applications can foster 
the engagement of local communities, respond to 
their needs, harness local creativity and knowledge, 
and build a human-centred and socially driven AI.  
We still know very little about how AI will impact the 
way we think, make decisions, relate to each other, 
and how it will affect our jobs. This uncertainty can be 
a source of concern but is also a sign of opportunity. 
The future is not yet written. We can shape it based 
on our collective vision of what future we would like 
to have. But we need to act together and act fast.
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Part I - Introduction and AI International Landscape
Artificial Intelligence (AI) will bring many op-
portunities…
AI is a technological field that powers many appli-
cations we use daily, often without knowing it. As it 
develops further, it has the potential to bring many 
changes to both economy and society. This might 
unfold in a similar way to the invention of the World 
Wide Web 25 years ago which, combined with the 
subsequent diffusion of mobile phones, opened the 
way to the massive increase the use of the internet 
across the world. 
Looking back over these 25 years, we can see how 
early views about the death of distance (Economist, 
1995), and the demise of cities (Gilder in Karlgaard 
and Malone, 1995) as a result of the internet were 
vastly exaggerated: cities have continued to grow 
and in fact increased their role as the hubs of in-
novation. The internet has profoundly changed the 
way we work, learn, and socialise, created entirely 
new products, services, and business models, and 
reshaped international relations and markets. We 
have seen new challenges emerging, including cy-
ber-threats, misinformation, loss of privacy, and the 
displacement or loss of jobs in many sectors, but 
we have also seen many benefits such as ubiqui-
tous access to information and services.
The recent developments in AI are the result of 
increased availability of processing power, im-
provements in algorithms and the exponential 
growth in the volume and variety of digital data, 
and increased funding. We use AI today in many 
contexts, e.g. to guide us to a destination, help 
us find the next song to listen to, filter our spam 
e-mails, or help us texting messages. In the coming 
years, AI-supported medical diagnostics may be-
come increasingly common. Evaluating job candi-
dates or predicting reoffending could be supported 
by the responsible use of transparent algorithms 
helping to overcome personal or institutional 
biases (see, for example, Faliagka et al., 2012 and 
Tollenaar et al., 2013). Robots able to understand 
the complexity of social and human behaviour have 
the potential to improve human cognitive perfor-
mance (Belpaeme et al., 2018), and support the 
development of skills, e.g. in children with autism 
(Scassellati et al., 2018).
…and many challenges
AI can solve a wide range of problems, but we still 
know very little about how it will impact the way 
we think, make decisions, or relate to each other 
(Gomez et al., 2018). AI is still not well understood 
even by specialists. AI systems are currently limited 
to narrow and well-defined tasks, and their tech-
nologies inherit imperfections from their human 
creators, such as the well-recognised bias effect 
present in data and algorithms. We should there-
fore be aware of the potential shortcomings of AI 
and work towards agreed ways to evaluate algo-
rithms, build transparent and reliable systems, and 
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Why this report… 
Hundreds of reports are published each year on AI 
and related technologies, in addition to scientific 
papers. This clearly shows the high level of interest 
in this subject, but do we really need another report?
Most of these publications come from industrial or 
national interests. Therefore, an independent Euro-
pean perspective underpinned by original research 
and not focused on a single policy domain is miss-
ing. Hence the value of this report from the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), the science and knowledge 
management service of the European Commission 
(EC). This report is also timely because many Euro-
pean countries are developing national strategies 
for AI (see Chapter 4) to embrace this technologic- 
al field and prepare society for the changes it will 
bring. The EC is working with the Member States 
on a coordinated Action Plan for AI. A High-Level 
Expert Group on AI has also been established by 
the EC to make recommendations on policy and 
investment, and set guidelines on the ethical de-
velopment of AI. The latter are crucial as there is 
a strong consensus in Europe that our AI should be 
human-centric, with ethics and security by design, 
and supporting the core values of the European 
Union: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal- 
ity, rule of law and human rights.
…and its objective
To provide a balanced assessment of opportunities 
and challenges for AI from a European perspective, 
and support the development of European action in 
the global AI context. 
What is in the report
We have organised the report into two sections: 
in Part 1 we give a brief introduction to AI, and 
analyse the EU positioning in the global AI land-
scape, including key features and leading players, 
research and technological capacity, and areas 
of strength. We then consider a few examples of 
Member States’ policies and strategies to assess 
points of synergy and where European action can 
best add value. This is followed by an analysis of AI 
in China since this country has set out, and could 
well achieve the objective of becoming the domin- 
ant AI player in the world by 2030, overtaking the 
USA. Whilst we are more familiar with USA compa-
nies, technologies and applications, we know little 
about developments in China and for this reason 
we pay comparatively more attention to China in 
this report, taking advantage of bespoke research 
done on this subject for the JRC.
In Part 2 we look at AI from multiple perspectives: 
ethical, legal, educational, economic, cybersecurity, 
computing and energy, data-related, and societal 
resilience. We discuss each perspective in turn but 
they are intertwined in multiple ways and should be 
considered all together in framing a European way 
to the development and use of AI. 
What is not in the report
The report does not include any analysis of AI appli-
cations in different sectors of the economy. This will 
be the subject of a separate JRC report in prepar- 
ation, as well as the focus of an AI-Watch facility 
to monitor and analyse AI developments launched 
in December 2018. Other JRC reports on resilience, 
fairness, mobility, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, 
and China will be published soon, complementing 
and adding details to some of the arguments ad-
dressed in this report. 
What you should take away
Currently, the global competition on AI is largely be-
tween the USA and China at the present time. For the 
EU, it is not so much a question of winning or losing a 
race but of finding the way of embracing the oppor-
tunities offered by AI in a way that is human-centred, 
ethical, secure, and true to our core values. 
We have many areas of strength, including ex-
cellent research, extremely rich cultural diversity, 
and leadership in some industrial sectors, such as 
automotive and robotics.  
We should therefore not feel intimidated or fearful 
about the future. However, we need to act and shape 
this future because EU countries are stronger to-
gether in this global competition than acting alone.
SUMMARY
AI is a generic term that refers to any machine or algorithm that is capable of obser-
ving its environment, learning, and based on the knowledge and experience gained, 
taking intelligent action or proposing decisions. There are many different technologies 
that fall under this broad AI definition. At the moment, ML techniques are the most 
widely used.
In this chapter, we introduce the basic concepts of AI and highlight recent develop-
ments. The opportunities opened up by AI are many, and in some cases not yet fore-
seen, but so are the challenges. These will be explored in particular in Part 2 of the 
report, but in this chapter, we highlight that the algorithms powering AI display all the 
characteristics of a black box: we can access the inputs and outputs, but do not un-
derstand fully what happens in-between, and how certain outputs, including decisions 
and actions, are derived. Given this major drawback, it is imperative to increase our 
scientific understanding, develop transparent mechanisms to assess the quality 
and performance of AI so that as a society we are able to build and retain trust 
in this disruptive technology.
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AI augments our vision of the world
ABOUT AI
Traditionally, Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to 
machines or agents that are capable of observing 
their environment, learning, and based on the 
knowledge and experience gained, taking intel-
ligent action or proposing decisions. 
To date, there is no agreed definition of what con-
stitutes AI. When reflecting of AI and machines, the 
general public often thinks about humanoid robots 
which have always been part of the public’s per-
ception of intelligent machines, as popularised in 
science fiction novels and films. In fact, robotics is 
only one subfield of AI and makes use of many ML 
techniques, including neural networks. 
The origins of AI date back to the 1940s and 50s, 
but it is only recently that it has entered into our 
everyday life, from filtering out the spam in our 
mailbox (see Box 1), to automatically tagging our 
loved ones in family photos, to real-time machine 
translation, and many more applications in busi-
ness, industry, defence, and social media. 
Although AI  
has a long history  
of development,  
recent major  
breakthroughs  
are due to the 
convergence  




of data, and  
new algorithms.
 2.1 A brief history of AI
There have been ups and downs in the history of 
AI with logic-based approaches in the 1950s and 
early 60s, knowledge-based expert systems in the 
1970s and 80s, and data-driven approaches (from 
2000 onwards) with periods of disillusionment and 
reduced funding in-between. We are now at the 
beginning of a new phase of high expectations, 
fuelled by vastly increased computing processing 
capabilities and data. Their combination supports 
new developments such as Machine Learning (ML) 
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box 1. Early success case of ML in 
cybersecurity: Spam filtering
We are all familiar with the sense of annoyance when our inbox 
gets filled with junk mail or spam. In the early 2000s, the appli- 
cation of a ML technique called Bayesian Networks brought a 
new generation of more effective e-mail filters that were able to 
adapt themselves to their environment, learning to detect spam 
e-mail by analysing large quantities of samples. Unsolicited e-mail 
has become not just a nuisance but a potential security threat as 
mail messages are used to distribute malware, conduct phishing 
campaigns or carry out targeted attacks. Modern e-mail filters 
continue to fight these threats employing a new generation of 
algorithms and AI methods to create more effective and resilient 
countermeasures. 
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that has emerged as a subfield of AI to predict a be-
haviour from many examples given as input. 
ML represents a paradigmatic shift in computing. 
Traditionally, a programmer would write computer 
code setting the rules needed to process data inputs 
to get an answer as output. In ML, the computer re-
ceives input data as well as the answers expected 
from the data, and the ML agent needs to produce 
the rules (see Fig. 1). These rules can then be applied 
to new data to produce original answers. An ML sys-
tem is trained rather than explicitly programmed. 
Figure 1. Paradigm shift in ML2
Source: after Chollet, 2017
 2.2 Recent developments in ML
The recent interest in AI, and ML in particular, re-
sults from three parallel developments. First, in-
creasingly realistic computer games have required 
specialised graphic processors. When the PC graph-
ics card manufacturer Nvidia published the CUDA 
programming interface to its graphics accelerator 
cards in 2007, it became possible to take advan-
tage of fast parallel computing at low cost. 
Second, very large amounts of data have become 
available as computers and their users have been 
networked. The digitalisation of images, videos, 
voice and text has created an environment in which 
ML thrives. This has allowed AI researchers to re-
visit old artificial neural network models, training 
them with very large datasets to address some 
hard problems such as object recognition from dig-
ital images and machine translation. Whereas it 
was previously believed that computers needed to 
understand language and its structures before they 
could translate text and speech from one language 
to another, for many practical uses it is enough to 
process millions of sentences to find out the con-
texts where words appear and make translations 
without linguistic knowledge. This has considerably 
speeded up the process, leading to real-time trans-
lation applications now available on most mobile 
phone platforms. 
Third, there have been new advances in ML al-
gorithms. In addition, specialised open source ML 
software libraries have become available that 
make the creation and testing of ML algorithms 
easier. These trends started to came together 
around 2012 (see Box 2)
Whilst ML is the generic class of algorithms that 
learn from the data, their accuracy depends very 
much on the quality of the training dataset, and 
how well they have been structured, semantical- 
ly labelled, and cleaned by humans to make them 
representative of the problem to tackle, and reduce 
the number of parameters in the data.
box 2. Turning point in image recognition 
In 2012, a multilayer network trained using Nvidia’s graphics 
processor cards showed outstanding performance in a well-known 
image recognition competition. The competition was based on 
the ImageNet database that contains about 14 million human-
annotated digital images. The ImageNet Large Scale Visual 
Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) is now one of the main benchmarks 
for progress in AI. Its object detection and classification challenge 
uses 1.2 million images for training, with 1 000 different 
types of objects. In 2017, the best neural networks were able to 
guess the correct object category with 97.7 per cent ‘top-
5’ accuracy, meaning that the correct object class was among 
the five most probable classes as estimated by the network.
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• Deep Learning (DL) is a subset of ML that can 
cope with noisier data by increasing significant-
ly the number of neural layers and neurons3, 
and the amount of data used for the training. 
DL has facilitated object recognition in images, 
video labelling, and activity recognition, and is 
making significant inroads into other areas of 
perception, such as audio, speech, and natural 
language processing. 
• Reinforcement Learning (RL) is another set 
of algorithms that focus on experience-driv-
en sequential decision-making, i.e. they make 
software agents take action to maximise some 
notion of cumulative reward. RL combined with 
DL is the basis of many recent successes in 
complex games, such as Go, Poker and Dota, 
where computers have been able to beat lead-
ing human experts in the field. Practical appli-
cations of these algorithms are starting to be 
applied in many domains, such as autonomous 
driving, unmanned aerial vehicles, stock mar-
kets, and defence. 
In addition to image and text recognition and gam-
ing, the field of human-computer interaction has 
seen many impressive improvements recently as 
a result of the AI applications. A long-standing 
goal has been to enable people to have a natural 
conversation with computers, as they would with 
each other. In recent years, the application of DL 
and the combination of multiple AI components, 
including natural language processing, voice syn-
thesis and voice translation, have revolutionised the 
interaction we have with computers, as discussed 
in Section 2.3 below and exemplified by the virtu-
al assistants now available on most mobile phone 
platforms, such as Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana 
and Amazon’s Alexa.
The extent of progress in computer-generated 
speech is such that even in singing it is increasing-
ly difficult to distinguish a human from a machine 
(see Box 3). 
Real-time translation of both text and voice have 
been developed by Google and Baidu, while Micro-
soft researchers have created algorithms that read 
a document and answer questions about it almost 
as well as a human. This is a major milestone in the 
push to have search engines such as Bing and intelli-
gent assistants such as Cortana interact with people 
and provide information in more natural ways, much 
as people communicate with each other.
 2.3 Recent developments in social robots
Advances in robotics have allowed AI to be embed-
ded in physical entities that take into consideration 
the characteristics of their ‘body’ as well as those of 
the physical and social environment in which they 
operate. This raises the potential for socially intel-
ligent robotic agents to co-exist with humans, as 
in the case of co-workers, personal companions or 
self-driving vehicles. 
Advances in perception systems make it possible to 
translate low-level signals into high-level abstract 
concepts. For instance, natural language processing 
(NLP) techniques connect sounds from speech with 
language semantics. This contributes to creating a 
perception-cognition-action loop for autonomous 
box 3. DL for singing processing 
The singing voice has traditionally been a challenging instrument 
to analyse and synthesise given its expressive character and 
the variety of timbre and expressive resources that characterise 
styles and singers. However, recent data-driven ML techniques, 
especially DL, have substantially boosted the quality and 
accuracy of singing processing techniques. 
Singing synthesisers might soon make them indistinguishable from 
human singing. As ML algorithms can also compose new music 
and imitate the style of classic composers of the past, we may 
soon be confronted with a major shift in our understanding of what 
music is, how we experience it, as well as new models of music 
production, distribution and consumption (Gomez et al., 2018).   
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robots that makes them able to understand and in-
teract with the surrounding environment.
These developments in robotics bring additional 
perspectives to the integration of AI in our every-
day life: (i) the agents are becoming increasingly 
capable of perceiving the context within which they 
act by developing an understanding of the human 
physical environment, including complex human 
social behaviour; (ii) the embodied form of AI can 
physically act upon and shape human environment 
and potentially affect human behaviour as well as 
human to human social interaction not only at the 
individual level but also in small groups; and (iii) the 
interaction between humans and intelligent robot-
ic systems increasingly involves human emotions 
which might stimulate empathic behaviour towards 
artificial systems and have an impact on human 
development over time.
In this context, a relatively new strand of research 
has emerged, which investigates the ways in which 
humans interact with robots and how various 
robot behaviours and designs affect human cog-
nitive and socio-emotional development. A seam-
less human-robot interaction has the potential to 
contribute to transparent and explainable AI, and 
for vulnerable populations too (e.g. children and the 
elderly), because of its intuitive nature even with 
minimalist design characteristics. 
For this reason, while the field of robotics is ad-
vancing, researchers in the field of human-robot 
interaction create scenarios in which they test 
various robot characteristics in real-life settings. 
In this way, they investigate the impact of so-
cially intelligent robots on human cognitive and 
socio-emotional development by involving multiple 
stakeholders. This type of research allows society 
to actively shape the ways in which robots might be 
integrated into our everyday life and contribute to a 
more inclusive and sustainable use of AI.
Whilst these developments are important because 
they bring AI into our everyday experience, they 
represent what is often defined as the Narrow AI. 
General AI, which would involve the development 
of consciousness, is many years away. The current 
consensus of the private-sector expert community 
is that general AI will not be achieved for several 
decades (NSTC 2016a).
 2.4 Current challenges
Each specialised sub-area of AI has its own specif-
ic challenges, but here we focus on those related 
to algorithm design and evaluation in ML as this 
is one of the main areas of development, as dis-
cussed above. Other challenges, including ethical, 
legal and cybersecurity, are discussed in Chapters 
6, 7 and 10, and by different scientists (see also 
Gomez et al., 2018).
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   We need  
to advance  
the explainability, 
accountability  
and transparency  
of algorithms  
in general and  
DL systems  
in particular.
23
Nowadays, many ML techniques display some char-
acteristics of a ‘black box’ model, i.e. we know what 
goes in and what comes out of the algorithm, but 
we do not have a full understanding of its inner 
workings. This limits the scientific understanding 
of algorithms, the capability to recover from ad-
versarial examples, and complicates human super-
vision in practical applications (see Chapter 10 on 
cybersecurity).
We need to define evaluation frameworks that are 
meaningful and in realistic settings to match prac-
tical application contexts. In this respect, we should 
consider engineering best practices, impact as-
sessment methods, user satisfaction and business 
metrics, in order to develop smart and transparent 
benchmarking strategies. We should train the next 
generation of ML developers to apply and commu-
nicate these strategies and follow best practices 
for AI evaluation. 
We need to advance the explainability, accountability 
and transparency of algorithms in general, and DL 
systems in particular, both from the perspective 
of ML research and from that of users in different 
applications. We need to extend data and algorith-
mic literacy across society to increase the ability of 
critical thinking with respect to machine intelligence 
and challenge it when necessary. 
Further research is also needed to understand fair-
ness in the context of automated decision-making. 
An algorithm or decision is fair when it does not 
discriminate against people because of their mem-
bership to a specific group (such as gender, race, 
sexual orientation). It is unbiased if it is not affect-
ed by the membership of a person to a protected 
group. Attempts to formalise algorithmic discrimi-
nation leads to a long list of fairness criteria that 
are always harmful to one group of stakeholders 
and beneficial to the other, making it difficult to 
arrive at an agreed set. Moreover, these criteria 
are helpful to identify if there has been discrimi-
nation in decision-making, but they do not explain 
the source of unfair treatment. This is best done by 
looking at biases in the training data, its labelling, 
and the algorithm development process which may 
encode biases by the development team or context.
 2.5 Summary and conclusions 
AI is a generic term that refers to any machine 
or algorithm that is capable of observing its en-
vironment, learning and, based on the knowledge 
and experience gained, taking intelligent action 
or proposing decisions. There are many different 
technologies that fall under this broad AI definition. 
At the moment, Machine Learning techniques are 
the most widely used.
The methodological developments in AI date back 
more than 50 years but the recent breakthrough has 
come from advances in computing power, availability 
of data, and complexity of the algorithms. Now the 
many applications of AI are entering into our every-
day lives, from filtering spam, to machine transla-
tions, image recognition, and music generation, and 
are increasingly used in industry, government and 
commerce. We are probably only at the beginning of 
this process because the development of ubiquitous 
sensor networks, and the IoT, will increase exponen-
tially the sensing capabilities of AI, the volumes of 
data available to train the algorithms, and the reach 
of AI through decisions and actions.
  
The opportunities are many, and in some cases not 
yet foreseen, but so are the challenges. These will be 
explored in particular in Part 2 of the report, but in 
this chapter we have highlighted that the algorithms 
powering AI display all the characteristics of a black 
box: we can access the inputs and outputs, but do 
not understand fully what happens in-between, and 
how certain outputs, including decisions and actions, 
are derived. Given this major drawback, it is impera-
tive to increase our scientific understanding develop 
transparent mechanisms to assess the quality and 
performance of AI so that we are able as a society 
to build and retain trust in this disruptive technology.
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SUMMARY
The overview of the global and European AI landscape we report in this chapter is the fruit of 
a comprehensive analysis of over 35 000 key players worldwide. The analysis confirms the 
intense competition in AI taking place worldwide with three main leaders: the USA, Europe, 
and China. Each region has about one quarter of all key players in the AI field, including both 
research and industry, but a distinctive different mix of players: while Europe is well balanced 
in the number of research and non-research players, the USA has approximately three times 
as many industrial/corporate players as research ones, and China has about six time as many 
research players as industrial ones. The strength of the corporate world in the USA is also 
indicated by its dominance in the number of start-ups (almost half of the total worldwide) 
and venture capital (more than one third of the total). China, on the other hand, is making a 
concerted effort to turn research into patents, and accounts for almost 60% of the world total.
Europe is currently in a good position regarding the quality of its research, with more than 30 % 
of top AI publications, just behind the USA (33 %). This result is the fruit of the high level of 
research funding and the intense inter-country collaboration provided by the framework pro-
grammes. Key areas of strength in Europe on which to build upon are automated and connected 
vehicles, and robotics. Continued policy support seems key mantaining and improving Europe’s 
position in an ecosystem which is rather polarised around a few big powers.
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Europe has excellent research in AI and leading industrial sectors on which to build
 3. EU in the AI competitive global landscape
 3.1 The international policy context
Dutton (2018)4 has identified at least 21 countries 
that have launched or are preparing national AI 
strategies and programme in 2017-2018, of which 
8 are in Europe, 3 in North America, and the rest in 
Asia and Oceania. Here we summarise the develop-
ments in the USA, Canada, India, Japan, and South 
Korea, leaving Europe to Chapter 4, and China to 
Chapter 5.
 3.1.1 USA
In October 2016, the Obama administration pub-
lished three reports that concluded that AI technol-
ogy will be the driving force behind transformations 
across both the economy and national security. One 
of the reports (NSTC, 2016c) proposed a national AI 
R&D strategy linked to some other initiatives with 
six main directions:
1. Make long-term investments in AI research.
 
2. Develop effective methods for human-AI 
 collaboration. 
3. Understand and address the ethical, legal, 
 and societal implications of AI. 
4. Ensure the safety and security of AI systems.
 
5. Develop shared public datasets and environ- 
 ments for AI training and testing. 
6. Measure and evaluate AI technologies 
 through standards and benchmarks. 
The current administration seems to be supporting 
the unrestricted development of AI, and in the May 
2018 Summit on AI at the White House with lead-
ing industrialists Michael Kratsios, Deputy Assistant 




In the context  
of strong global  
competition on AI,  
the EU is well placed 
if it builds on its 
strengths, like  
research and robotics, 
and works together.
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to the President for Technology Policy, announced 
the government’s goals: (1) maintain American 
leadership in AI, (2) support the American worker, 
(3) promote public R&D; and (4) remove barriers 
to innovation. To achieve these objectives, Kratsios 
announced a new Select Committee on Artificial In-
telligence to advise the White House on interagency 
AI R&D priorities and to consider the creation of Fed-
eral partnerships with industry and academia.5  
In September 2018, DARPA, the government de-
fence research agency, announced an investment 
plan of over US$ 2 billion to overcome some of the 
perceived limitations of current AI technologies, i.e. 
their dependence on large amounts of high-quali-
ty training data, poor ability to adapt to changing 
conditions, limited performance guarantees, and 
inability to provide users with explanations of their 
results. The ‘AI Next’ programme seeks to explore 
new theories and applications that could make it 
possible for machines to adapt to changing situa-
tions developing contextual reasoning capabilities.6
These are signals of continued support from the 
Trump administration towards the development of 
AI, which will also be boosted by an undisclosed 
part of the large USA defence budget. Compared to 
other regions of the world where government plays 
a major part in both policy and investment, in the 
USA, private companies play a central role in the 
development of technology in general as well as AI. 
The USA stock market was worth some US$ 34 tril-
lion in April 2018, 43 % of the total world markets, 
compared to Europe’s 15 %, and Asia and Japan 
15 %.7 Tech companies account for one quarter of 
this value8, and the top five (Apple, Amazon, Google/ 
Alphabet, Microsoft and Facebook) account for 
some US$ 4 trillion9, or 11 % of the total USA mar-
ket, and 33 % of the total valuation of the Euro-
pean market. Not surprisingly, the R&D investment 
of companies like Amazon and Alphabet is very 
significant, at US$ 16.1 billion and US$ 13.9 billion 
respectively in 2017 (Knight, 2018), much more 
than the civilian investment of the government. 
In comparison, the total budget for the National 
Science Foundation, the main agency funding R&D 
on AI together with DARPA and the Department for 
Transportation (in the specific area of autonomous 
and unmanned systems), amounts to US$ 5.3 bil-
lion in the 2019 budget.10 
The power of the USA tech giants is of course not 
just financial, but more crucially about the vast 
quantities of data they are able to gather and 
analyse from all over the world. Google accounts 
for 86 % of all internet searches in the world,11 
processing some 40 000 queries per second, or 
3.5 billion per day.12 Facebook has some 2.2 billion 
active users per month.13 It is thus the largest 
content manager in the world, although it does not 
produce any of its own data. All the data, and more 
importantly for AI training, the context for the data, is 
provided by its customers in exchange for the service 
provided by the platform. Its Like button has turned 
the company into the largest recommendation 
platform in the world, able to profile and target 
small groups and individuals for both marketing, 
and as seen recently with the Cambridge Analytica 
case, also for political purposes. As indicated in 
Chapter 2, the development of AI rests largely on 
the ability to have large volumes of well-structured 
and labelled data, and in this respect the USA giants 
have a clear lead in the West.
 3.1.2 Other countries
Canada: Canada announced its AI strategy in the 
2017 budget, which allocates CAN$ 125 million 
over five years to achieve four main objectives:
• To increase the number of outstanding AI 
 researchers and skilled graduates in Canada. 
• To establish interconnected nodes of scien- 
 tific excellence in Canada’s three major cen- 
 tres for AI in Edmonton, Montreal and Toronto. 
• To develop global thought leadership on the 
 economic, ethical, policy and legal implica- 
 tions of advances in AI. 
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•  To support a national research community 
 on AI.
The strategy is led by the Canadian Institute for 
Advanced Research17 in close partnership with 
the Canadian government and the three new AI 
Institutes: the Alberta Machine Intelligence Insti-
tute in Edmonton, the Vector Institute in Toronto, 
and MILA in Montreal. Compared to other nation-
al strategies that have a strong emphasis also on 
sectoral developments, data, and supporting in-
dustry, the Canadian strategy is primarily focused 
on research. 
India: A discussion paper for an AI strategy was pub-
lished in June 2018 by NITI Aayog (a government 
think-tank) focusing very much on social inclusive-
ness: #AIforAll. 
The strategy follows three distinct, yet inter-related 
components:
a)  Opportunity: the economic impact of AI for 
 India.
b)  AI for Greater Good: social development and 
  inclusive growth.
c)  AI Garage for 40 % of the world: solution 
  provider of choice for the emerging and 
  developing economies across the globe.
box 4. Some examples of AI developments in the USA 
Google is an AI world leader. It researches and develops AI 
products and services, has developed its own AI chip, the Tensor 
Processing Unit (TPU), and created TensorFlow, one of the most 
widely used open source AI/ML libraries. DL algorithms are 
already a considerable part of several Google products including 
recommendation systems, Android, Gmail, Maps, and translation 
services. The number of DL directories Google uses has gone 
from zero in 2012 to 4 000 in 2016.14 In May 2018, 
Google announced Google duplex, an AI system for 
accomplishing real-world tasks over the phone. 
Google, and other large operators, also use AI extensively to 
manage their data centres and save energy.15
Facebook is the biggest social media company in the world. It has 
established a Facebook AI research (FAIR) team which is one of 
the most advanced, with several labs around the world. Facebook 
supports the open source AI libraries PyTorch and Caffe2 
that compete with Google TensorFlow. The company has 
also released plans to develop its own AI chips.  
Amazon uses AI extensively in its recommendation systems and 
logistics. It also offers both consumer and business-oriented AI 
products and services. Amazon Echo brings AI into the 
home through the intelligent voice server, Alexa. For business, 
Amazon AI empowers fake reviews detection, chatbots, product 
recommendations, big data management, etc. Amazon 
Web Services are probably the biggest cloud system in the 
world providing infrastructure as a service to over 1 million 
users. 16
 
Microsoft has also been investing heavily in AI and infrastructure 
as a service. Microsoft Azure is one of the three biggest 
cloud (and AI) providers together with Google Cloud and 
Amazon web services. Cortana is the Microsoft virtual 
assistant that competes with Amazon Alexa, Apple Siri, Google 
Duplex and others. 
Apple is the most valuable company in the world worth over 
US$ 1 trillion. Apple’s main AI divisions are Siri team, and 
the Core ML team. Siri’s team focus is on NLP and computer 
vision, both of which are necessary to power voice assistant 
features and new, more cutting-edge technology such as 
augmented reality apps that rely on object recognition. Core ML is 
the ML Application Programming Interface (API) 
that Apple launched last year to help AI tasks and AI-focused apps 
and services from third-party developers run more efficiently on 
Apple devices. 
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In relation to c) the strategy argues that India pro-
vides a perfect ‘playground’ for enterprises and 
institutions globally to develop scalable solutions 
which can be easily implemented in the rest of the 
developing and emerging economies. NITI Aayog 
focuses on five sectors that are envisioned to bene-
fit the most from AI in solving societal needs, and 
where only private-sector-led initiatives may not 
lead to the desired societal outcomes:
a) Healthcare: increased access and afforda- 
 bility of quality healthcare,
b) Agriculture: enhanced farmers’ income, in- 
 creased farm productivity and reduction of 
 wastage,
c) Education: improved access and quality 
 of education,
d) Smart Cities and Infrastructure: improved 
 connectivity for the rapidly increasing urban 
  population, and 
e)  Smart Mobility and Transportation: smarter 
 and safer modes of transportation and bet- 
 ter traffic and congestion management.
The strategy makes some 30 recommendations. 
With respect to research, it proposes a two-tier 
system: new Centres of Research Excellence in 
AI will focus on fundamental research and act as 
technology feeders for the International Centres 
for Transformational AI, which will focus on cre-
ating AI-based applications in domains of societal 
importance.
To facilitate adoption of AI, the strategy recom-
mends in particular: 
1)  Establishing a market place for AI, and
2)  Facilitating the creation of large found- 
  ational annotated data sets.
Although the discussion paper acknowledges that 
significant public investment would be needed to 
implement the strategy, it does not put a figure on 
it, leaving the matter to the political discussion.
Japan: In 2015, the Japanese government an-
nounced a five-year plan, placing AI and robotics 
as the stepping stone of its renewed strategy for 
science, technology and innovation. Japan’s ap-
proach to artificial intelligence is a combination of 
the USA and Chinese models. It is based on the 5th 
Science and Technology Basic Plan (2016–2020) 
of the Japanese Council for Science, Technology 
and Innovation. The plan’s objective is to establish 
Japan as a super smart society (i.e. Society 5.0). The 
programme is headed by the prime minister, and 
its field-specific programmes are headed by select-
ed corporate heads. In April 2016, the government 
established a Strategic Council for AI Technology 
promoting research and development of AI tech-
nology, coordinating with industries related to the 
industries that utilise AI (so-called ‘exit industries’), 
and moving forward with the social implementa-
tion of AI technology. The Council coordinates the 
activities of three leading research centres:
 
1) The Centre for Information and Neural 
 Networks and Universal Communication 
 Research Institute of the National Insti- 
 tute of Information and Communications 
 Technology. 
2)  The RIKEN Centre for Advanced Intelligence 
   Project of the Institute of Physical and 
   Chemical Research. 
3)  The Artificial Intelligence Research Centre of 
  the National Institute of Advanced Industrial 
  Science and Technology.
The AI Technology Strategy was published in March 
2017. It identifies four priority areas for the devel-
opment and integration of AI: increased productiv-
ity through user-driven hyper customisation of ser-
vices, medical healthcare and welfare to support an 
increasingly ageing population, mobility to support
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safe and environmentally friendly travel for all, and 
information security. What is particularly interest-
ing in this strategy is that each of these four prior-
ities is driven by an image of the society Japan is 
aiming for. A clear example of socially driven AI. The 
strategy is articulated in three phases: 
1)  Utilisation and application of data-driven 
 AI developed in various domains (until 2020), 
2)  Public use of AI and data developed across
 various domains (2020-2025), and 
3)  creation of an ecosystem built by connecting 
 the multiplying domains (2025-2030). 
The three centres identified above will act as lead for 
each of the priority areas identified, and act as hubs 
for R&D in partnership with industry and academia. 
The strategy pays particular attention to the col-
lection, management and sharing of data across 
government, academia and the private sector. With 
respect to the latter, it recognises that there are 
still many issues to be solved, including the han-
dling of personal data, but has set up a Data Dis-
tribution Acceleration Working Group to help share 
best practice. 
South Korea: In 2016, the government introduced 
a mid-to-long-term Master Plan for the Intelligent 
Information Society. One of the plan’s goals is to 
foster the ‘establishment of the basis for AI tech-
nology’. It announced it would spend 1 trillion won 
(US$ 840 million) by 2020 to boost the artificial 
intelligence industry. The government plans to sup-
port the establishment of a high-profile research 
centre that will serve as a ‘pivot’ of the nation’s 
research and development in the AI field. Samsung 
and LG Electronics, SKT, KT, Naver, and Hyundai 
Motor have decided to join the initiative. Each com-
pany plans to invest about 3 billion won (Marquart, 
2016). In May 2018, the government added another 
2.2 trillion won to its AI strategy focusing on three 
priorities: training an additional 5 000 AI scientists, 
developing applications in the areas of national de-
fence, medicine, and public safety and funding in-
frastructure and incubators for start-ups.
 3.2 Analysing the key features  
 of the AI landscape
The field of AI is experiencing a period of intense 
progress, due to the consolidation of several key 
technological enablers: faster processing, vastly in-
creased amounts of data, and better algorithms. 
Because AI is expanding so quickly across multiple 
sectors, and there has yet to be a single and agreed 
definition in which technologies and applications 
are included as ‘AI’, it is not possible to track its 
evolution through official statistics at this stage, as 
would be done for more-established fields. 
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The JRC has developed a specific methodology to as-
sess emerging techno-economic segments (TES) like 
AI, providing a synthetic overview of their ecosystem 
and dynamics. The main aim is to understand the en-
tire ecosystem as it emerges: who are the key play-
ers, in which technologies they specialise, how they 
are distributed, how they are connected to each other, 
and how innovation spreads through the network. 
The methodology (De Prato et al., 2018) makes 
use of different types of factual data such as pat-
ents, business registers, scientific and trade pub-
lications, and industrial associations records.18 To 
make sense of this heterogeneous data it applies 
both statistical and ML techniques to detect early 
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Figure 2. Percentage of AI players detected by the most representative keywords (2000-18)
Note: The conceptual proximity of some of the keywords, and the overlap between techniques and applications, may result in the same 
player been detected more than once.
box 5. The Techno-Economic Segment (TES) approach in a nutshell 
The first step in the methodology is to define the boundaries of the 
TES (AI in this case), by detecting players that focus on AI as their 
primary or secondary activity. Players are defined as research 
centres, academic institutions, and companies which have 
participated in one or more of the following economic activities: R&D 
processes, industrial production and marketing, specific 
AI-related services. The players´  activities may be explicitly stated, 
e.g. in the description of the companies’ activities in business registers 
or segment specific firms’ repositories, or derived from the analysis of 
their R&D activities, e.g. text from patents, conference proceedings 
and research projects. To carry out this analysis, we developed a 
comprehensive dictionary of domain specific keywords covering the 
technological aspect of the TES (in this case AI). A selection of the 
keywords that helped to identify the highest number of AI-related 
players and R&D activities is shown in Figure 2. Once we defined the 
boundaries of the TES and mapped the players, we examined their 
interconnections to describe the ecosystem. We considered different 
types of relations such as: co-participation in R&D activities, co-
location, similarity in technology, etc. We used multilayer network 
analysis to understand the relative importance of the players in the 
ecosystem and their positional advantages/disadvantages. We also 
modelled the information flows throughout the network, and studied 
the network s´ resilience over time. By clustering players by type of 
technology, geographical location, and linkages to other players we 
are also able to identify country or regional profiles of technological 
specialisation and study their evolution over time.
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developments, map them, monitor their evolution, 
and benchmark the ecosystem with the necessary 
scientific evidence. 
Given the volume and variety of sources analysed, 
and the amount of painstaking work needed to match 
different data structures and identify connections 
through the data sources, we believe this is the most 
accurate and comprehensive database of the AI eco-
system to date. In the following section, we provide 
a global overview, and highlight some characteristics 
of the EU with respect to this global landscape. 
 3.3 Overview
Considering the AI landscape worldwide, the TES 
analysis has detected around 35 000 players in 
the period 2009-2018, of which 16 000 were in-
volved in at least one research or innovation activ- 
ity, and 19 000 are players engaged solely in indus-
trial activities.
The TES analysis shows (Fig. 3) that the EU is among 
the geographical areas with the highest number of 
players active in AI, just behind the United States 
and just ahead of China. The USA had about 28 % 
of the players, with the EU (25 %), and China (23  %) 
following closely behind. All together these three re-
gions account therefore for more than three quar-
ters of all AI players worldwide. Within the EU (Fig. 5) 
the largest economies have the most AI players, with 
the UK representing 25 % of the EU AI players and 
just over 6 % worldwide, Germany about 15 % of 
the EU’s AI players and 3.7 % worldwide, and France 
about 11 % of the EU’s and 2.7  % worldwide.
Consideration of the number of players relative to 
their country’s GDP provides additional valuable in-
formation about countries with a smaller economy 
but a flourishing AI industry. Figure 4 shows that 
Israel and Singapore are making a huge effort to 
keep up in the race for AI; while they already have 
a non-negligible 2.1 % and 1.3 % of total world AI 
players, the indicator relative to GDP scales up to 
2.45 and 1.63 players per billion euro respectively 
and positions them as first and second in the rank-
ing. The EU presents 0.59 AI players per billion euro, 
slightly higher than the USA (0.57) and China (0.43). 
In the EU we can see a similar picture (Fig. 5). 
The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, It-
aly, and the Netherlands have the largest number 
of players but, when weighted by GDP, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Cyprus and Malta stand out, although when 
numbers are small, ratios have be treated with 
some caution. 
Figure 6 illustrates clearly the different mix of R&D 
and industrial players in the different regions and 
countries. On the right side of the graph, the bars 
indicate the number of players engaged in at least 
one R&D activity in the period 2009-2018 (firms, 
research institutions and academia). On the left, we 
have the non-R&D, i.e. industrial players only. 
Figure 3. AI players in the world by geographical zones (% over world total), 2009-2018
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As shown, while Europe is well balanced in the 
number of research and non-research players (ap-
proximately 25 % each of the global number), the 
USA has approximately three times as many indus-
trial/corporate players as research ones (41% of all 
industrial players in USA vs. 13 % R&D), and China 
has about six times as many research players as 
industrial ones (7 % industrial players and 42 % 
R&D of the world total in each category). While we 
cannot forget that the TES analysis relies, so far, 
only on R&D materials published in English and 
thus is possibly penalising China, and other coun-
tries publishing strongly in their own language, Fig-
ure 6 shows clearly the Chinese effort to enter the 
R&D worldwide network and possibly come to dom-
inate in the future. This overwhelming ratio of R&D 
versus non-R&D players is also observed in South 
Korea and, to a lesser extent, in Russia. The high 
proportion of non-R&D players in the USA, India, 
Israel and Canada reflects their vibrant industrial 
ecosystems, while the balance in the EU reflects 
a very strong research and academic environment 
with potential to nurture a flourishing AI industry.
Figure 7 analyses the players that deserve special 
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Figure 5. AI players in the EU and relation with GDP by country, 2009-2018
Figure 4. Top 10 AI players in the world and relation with GDP by geographical zones, 2009-2018
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Figure 6. R&D versus non-R&D players in top 10 countries by number of AI players, 2009-2018
Figure 7. Number of AI players in selected types of activity (% over world total), 2009-2018
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attention, like innovative players and firms consid-
ered to be start-ups or receiving venture capital. 
The highly developed industrial ecosystem in the 
USA puts this country at the forefront of AI-related 
activities with 37 % of all firms receiving venture 
capital, and 45 % of start-ups active in the field. 
Both venture capital and start-ups are concen-
trated in a few countries, with the EU featuring 
strongly with 27 % of start-ups and 27 % of 
venture capital. 
It is worth noting the number of start-ups in India 
(9 %) and Canada (5 %), while the relatively low 
number in China reflects a different funding mech-
anism for new companies in that country. 
China has a relatively strong position in venture 
capital (14 %), behind the USA and the EU. Moreover, 
in the past few years, China has conquered the top 
position in patenting, with 57 % of patenting appli-
cants in AI worldwide coming from that country. 
Behind the USA, the EU has a prominent position 
in the research scene (frontier research), with 
30 % of papers submitted to the top AI interna-
tional conferences are coming from EU companies 
or research institutions. The importance of the EU 
in this field stems from lively AI scientific research 
activity supported by the EU framework pro-
grammes for R&D, which have fostered an intense 
inter-country collaboration and high participation 
from most EU countries. Figure 8 shows the dis-
tribution of players by country which participated 
in AI-related research projects under the FP7 and 
H2020 European research programmes in the peri-
od 2009-2018 with a good spread among the larg-
er and more research-active countries, Germany, 
UK, Italy, Spain, France and the Netherlands. 
 3.4 Technological capacity
Research, both basic and applied, is the backbone 
of the technological capacity needed to bring the 
European industry to a leading position in the inter-
national landscape. In this section, we look at a few 
technological sub-domains of the AI landscape to 
analyse the EU’s key strong areas with respect to 
other world regions. The largest number of AI play-
ers address AI domains related to ML (e.g. neural 
networks), and applications such as face recognition, 
speech recognition, computer vision or those encom-
passed by connected vehicles.
Figure 8. Distribution of EU players (%) in EU-funded AI research projects, 2009-2018
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 From the TES analysis, we identified four key top-
ics in the AI technological landscape for 2000-
2018: ML methods; connected and automated 
vehicles; speech recognition and natural language 
processing; and face recognition. Figure 9 shows 
the key areas of attention/specialisation of each 
geographical area. As indicated, the USA and Ja-
pan have focused on the area of speech recogni-
tion and natural language; ML has captured great 
interest in the EU, the USA, and to a lesser extent 
in China, while face recognition is in the spotlight 
in China and Japan. The EU is the region present-
ing a more balanced coverage of all four topics.
 3.5 Summary and conclusions 
The overview of the global and European AI land-
scape we report in this chapter is the fruit of a 
comprehensive analysis of over 35 000 key players 
worldwide. The analysis confirms the intense com-
petition in AI taking place worldwide with three 
main leaders: the USA, Europe, and China. Each 
region has about one quarter of all key players in 
the AI field, including both research and industry, 
but a distinctive different mix of players: while Eu-
rope is well balanced in the number of research 
and non-research players, the USA has approxi-
mately three times as many industrial/corporate 
players as research ones, and China has about six 
times as many research players as industrial ones. 
The strength of the corporate world in the USA is 
also indicated by its dominance in the number of 
start-ups (almost half of the total worldwide) and 
venture capital (more than one third of the total). 
China, on the other hand, is making a strong effort 
to turn research into patens, and accounts for al-
most 60 % of the world total. China has also put 
in place a strongly coordinated approach to AI, in-
cluding government policy, industrial applications 
and research with the objective of becoming the 
world leader in AI by 2030. This is an ambitious but 
achievable target (Chapter 5).
Europe is currently in a good position in the quality 
of its research, with more than 30 % of top AI pub-
lications, just behind the USA (33 %). This result is 
the fruit of the good level of research funding and 
the intense inter-country collaboration provided by 
the framework programmes. Key areas of strength 
in Europe on which to build upon are automated 
and connected vehicles, and robotics. Continued 
policy support seems key to maintain and improve 
the European position in an ecosystem rather po-
larised around a few big powers.
Figure 9. Occurrence of AI topics (%) by geographical zone, 
 2000-2018
SUMMARY
This chapter shows that many European countries as well as the EC are developing 
strategies and programmes to guide the development of AI, with shared concerns over the 
need for an agreed ethical framework and applications that clearly benefit European society 
and uphold the European values enshrined in the Treaties. The High-Level Expert Group esta-
blished in 2018 by the European Commission is developing ethical and investment guidelines 
that will provide a framework for subsequent developments.
Most national strategies analysed share similar attention to strengthening their research 
base, including the setting up of one or more national centres for AI, support for their industry 
and SMEs and awareness of the need to share data better between all the stakeholders: the 
public sector, industry, and the public. They also focus on applications aimed at modernising 
public administrations, as well as specific sectors such as health.
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AI IN THE EU
 4.1 Strategies and plans 
 4.1.1 The European Union
Many activities related to AI are currently taking 
place In the EU. They include national strategies 
and programme, and coordination activities among 
the Member States and the European Commission. 
Many of the enablers for the development of AI 
have been addressed during the last five years un-
der the Digital Single Market strategy. This is aimed 
at ensuring access to online activities for individ-
uals and businesses under conditions of fair com-
petition, consumer and data protection, removing 
geo-blocking and copyright issues. 
In April 2018, the EU Member States signed a 
Declaration of cooperation on Artificial Intelligence19 
in which they agreed to work together on the most 
important issues raised by AI, from ensuring Europe’s 
competitiveness in the research and deployment 
of AI, to dealing with social, economic, ethical and 
legal questions.
During the same month, the EC issued a Communi-
cation on AI for Europe (EC, 2018a) with three main 
objectives: 
•  Boosting the EU’s technological and industrial 
 capacity and AI uptake across the economy, 
 both by the private and public sectors. 
 This includes investments in research and 
 innovation and better access to data. 
•  Preparing for socio-economic changes 
 brought about by AI by encouraging the 
 modernisation of education and training sy- 
 stems, nurturing talent, anticipating changes 
 in the labour market, supporting labour 
 market transitions and adaptation of social 
 protection systems. 
• Ensuring an appropriate ethical and legal 
 framework, based on the Union’s values 
 and in line with the Charter of Fundamental 
 Rights of the EU. This includes forthcoming 
 guidance on existing product liability rules, 
 a detailed analysis of emerging challenges, 
 and cooperation with stakeholders through 
 a European AI Alliance to develop AI ethics 
 guidelines.
The Communication earmarked EUR 1.5 billion to 
support AI research for 2018-2020, having already 
invested some EUR 2.6 billion in AI-related research 
in the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (EC, 
2018b). However, the aim is to join forces between 
European, national, and private-sector invest-
ments to reach some EUR 20 billion per year for 
the next decade. As part of this partnership effort, 
the EC established the European AI Alliance as a 
multi-stakeholder forum for engaging in a broad 
Many European 
countries 
as well as the EC 
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the development of AI  
so that it benefits  
all Europeans.
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and open discussion of all aspects of AI develop-
ment and its impact on the economy and society. 
It is steered by the High-Level Expert Group on AI 
(AI HLEG), which consists of 52 experts who have 
been selected by the Commission for this task. 
The AI HLEG is now focusing on two main reports 
with input from the members of the European AI 
Alliance:
(1) Draft AI ethics guidelines, which will 
 offer guidance on how to implement ethical 
 principles when developing and deploying 
 AI, building on the work of the European 
 Group on Ethics in Science and New 
 Technologies and the European Union 
 Agency for Fundamental Rights; and
(2) Mid- and long-term policy recommendations 
 on AI-related challenges and opportunities, 
 which will feed into the policy development 
 process, the legislative evaluation process 
 and the development of a next-generation 
 digital strategy.
The EC is currently working with Member States to 
have a coordinated plan on AI by the end of 2018. The 
main aim is to maximise the impact of investment 
at the EU and national levels, encourage cooperation 
across the EU, exchange best practices, and support 
the EU’s global competitiveness in this sector. 
The plan should last until 2027, i.e. the remaining 
time under the current financing framework and 
the entire period of the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2021-2027 to support better European 
and national strategies.  
The areas currently listed as priorities for collabor- 
ation among the Member States include: 
• Mapping research excellence and joining 
 efforts to increase partnerships in Europe.
•  Interoperable dataset repositories (or ‘data 
 spaces’) making quality data available for a 
  broad range of users, including trusted 
 data and validation/certification systems for 
 algorithms.
• Access to know-how support and shared 
 testing facilities such as smart hospitals or 
 precision-farming solutions. 
• Networks of Digital Innovation Hubs to 
 facilitate the uptake of AI.
• Support to start-ups.
• Skilling and upskilling of the workforce and 
 action to attract and retain talent in Europe.
 
• Improved public services through numerous 
 AI-enabled applications, such as citizen- 
 government interaction in the context of 
 smart cities and tax-fraud detection.
The plan for AI will also link to the ecosystem of 
supporting technologies: AI chips, 5G, High-Per-
formance Computing (HPC) that are already in the 
pipeline or are planned. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that in June 2018 the EC proposed a Digital 
Europe programme20 with a budget of EUR 9.2 bil-
lion. for the period 2021-2027. There are five areas 
proposed as the focus: high-performance comput-
ing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, advanced 
digital skills, and ensuring their wide use across the 
economy and society. 
Within the Digital Europe Programme, the EC pro-
poses to develop common ‘European libraries’ of 
algorithms that would be accessible to all to help 
the public and private sectors identify and acquire 
whichever solution would work best for their needs. 
Open platforms and access to industrial data spaces 
for artificial intelligence will be made available 
across the EU in Digital Innovation Hubs, providing 
testing facilities and knowledge to small business-
es and local communities. 
In addition to the above regulatory package, oth-
er aspects are currently been addressed such 
as: Liability (including the revision of the Product 
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Machinery Directive), and an Action Plan on Disin-
formation.
European action is not limited to the development 
of an appropriate legislation (and standards) but 
also includes a set of relevant initiatives to speed 
up technology development and its uptake. Some 
relevant examples for AI include, for example 5G, 
Galileo, very high-speed and ubiquitous connectivi-
ty, European Processor Initiative, Joint Undertaking 
for High Performance Computing, and the Big Data 
Public-Private Partnership.
Moreover, sectoral policies are being discussed to 
regulate the use of the ICT technologies (including 
AI) in specific segments, for example:
•  The Third Mobility Package aims to allow 
 citizens to benefit from safer traffic, less- 
 polluting vehicles and more advanced tech- 
 nological solutions, while supporting the 
 competitiveness of the EU industry. 
 Particular focus is given to autonomous mo- 
 bility that has the potential to make tran- 
 sport safer, more accessible, inclusive and 
 sustainable. The Commission’s proposal en- 
 compasses a strategy aiming to make 
 Europe a world leader for fully automated 
 and connected mobility systems.
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•  The Clean Energy for all Europeans package 
 was presented in November 2016 and aims 
 to provide the stable legislative framework 
 needed to facilitate the clean energy transition.
• The Commission Directive 2018/844 aims to 
 improve energy efficiency through digital 
 solutions such as building automation and 
 electronic monitoring of technical building 
 systems.
By nature, AI technology will penetrate all indus-
trial sectors, digital services and social life. It is 
therefore extremely difficult to reconcile the need 
for a clear common framework and the rapid 
adoption in some domains when the technology is 
already mature to enter the market. To monitor the 
development and uptake of AI in different sectors 
and its impacts on work and society, in December 
2018, the EC is launching an AI-Watch facility with 
the following objectives: 
1)  Develop an overview and analysis of the 
 European AI ecosystem, 
2)  Monitor the uptake of AI applications across 
 the economy,
3)  Monitor the progress of AI technology,
4)  Assess the evolution of service robotics over 
 the last 10 years,
5)  Gather information on all EU Member States’ 
 national initiatives on AI,
6)  Provide an overview on the use of AI in 
 public services,
7) Develop an AI index including the dimen- 
 sions relevant for policymaking,
8) Make information available to the public 
 using an online tool.
In the following sections, we provide a summary of 
selected national strategies on AI. 
 4.1.2 France
France is one of the more active countries in devel-
oping a national AI strategy. The government has 
recently published three main reports which are re-
viewed below:
 
The French AI plan (FIA, 2017) offers a strategy for 
the coming years focusing on research and educa-
tion, innovation, and the social and economic im-
pacts of AI. 
The report by the Office of the Parliament for Sci-
ence and Technology (OPECST, 2017) ‘Toward a 
Controlled, Useful and Demystified Artificial Intel-
ligence’ focuses on social and regulatory aspects 
and raises important issues to be addressed in de-
veloping a socially useful AI, whilst being realistic 
about expectations on potential impacts. 
The Mission Villani report (2018) addresses six 
main areas: 
1.  An innovative and ambitious industrial and 
 economic policy: the mission opted to con- 
 centrate on some key sectors: health, trans- 
 portation, environment, and defence-secur 
 ity. The policy will require public support but 
 along with some structuring and precise 
 challenges. 
2. To devise a data policy fitted for the stakes. 
 Access to a sufficient amount of data 
 is a major issue in France and Europe. The 
 mission is trying to favour wide access, 
 the creation of data ecosystems while pro- 
 viding new protection to users. 
3. To anticipate and monitor the impact of AI 
 on work and employment. 
4.  AI as a tool for a sustainable and ecological 
 economy, providing a vision for a ‘greener’ 
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 AI enabling an ecological transition. For 
 instance, the EU could take a leading role 
 in the development of specific chips in the 
 semi-conductor industry, preparing the EU 
 industry for the post-silicon era.21 
5. Setting a framework for ethics and trust 
 to enable the growth of AI. 
6. Reducing the brain drain and finding ways 
 to offer attractive working conditions to 
 both French and international researchers.
The final report pleads for an inclusive and diverse 
AI stressing, for instance, a role to improve gen-
der balance. To develop an inclusive policy for AI, 
the report suggests incorporating a dual objective: 
‘First, to ensure that the development of AI technol-
ogy does not cause an increase in social and eco-
nomic inequality. Second to call on AI in order to 
reduce this’ (Mission Villani, 2018: 133).
The mission advocates building a data-focused 
economic policy grounded in a European data eco-
system. The report holds that the state has to be a 
key driver in these various areas of transformation 
and suggests setting up an inter-ministerial coordi-
nator to implement this strategy, with support from 
a shared specialist centre. One of the novel aspects 
is to set up four to six Interdisciplinary Institutes 
for Artificial Intelligence (3IA institutes) nationwide, 
organised into a network: the National Network of 
Interdisciplinary Institutes for Artificial Intelligence.
These new entities are meant to improve the rela-
tionships between public basic research and private 
firms. It is also a means to avoid the brain drain 
of researchers. This network should be integrated 
in a future European AI research area network that 
could be modelled on the EMBL (European Molecular 
Biology Laboratory), which has been operating suc-
cessfully since 1974. Other European partnerships 
could be built with the instruments of the H2020 
programme, like the current public-private partner-
ships in robotics and Big Data. Enhancing the appeal 
of careers in public research is another concern, 
with the suggestion to at least double the starting 
salary for researches in the public sector in view of 
the high degree of competition with industry.
 4.1.3 United Kingdom
In 2016, the Government Office for Science (UK 
Gov., 2016a) released a note on ‘Robotics, auto-
mation and artificial intelligence’, which explored 
the opportunities and recommended three actions 
concerning challenge areas, facilities and skills. The 
same entity released a report that same year ‘Ar-
tificial intelligence: opportunities and implications 
for the future of decision making’ (2016b) that in-
cluded a presentation of what AI is, a review of the 
use of AI by governments, and a discussion on the 
effects on labour markets. In 2015, the Alan Turing 
Institute was created as the national institute for 
data science, headquartered at the British Library 
(Hall & Pesenti, 2017).
In 2016, the House of Commons Science and Tech-
nology Committee released a report on ‘Robotics 
and artificial intelligence’ (House of Commons, 
2016). The report deals mostly with the broad is-
sues (economic, social, ethical, and regulatory) 
triggered by this disrupting technology, but the last 
chapter examines ‘the research, funding and inno-
vation landscape for robotics and AI’. Its conclusions 
were rather critical: ‘Government leadership has 
been noticeably lacking. There is no Government 
strategy for developing the skills, and securing the 
critical investment, that is needed to create future 
growth in robotics and AI’ (UK House of Commons, 
2016: 33). In its answer to the report, the govern-
ment acknowledged that more could be done to 
take a leading role, and in March 2017 it announced 
an industry-led review on the conditions necessary 
for the AI industry to continue to thrive and grow 
in the UK. In April 2018, the government published 
its AI Sector Deal (UK Gov. 2018) as part of a large 
industrial strategy to place the UK at the forefront 
of AI development and use. The Deal invests £ 950 
million, of which two thirds is new money and the 
rest is budget already allocated. 
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The Deal has five main pillars: 
Ideas: Support research in data science AI with 
£300 million, including £49 million for the Alan Tu-
ring Institute, stimulate the uptake of AI, including 
within the public sector, and invest up to £100 mil-
lion to support AI innovation to raise productivity. 
The Institute’s public policy programme, in particu-
lar, is where the UK government comes for inde-
pendent advice on data science, AI, and ethics. 
People: Work with schools, universities and industry 
to ensure a highly skilled workforce, including £ 400 
million to support STEM teaching in schools, and up to 
200 additional PhD bursaries in AI-related fields with 
the target of reaching 1 000 government-supported 
PhD places per year in 2025. Also enable access to 
highly skilled global talent and promote diversity. 
Infrastructure: Enhance the UK’s data infrastructure 
making more public-sector data available, includ-
ing geospatial data under the guidance of a newly 
created Geospatial Commission, and promote Data 
Trusts as a way to share public- and private-sec-
tor data in a secure way. Promote the upgrading 
and maintenance of the physical digital infrastruc-
ture, including £1 billion to develop 5G and extend 
broadband. 
Business environment: The government has set up 
an AI council with industry and academia to over-
see the strategy and a new Office for AI to support 
its delivery. Support for business and innovation will 
include a £ 2.5 billion investment fund, reaching 
£ 7.5 billion in partnership with the private sector.
Places: Support the continued development of Lon-
don as Europe’s capital for AI but also expand sup-
port to regional clusters with the appropriate infra-
structure and skills. Further support for the Alan 
Turing Institute to become the national academic 
institute for AI and data science.
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The government appointed a steering committee in 
May 2017 due to report in April 2019. A first report 
was published in October 2017 (Finnish Gov. 2017) 
setting out a vision of a country embracing AI in 
every aspect of life in an open and ethical way. It 
identified key areas for action including: 
•  Enhancing competitiveness by developing 
 industrial ecosystems to help in the applica- 
 tion of AI, and measures to facilitate the 
 access and use of AI and data for companies. 
• Increasing the quantity and quality of data 
 shared in Finland, through legal frameworks 
 that are ‘based on the importance of the 
 data to business operations (not on data 
 protection first)’, regulatory sandboxes for 
 experimentation, increased access to the 
 public of the government’s Mydata network, 
 and support to companies to turn their data 
 into products. 
• Launching an AI accelerator pilot in 2018 
 based on open data, open code, open inter- 
 faces with companies providing anonymised 
 data for research, partnership with univer- 
 sities to research on the data, and access to 
 small companies to experiment with the use 
 of AI-based solutions. In addition, a number 
 of open piloting and testing environments 
 will be set up to facilitate experimentation. 
• Establishing a new Centre of Excellence for 
 AI and basic research, including a virtual 
 university and the creation of massive open 
 online courses (MMOC) to support the 
 upskilling of the population and workforce. 
• Supporting research and innovation, and ex- 
 tending the application of AI in public service, 
 for example with the development of per- 
 sonalised AI assistants, and new partnership 
 models between the public and private sector 
 to facilitate the adoption and use of AI. 
 4.1.5 Other EU countries
Several other Member States already have AI strat-
egies in place or are in the process of adopting 
them. From those illustrated above, most strategies 
have similar aims and objectives: embracing AI and 
become a leading country in the field, supporting 
innovation and business, promoting the use of AI 
in the public sector, boosting R&D and skills, estab-
lishing one or more national centres of excellence, 
and developing strategies to promote the sharing 
and use of data more widely between the public 
and private sectors. A European strategy needs to 
build on these national efforts and investments to 
make the whole greater than the sum of its parts. 
 4.2 Summary and conclusions
This chapter shows that many European countries 
as well as the EC are developing strategies and 
programmes to guide the development of AI, 
with shared concerns over the need for an agreed 
ethical framework and applications that clearly 
benefit European society and uphold the European 
values enshrined in the Treaties. The High-Level 
Expert Group established in 2018 by the European 
Commission is elaborating ethical and investment 
guidelines that will provide a framework for subse-
quent developments.
Most national strategies analysed give similar 
attention to strengthening their research base, 
including the setting up of one or more national cen-
tres for AI, support for their industry, and SMEs, 
and awareness of the need to share data better 
between all the stakeholders: the public sector, in-
dustry, and the public. They also focus on applica-
tions aimed at modernising public administrations, 
as well as specific sectors such as health.
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SUMMARY
This chapter highlights some of the main features of the AI developments in China, 
which has identified AI and related applications as strategic to its future economic 
and social development, and to its role as a global superpower. As a result, it has put 
in place a strongly coordinated approach to AI, including government policy, industrial 
applications and research with the objective of becoming the world leader in AI by 
2030. This is an ambitious but achievable target as the JRC analysis of the AI inno-
vation ecosystem in China confirms. This opinion is shared by main market analysts. 
In fact, AI deployments with a high impact on daily activities have already started, 
including authentication processes, medical diagnosis, premium insurance, transpor-
tation and retail facilities, and security. Potential obstacles to the full development of 
the strategy relate to the difficulty of having AI adopted in traditional industries, and 
prepare enough specialists in the country able to understand the domain of applica-
tion, its needs and expectations, identify the best algorithm and approach, and then 
customise it and develop it further.
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China is implementing its ambitious strategy on AI.
 5.1 China’s economic and policy context
The development of AI is a global phenomenon, but 
the case of China is particularly interesting and not 
as well known as that of the USA. For this reason, 
we dedicate a slightly longer section to this country, 
drawing on a comprehensive study carried out for 
the JRC by Feijoo (2018). 
China is already a leading global force in the digital 
economy. For example, it has 42  % of the global 
share of e-commerce, it processes 11 times more 
mobile payments than the USA, it is home to one-
third of the world’s unicorns22, and leads the im-
plementation of 5G mobile communications (Woet-
zel et al., 2017). This digital success is fuelled by 
three main factors: (i) a large and young Chinese 
market enabling rapid commercialisation of digital 
business models; (ii) a rich digital ecosystem ex-
panding quickly beyond a few large companies; 
and (iii) strong governmental support for compa-
nies through favourable economic and regulatory 
conditions, and a multiple role as strategic investor, 
consumer of digital technologies, and provider of 
access to key data. 
At the macroeconomic level, China can no longer 
depend solely on increases in capital and labour to 
achieve the desired levels of sustainable economic 
growth, nor on producing cheap goods to sell else-
where as has been the predominant model for the 
last three decades. Against this background, there 
has been a recent shift into innovation as a strategic 
driver to increase the quality of products and pro-
ductivity, and expand internal consumption, thus 
decreasing the dependency on external markets. 
Digital technologies in general, and AI in particular, 
are expected to lead to higher efficiency in products 
and services, achieving large productivity gains and 
a more dynamic economy, with businesses able to 
compete globally and even export ‘Made in China’ 
digital business models and solutions (Woetzel et 
al., 2017). 
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But there are other interests beyond mere economics. 
China, as a global power, is using initiatives such as 
‘One belt, one road’ or institutions such as the Asian 
Infrastructures Investment Bank to shape a geopo-
litical environment more favourable to its interests 
(Delage, 2017). Digital technologies, and AI in par-
ticular, are essential constituents of this strategy, 
showcasing a state-of-the-art new industry fully 
developed in China and a different approach from 
the West to economy and policy through technology. 
The strict application of national laws to cyberspace 
and the use of AI-related technologies to maintain 
social harmony and control are the main examples 
of this differentiated approach. 
The potential of AI is clear to China’s policymak-
ers. As stated by President Xi, China ‘… should un-
swervingly follow an independent innovation path 
featuring Chinese characteristics, stick to the guid-
ing principles of independent innovation, leap-frog-
ging development in key sectors, with development 
supported by science and technology and oriented 
towards the future’ (Xi, 2014, p. 134). In fact, since 
2014, the government has launched a series of key 
national economic initiatives that are relevant to AI 
with the goal of creating a EUR 13 billion AI market 
in China by 2018, and helping China to lead the world 
in AI by 2030. 
In the case of AI, and in contrast to what happened 
in the recent past, development of the sector re-
lies on a plan that encompasses all relevant play-
ers within an ecosystem, from universities and re-
search centres to existing companies and new firms 
in the entrepreneurial / innovation milieu, which is 
also under development in China. It will be, there-
fore, a first real assessment of China’s chances to 
create an independent home-grown, fully-fledged 
innovation and industrial ecosystem. 
However, AI is not an isolated ecosystem as it inter-
acts and benefits from not only the development 
of successful innovations such as ecommerce or 
mobile payments but also from cloud computing, 
industry 4.0, robotics, IoT, blockchain, and IT se-
curity ecosystems. The particular case of cloud 
computing is relevant since it is expected that a 
considerable part of AI services will be provided 
from the cloud. Therefore, market developments 
in both AI and cloud computing will be considera-
bly aligned.
 5.2 Government policies and initiatives
In this section, we summarise the main govern-
ment initiatives related to AI following a timeline 
up to 2018. The timeline is interesting because it 
displays how policies and initiatives started at 
industry level slowly go up the value chain to 
include applications and consumer products. It 
is particularly relevant to follow the developments 
that allowed companies in different sectors to 
share and access data to train newer and better 
algorithms. Crucially then, the government issued 
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specific AI guidelines covering the whole value net-
work in a holistic perspective.
Made in China 2025, State Council, May 20, 2015
The goal of this strategy is to make China an ad-
vanced and prestigious manufacturing power by 
2025. In fact, intelligent manufacturing is positioned 
as the main development direction of ‘Made in Chi-
na’. The main industries targeted are machinery, avi-
ation, shipping, automobiles, light industry, textiles, 
food and electronics, and the general aim is to im-
prove the precision manufacturing and agile manu-
facturing capabilities. 
The strategy includes the promotion of an open 
industrial ecosystem based on the dynamic per-
ception of consumer demand and new industrial 
internet applications, such as intelligent moni-
toring, remote diagnosis and management, and 
whole industry chain tracing. 
Internet +, Action Guidance, State Council, July 4, 2015
The internet+ strategy focuses on intelligent man-
ufacturing and innovation, promoting the develop-
ment of cloud computing, IoT, intelligent industrial 
robots, industrial control systems, IntelliSense com-
ponents, industrial operating systems and soft-
ware, and additive manufacturing technologies. It 
also includes an upgrade of production equipment, 
processes and a focus on (big) data sharing. The 
strategy objectives specific to AI are:
•  To increase public support for the develop- 
 ment of AI and core technological break- 
 throughs;
• To promote the popularisation and applica- 
 tion of AI in fields such as smart home, 
 smart terminal, smart car, and robots; 
• To create a new computing cluster that 
 supports ultra-large-scale DL; 
• To build a massive training resource base 
 including voice, images, videos, maps and 
  other data; 
• To strengthen the construction of innovation 
 platforms of basic AI resources and public 
 services; 
• To research, develop and industrialise key AI 
 technologies such as computer vision, intel- 
 ligent speech processing, biometrics, natural 
 language understanding, intelligent decision 
 control and new human-computer interaction; 
• To support cooperation among security en- 
 terprises and internet companies, in order 
 to develop and promote big data analysis 
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 technologies such as image recognition and 
 enhance the intelligent service level of secur- 
 ity products; 
• To promote the application of internet 
 technologies, intelligent sensing, pattern 
 recognition, data analytics and robotics;
• To nurture a number of key enterprises and 
 innovation teams to lead the global develop- 
 ment of AI. 
Robot Industry Development Plan (2016 - 2020), 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
National Development and Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, April 27, 2016
The main goal of this plan is the development of 
intelligent industrial and service robots. Six areas 
are defined for industry: welding robots, vacuum 
robots, fully autonomous programming intelligent 
robots, human-computer collaboration robots, 
dual-arm robots and heavy-duty autonomous ve-
hicles, plus four areas for the service domain: fire 
rescue robots, surgical robots, intelligent public ser-
vice robots, and intelligent nursing robots. The plan 
also proposes that the government establishes 
robotic innovation centres and encourages banks 
and private investors to support the development 
of robotics and robots.
New Generation AI Development Plan, State Council, 
July 8, 2017
This is the key strategy for AI where guidelines, 
strategic goals, key tasks and supporting measures 
for a new-generation AI development by 2030 are 
set up. The plan defines very clearly the strategic 
goals in AI development: 
• By 2020, most AI technologies and applica- 
 tions will be on a par with the most advanced 
 levels worldwide, and the AI industry will 
 become a new important economic growth 
 net contributor. AI will have an impact on 
 our daily lives. 
• By 2025, major breakthroughs will be made 
 in the basic AI theory. Some of the techno- 
 logies and applications will reach the world 
 leading level. AI will become the major driving 
 force for industrial upgrading and economic 
 restructuring in China. It will have an impact 
 on society. 
• By 2030, AI theory, technologies and applica- 
 tions will be world leaders. China will become 
 the world’s major AI innovation centre. 
The plan mentions six key tasks: 
• To build an open, collaborative AI technology 
 innovation system, cutting edge in terms of 
 basic theory, key common technologies, 
 innovation platforms, and high-end talent. 
• To foster a high-end and efficient smart 
 economy, develop the emerging AI industry, 
 promote industrial upgrade and create AI 
 innovation areas. 
• To build a safe and supportive smart socI- 
 ety, develop efficient and intelligent services, 
 including for social governance, enhance 
 public safety and security based on AI and 
 promote sharing and mutual trust in social 
 interactions.
• To strengthen military and civilian integra- 
 tion in the field of AI, promote the two-way 
 conversion of AI technology between military 
 and civilian sectors and jointly build up and 
 share military and civilian innovation resources. 
• To construct a ubiquitous, safe and efficient 
 intelligent infrastructure system and strength- 
 en the upgrading of infrastructures such as 
 networks, big data and high-performance 
 computing. 
• To plan significant science and technology 
 projects, and strengthen overall coordination. 
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 5.3 Regional / local initiatives
There are many initiatives taking place in China 
at the regional and local level and supported by 
the respective governments. This seems to create 
a particular type of competition between different 
locations that is a main feature of the AI innovation 
ecosystem. Below, we give a few illustrative cases.
 
Beijing: In 2017, the local government of Beijing 
issued a guideline to support technologies, appli-
cations and the AI industry. It sets the goal for the 
city to become an AI innovation hub with global in-
fluence by 2020 - anticipating national objectives. 
According to the Beijing government, the region has 
more than half of the key AI research institutes in 
China, nearly 400 AI enterprises, and during the 
first nine months of 2017 there were investments 
in 51 AI projects totalling US$ 1.6 billion. 
Zhongguancun: often referred to as China’s Silicon 
Valley - is the main high-tech business district of 
Beijing. It includes some of the most prestigious 
tech universities and about 500 colleges, national 
scientific research institutions and R&D centres for 
multinational companies. There is a plan to locate 
the largest industrial cluster for integrated circuits 
in China there. The high-tech companies located in 
the district generated about US$ 600 billion in rev-
enues in 2017 and the area is home to 67 unicorns. 
It is estimated that 30 000 overseas returnee en-
trepreneurs have established over 8 000 compa-
nies in Zhongguancun. The district also published 
a plan at the end of 2017 for cultivating AI talent 
with the expectations of achieving an output for 
the AI industry there of more than EUR 7 billion in 
2020. 
Shanghai: Shanghai has its adaptation of the cen-
tral government plan called ‘13th Five-Year Plan 
for Shanghai Manufacturing Transformation and 
Upgrading’, issued by the Shanghai Municipal Peo-
ple’s Government in 2016. It aims to capture the 
opportunities from emerging technologies such 
as AI, quantum communication, VR and preci-
sion medical treatment, as well as new trends in 
industrial organisation, innovation and entrepre-
neurship. In 2017, Shanghai had about 500 innova-
tive parks hosting 16 000 start-ups. 
Guangzhou: Guangzhou has launched a full set 
of industrial parks supported by the local gov-
ernment: the Guandong Intelligent Manufacturing 
Demonstration Base, the Intelligent Industrial Park 
in Huangpu Machinery Valley, the Zengcheng In-
telligent Equipment Manufacturing Industrial Park, 
the Huadu New Energy Vehicles and Intelligent 
Manufacturing Equipment Industrial Park and the 
Liwan 3D Printing Industrial Park. All of them in-
clude direct support to innovative companies, par-
ticularly those linked to the transformation of the 
manufacturing industry. 
Hangzhou: A radically distinct approach is taking 
place in Hangzhou. Alibaba’s success has shaped 
Hangzhou’s tech scene. The city is home to many 
incubators, funded in part by government subsi-
dies, that are filled with entrepreneurs who previ-
ously worked at Alibaba. 
 5.4 The specificities of the AI innovation 
 ecosystem in China
The AI innovation ecosystem in China is most 
developed in the areas of image, face and voice 
recognition, together with the techniques that 
support such fields (basically machine and DL and 
the algorithms that accompany both). There is also 
recent and particular emphasis on the develop-
ment of AI chips. As a consequence, the more de-
veloped areas of application in China are security, 
healthcare, transportation, urban traffic manage-
ment, commerce and driverless cars. Adding all of 
them together configures a scenario of deep eco-
nomic and social changes that have already started 
to take place in China. Applications of AI are now 
widely available and impact the daily lives of China’s 
citizens, combining convenience, efficiency, person-
alisation and surveillance (See Box 6).
 
China’s large companies work closely with the 
government, and take advantage of the positive 
50
perception of consumers to experiment with applic- 
ations unheard of outside China. This fact perme-
ates the AI innovation ecosystem, but arguably, the 
foremost instance of alignment between consumers, 
companies and government is the implementation 
of the so-called ‘social credit system’, tentatively 
scheduled for 2020. This AI-based system, which 
would be controversial in other countries, will be 
able to collect user behavioural data in both phys-
ical space and cyberspace and provide a rating of 
citizen reputation. This rating could then be used to 
give or deny access to a range of services provided 
by the state.
Military involvement is another salient feature of the 
AI ecosystem in China: civilian AI breakthroughs are 
applied for military use (under the national strat-
egy of ‘military-civil fusion’) and, vice versa, mili-
tary-based developments are transferred to civilian 
industry. According to the Central Military Commis-
sion for Science and Technology, AI could accelerate 
military transformation by means of intelligent and 
autonomous unmanned systems, AI-enabled intel-
ligence analysis, war-gaming simulation and train-
ing, defence, offence, and command in information 
warfare; and intelligent support to command deci-
sion-making (Kania, 2017). In the other direction, 
China wants to significantly increase the spillover of 
military developments into the civilian industries. 
Another feature of the AI innovation ecosystem 
in China is the competition among cities and re-
gions for talent, in particular from the new policies 
launched by second-tier cities. As a result, there 
are considerable differences in the accumulation 
of talent and opportunities in new tech industries 
between East and West China. 
A final feature of the ecosystem refers to the limit-
ed role awarded to critical views of AI in China. Such 
views could be perceived as a lack of loyalty to a 
policy that is highly supportive of AI. However, this 
absence of criticism could lead to a lack of verifi- 
able algorithms, trustworthy systems, or a situation 
in which moral responsibilities are outsourced to 
algorithms. The calls for policy support of algorithmic 
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box 6. Some examples of AI applications 
in China  
Alibaba’s core business is selling goods and providing a 
platform for B2B trade. Just to give a sense of scale, during 
‘Singles’ Day’ a creation of the company that takes place 
on 11 November, Alibaba processed at peak time more than 
325 000 orders per second through pop-up stores 
selling products fitted with VR mirrors for virtual try-outs. An AI 
fashion consultant helped match items with the one selected. 
In one day it sold more than US$ 25 billion worth of 
goods. By contrast, on 2017 Cyber Monday (November 27), 
the biggest online shopping day in the US, all retailers combined 
brought in US$ 6.59 billion (Knight, 2018).  
Tencent’s main source of data is WeChat which, in 2018, 
reached more than 1 billion monthly active users.23 Its 
flagship project is its healthcare platform to book appointments 
and make payments which, in 2017, was available in 38 000 
medical facilities serving 110 million customers. 
In 2018, it launched its AI-powered diagnostic medical imaging 
service in 100 hospitals. The system is trained using over 
1 billion images from Tencent social network 
complemented by anonymised patient data. 
iFlytech, a former start-up, is now a consolidated company 
specialised in user interfaces and voice recognition. Its AI-
enabled general practitioner medical robot passed the written 
test of China’s national medical licensing examination in 
November 2017. The robot can automatically capture 
and analyse patient information and make an 
initial diagnosis. 
There are many start-ups in the area of face recognition. Among 
them Megvii claims that their cameras are able to identify 120 
people per second in a crowded train station, while LLVision 
is developing AI-enabled glasses storing up to 10 000 
images of suspects on the device to achieve faster face 
recognition. They are part of an ecosystem of companies 
supporting the government’s objective to set up a 
national facial recognition database that will store 
information about the country’s 1.3 billion citizens, 
and be able to identify them within three seconds.24
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transparency and accountability present in the EU 
and the USA (e.g. Garfinkel, Matthews, Shapiro, & 
Smith, 2017) but notoriously absent in China.
The developments in China are very impressive. How-
ever, the JRC analysis identified some gaps in the 
current ecosystem and the roadmap to 2030. These 
structural gaps are not specific to AI but are also valid 
for other technically-based innovation ecosystems in 
China, a view supported by the main market analysts 
(Barton et al., 2017; Mubayi et al., 2017). 
The first gap refers to the slow adoption of AI within 
traditional industries, many of which are supported 
by local governments and some have a high level of 
debt, where the impacts on jobs could be particular-
ly difficult. A related issue refers to the gap between 
existing talent and its application within existing in-
dustries, including the distance between research and 
practical implementations in (traditional) industry. 
Some experts also include the lack of fundamental 
research into AI. This gap implies the need to devel-
op a sufficient quantity of AI talent and ensure that 
the local education system is able to supply it. The 
difficulties of increasing the pool of talent are also 
related to the set of knowledge and skills needed 
to succeed in the application of AI to a particular 
domain and the shortcomings in the innovation-re-
sistant education system in general. The issue at 
stake is that it will not suffice to create an AI ap-
plication - a programmer could do it almost me-
chanically with the appropriate directions - but to 
become a ‘functional specialist’ able to understand 
the domain of application, its needs and expecta-
tions, identify the best algorithm and approach, 
and then customise it and develop it further (Bac-
cala et al., 2018).
 5.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter highlights some of the main features 
of the AI developments in China, and in particular 
the synergy between government policy, private- 
sector investment, and research. China has identi-
fied AI and related applications as strategic to its 
future economic and social development, and to 
its role as a global superpower. As a result, it has 
put in place a strongly coordinated approach to AI, 
including government policy, industrial applications 
and research, with the objective of becoming the 
world leader in AI by 2030. This is an ambitious 
but achievable target as the the JRC analysis of 
the AI innovation ecosystem in China confirms. This 
opinion is shared by main market analysts (Barton 
et al., 2017; Mark Purdy et al., 2017). In fact, AI 
deployments with a high impact on daily activi-
ties have already started, including authentication 
processes, medical diagnosis, premium insurance, 
transportation and retail facilities, and security. 
Potential obstacles to the full development of the 
strategy relate to the difficulty of having AI adopt-
ed in traditional industries, and preparing enough 
specialists in the country able not only to advance 
technological innovation but also to adapt it to the 
needs of potential users.
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6 Ethical and Social Perspective
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we highlight some of the key dimensions of the ethical and societal debates on 
AI. As shown, the debate about ethical and social implications of AI for individuals and 
societies needs to move forward and fast. Political and regulatory frameworks seem to be 
lagging behind AI developments, which will soon pervade almost every aspect of our daily lives. 
To counter this situation, ‘regulatory foresight’ and ‘ethics foresight analysis’ at the same 
level of ‘technological foresight’, are needed to keep up with emerging implications of AI. This, 
however, cannot happen without a strong commitment to the following issues: clear ethical fra-
meworks and guidelines, including the right to choose between being cared for by a human or 
a robot, and the right to refuse being profiled, tracked, or measured, and responsible AI design, 
which is necessary to build trust in the applications. 
We conclude that, to build and retain trust in AI, we need a multi-layered approach that includes 
the critical engagement of civil society to discuss the values guiding and being embedded into 
AI, public debates in different fora to translate these values into strategies and guidelines, and 
responsible design practices that encode these values and guidelines into AI systems, so that 
they are ethical by design.
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AI is shaping our ways of thinking, acting, socialising and working.
 6.1 Introduction 
When addressing ethical and social impacts of 
technology, it is not just about avoiding detrimen-
tal or unintended consequences, or guaranteeing 
that humans have control over their technologies. 
Such externalist and instrumentalist perspectives 
tend to separate technologies from humans. That 
is, technologies as mere neutral tools devoid of 
values, and humans as sole masters defining the 
terms of engagement. 
In reality, the relationship between technologies and 
humans is much more complex. On the one hand, 
technologies are built by specific people and organ-
isations (Bijker et al., 1987), so they embody and 
replicate social norms, values, and other economic, 
ecological, political, or cultural forces at any given 
time. On the other hand, technologies shape how we 
work, move, communicate and ultimately live. There-
fore, ethical and social implications of technology 
need to consider this fundamental intertwining of 
the human and the technological domains. ‘Hu-
mans are technological beings, just as technologies 
are social entities’ (Verbeek, 2011, p.4). 
Calls for the development and use of AI to be 
placed ‘within limits of our fundamental norms, 
values, freedoms and human rights’ (EESC, 2017) 
are coming from a variety of viewpoints, including 
academia, civil society organisations, practitioners, 
think-tanks and businesses. There are encouraging 
signs of a commitment, or at least an interest in 
collaborative work, between governments, industry 
and ethicists to design technologies for common 
good and identify specific principles for account-
ability, transparency, safety and social good (Pau-
wels, 2018). In this respect, we should also mention 
Floridi’s (2018) plea for the EU to use ‘soft’ digital 
ethics25 as a good approach for AI, because it can 
support regulation and legislation and balance dif-
ferent values and interests. 
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In a concise format, we are presenting an overview 
of key ethical and societal issues in AI/ML, as cur-
rently discussed in policy, academia, civil society 
and business. The aim is to inform a comprehensive 
framing of ethical and societal challenges, based 
not only on fundamental values and rights, but also 
on wider discussions on who benefits from AI devel-
opments, to what end, and under what conditions. 
Drawing on Stahl, Timmermans and Flick (2017), 
we make a distinction between issues that could 
have an impact at individual level (such as auton-
omy; identity; dignity; privacy and data protection) 
and those that have impact at societal level (such 
as fairness and equity; collective identity and good 
life; responsibility, accountability and transparency; 
privacy in connection to surveillance and datafica-
tion; democracy and trust).
 6.2 Overview of individual and collective 
 implications of AI 
 6.2.1 Challenges at individual level
It is important to think about how artificial intelli-
gence might bring new challenges in relation to in-
dividual human beings. In this context, it is crucial to 
consider how the concepts of autonomy and identity 
of individuals as well as security, safety and privacy 
issues might change under the influence of AI.
a. Autonomy  
Autonomy is one of the central values in West-
ern ethics (Juth, 2009). It represents the idea that 
everyone has the capacity to know what is good or 
bad for them, to live according to their standards 
and that they have power over their thoughts and 
actions, thus promoting individual choice, rights 
and freedoms. AI might contribute to human devel-
opment by extending human capabilities, or could 
stimulate productivity and prosperity and lead to 
active work until a later age. It could also have the 
opposite effects, as discussed in Chapter 9.
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When it comes to interaction, there is also a need 
for people to know if they are interacting with an-
other person or a machine. It is often not clear for 
us today if we are communicating via digital media 
with a bot or a human being. Also, the content pre-
sented to us and selected by algorithms interferes 
with our freedom to receive and impart informa-
tion (Rathenau Institute, 2017). 
b. Identity
According to Fearon (1999), identity is seen either 
as a social category with its membership rules or 
‘a set of attributes, beliefs, desires or principles of 
action that a person thinks distinguish herself in 
socially relevant ways and that the person takes a 
special pride in’. In this case, the meaning of iden-
tity becomes very close to dignity or pride. As we 
interact and even develop close relationships with 
AI systems or robots, we need to understand better 
possible transformations of how we perceive them 
and how they shape our conception of the world. 
For instance, profiling, targeted advertising or other 
AI-powered techniques can deeply affect our iden-
tities (Floridi, 2015). The way in which human intel-
ligence and cognitive capacities are affected by the 
interaction with machines and AI is an important 
area of research, as indicated in Section 2.3.
c. Dignity
Human dignity is the right of a person to be re-
spected and valued and treated in an ethical man-
ner, as mentioned in the Article 1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU. It should be one of 
the basic notions used for the protection from harm 
caused to humans, and vulnerable groups in par-
ticular, and it should be respected while developing 
new technologies (Rathenau Institute, 2017). 
Individuals’ rights and responsibilities could start 
eroding as a result of the increasing interaction of 
humans and machines (EDPS, 2018). At the mo-
ment, smart devices have no moral responsibility 
and that is why it could be potentially harmful to 
let them manage human beings (EGE, 2018). How-
ever, the European Parliament called for the EC 
to consider a specific legal status for robots (EP, 
2017), which is still a controversial proposal when 
considering, for instance, that at the present time 
accountability is ultimately related to human re-
sponsibility (EECS, 2016). 
d. Privacy and data protection 
In the world of hyper-connected devices, crucial 
questions that are posed relate to privacy, security 
and data protection. Smart meters, toys, fridges 
and phones, to mention just a few, all have built-
in AI systems that are sending our data to the 
manufacturers of these devices, often without our 
knowledge. AI applications in healthcare are even 
more sensitive, for instance when suggesting diag-
nosis or treatments (AI Now, 2017) or when data 
is (mis)used by insurance companies or technology 
companies (Powles and Hodson, 2017). The right 
to protection of personal information and privacy 
is therefore increasingly recognised as crucial in 
European societies (EGE, 2018). 
The new GDPR that came into force in May 2018 
is raising expectations in relation to the protection 
of personal data used by algorithms. The full im-
pact of the Regulation will only emerge in the years 
to come, but it is clearly a major issue that needs 
monitoring.
 6.2.2 Challenges at societal level
AI and big data have broader consequences for soci-
ety and the well-being of communities, and nations 
worldwide. These changes have direct impact on re-
shaping of power relations and the transformation 
of the social contract. It is important to examine 
these changes in order to mitigate risks and dangers. 
a. Fairness and equity
Will AI decrease or increase social inequalities? To 
address this question, we can distinguish two levels: 
social inequalities generated by the application of 
AI in the workplace, and individual level inequal- 
ities as a result of unfair AI-driven decision-making. 
With respect to the former, the evidence is as yet 
unclear, as discussed in Chapter 9. With respect to 
6 Ethical and Societal Perspective
58
the latter, research has shown that the use of algo-
rithms could discriminate against particular groups 
or individuals, for instance in the criminal justice 
system (Chouldechova, 2017) and in recruitment 
processes (O’Neill, 2016). Bias could come from the 
training data or the algorithms, or from the biases 
of the people who build them (The Future Society, 
2017; CNIL, 2017; see also Section 2.4). Besides 
technical research (such as de-biasing or fairness 
evaluation tools), and education of developers and 
society as a whole to be alert about potential un-
fairness, there is a need for the active involvement 
of government in fostering the culture of equity, 
free from stereotypes, and equal access ‘across 
and within societies’ (EGE, 2018) to benefit from 
the opportunities provided by AI.
b. Collective human identity and the ‘good life’ 
AI impacts what we can consider the ‘good life’, 
that is, it can deeply transform how we live today 
and in the future. Similar to other technologies, 
AI can bring about social, economic, political and 
ecological changes to our experience, critical capaci-
ty and perceived reality (Borgmann, 1987; Feenberg, 
1991, 1999; Mitcham, 1980; Coeckelbergh, 2018; 
Higgs et al., 2000). In this sense, it confronts us 
with who we are and how we want to live in our 
society pursuing goals of well-being (Montréal 
Declaration 2017; IEEE, 2018).
c. Responsibility, accountability  
and transparency 
Responsibility and accountability
We should think of responsibility in congruence 
with human rights and values (CoE, 2017). Account- 
ability is connected to responsibility and it is ex-
tremely important because it deals with biases and 
discriminations caused by data mining and profiling. 
Accountability is seen as a necessary condition for 
the social acceptability of AI (Mission Villani, 2018). 
Besides the complexity of the online environment, 
locating responsibility and accountability becomes 
more difficult with the blurred relationship between 
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people and data, action and consequences, which 
could be considered as a wicked problem without a 
clear answer (Markham et al., 2018). In the context 
of AI, liability often follows responsibility. Current 
laws and regulations struggle with the emerging 
issues as discussed in Chapter 7.
Transparency
Transparency means not only transparency of algo-
rithms (often referred to as ‘black boxes’), but also 
of data and Automated Decision Making (ADM). The 
importance of the latter is particularly salient when 
ADM is used by public agencies, such as predictive 
policing or risk assessment in the criminal justice 
system (AI Now, 2018). The decisions made by al-
gorithms may not be understood or explained and 
it is not clear who is responsible for them. There-
fore, transparency is seen as key for accountabili-
ty, together with a right to meaningful information 
in automated decisions as foreseen by the GDPR, 
or even a ‘right to explanation’ (Selbst and Pow-
les, 2017; Edwards and Veale, 2017; see Chapter 7). 
Although it is not likely that the code will ever be 
completely transparent because of IP rights, other 
information such as variables used, with their val-
ues and deviations, and the amount and type of 
training data used could be made explicit and con-
tribute to an ‘effective transparency’ (CoE, 2017b). 
Besides transparency, there is a need to audit al-
gorithms, i.e. checking that they conform to certain 
properties (Kroll et al., 2016). Auditing should be 
done in collaboration with government and civil so-
ciety. However, lack of access to the training data is 
the main problem for public auditing of algorithms 
(Villani, 2018).
d. Surveillance/datafication 
Digital politics and media researchers argue that 
we live in a mass-surveillance culture, character-
ised by datafication of individuals’ lives that is diffi-
cult to escape (Van Dijck, 2014; Rathenau Institute, 
2017; Korff et al., 2017). The world’s biggest digital 
companies control a large part of the online public 
sphere and hold most personal data. Through the 
analysis of big data, they obtain ‘truths’ about hu-
man beings, their behaviour, needs and aspirations 
(Markham et al., 2018, p.4), as well as control over 
the users’ social behaviour and consumer prefer-
ences (Bakardjieva and Gehl, 2017). 
Connected to mass surveillance is the appearance 
of a phenomenon of voluntary self-surveillance that 
gained popularity through the so-called Quantified 
Self movement. Self-surveillance is seen through 
the use of tracking devices and corresponding plat-
forms, with the goal of controlling one’s indicators 
for the allegedly better management of life and 
health (Vesnic-Alujevic et al., 2015). While think-
ing about controlling their lives, users are often 
not aware of the fact that there are more parties 
involved in the technology and that the data they 
leave are not only available to themselves. A right 
‘not to be measured, analysed or coached’ by AI is 
needed (Rathenau Institute, 2017). 
f. Democracy and trust 
While dealing with ethical and societal implications 
of using algorithms, it is crucial to tackle their im-
pacts on democracy and the trust of citizens. The 
effects of new pervasive technologies on power 
relationships between governments, citizens and 
businesses are not straightforward. As we have 
discussed above, the lack of autonomy, privacy, re-
sponsibility, accountability, transparency and pos-
sibility for mass surveillance can impact deeply our 
democratic systems. In addition to issues discussed 
above, we should consider:  
Political profiling
Big data may be used not only for commercial ad-
vertising but also for political profiling, targeting 
and manipulation. A recent example is Cambridge 
Analytica and the way it used algorithms to target 
USA voters in the electoral campaign for the presi-
dential election in 2016. The accumulation of large 
amounts of data in the hands of one company or 
political party may have serious consequences for 
the erosion of democracy (Brundage et al., 2018). 
Social scoring systems based on AI optimisations 
of social processes might be dangerous for privacy, 
equality and freedom (Botsman, 2017). 
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Bots, disinformation and deep fakes
AI has been used as a political advertising tool to 
influence voter behaviour but also to manipulate 
the public. Influencing public opinion through algo-
rithm-enabled persuasion and manipulation, the 
use of political bots to spread false information 
has become easier than ever before. Bots have de-
creased trust in online environments and have cre-
ated an advantage for populist politics that reduces 
trust (Brundage et al., 2018). The so-called ‘deep 
fakes’, false audio-visual content generated by AI, 
are a novel challenge that we are likely to face in 
the very near future (EPSC, 2018).  
Freedom of expression
Free flow of information and the right to receive 
and impart information without interference are 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Court of 
Human Rights. These rights are being questioned 
because of the impact of algorithms and profiling 
in limiting users’ choice. In this context, platforms 
are becoming new information gatekeepers (Co-
lombo et al., 2017) and their responsibility in main-
taining freedom of expression needs to be clarified 
(Rathenau Institute, 2017). 
Algorithms in governance
The use of algorithms in governance has become 
very popular among researchers, and policymakers. 
Researchers are mostly interested in the perva-
siveness of algorithmic governance and its effects 
on power, freedom and human rights. According to 
Danaher (2017), ‘algocracy’ means using data min-
ing and analytics to predict and control human be-
haviour. This is done through hyper-nudges: dynam-
ic and personalised algorithmic nudging that can 
change and update based on the behaviour of their 
intended target (Yeung, 2016). This could threaten 
democratic societies if citizens lost agency and the 
possibility to participate freely in public life. 
At the same time, there may be opportunities to 
leverage some of the characteristics of the current 
digital transformation, including algorithms in gov-
ernance to increase democratic accountability and 
participation, and drastically change policy design 
and implementation (see Chapter 12). A societal 
debate about the opportunities and challenges in 
the use of algorithms in government is needed to 
direct future developments.
g. Cumulative knowledge as a common good?
In the longer term, there is also a need to start to 
reflect at all levels in society on the extent to which 
the digital data that constitutes the cumulative 
knowledge about society should also be consid-
ered a national asset, in a similar way to cultural 
assets and landscapes. The Mission Villani alluded 
to this issue in arguing for an AI strategy struc-
tured around the goals of sovereignty and strategic 
autonomy (Mission Villani, 2018). In this respect, we 
need to reflect on the need to widen the view of digi-
tal data as a public good to also include a dimension 
of preserving data about society for future genera-
tions, and consider whether the state should exercise 
some degree of sovereignty over national data.
AI is of the utmost importance to help build co-
herence among the actions and policies to address 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
achieve the EU Agenda 2030. The use of big data 
and AI is essential to identify synergies and trade-
offs among the various strategies for achieving the 
individual goals, and develop a systemic approach 
to SDGs. The level of democracy of the digital world 
and the way we address AI affects the sustainabil-
ity of our future.
 6.3 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we highlight some of the key di-
mensions of the ethical and societal debates on 
AI. As shown, the debate about ethical and social 
implications of AI for individuals and societies 
needs to move forward and fast. Political and 
regulatory frameworks seem to be lagging behind 
AI developments, which will soon pervade almost 
every aspect of our daily lives. To counter this sit-
uation, ‘regulatory foresight’ (EGE, 2018) and ‘eth-
ics foresight analysis’ (Floridi (2018) at the same 
level of ‘technological foresight’ (EDPS, 2018a), are 
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needed to keep up with the emerging implications 
of AI. This however cannot happen without a strong 
commitment to the following issues:
Clear ethical frameworks and guidelines
There is a recognition in Europe at both EC, and na-
tional level that a clear ethical framework is need-
ed. This is a rapidly evolving area with guidelines 
from the High-Level Expert Group expected by the 
end of 2018, as well as panels on ethics set up by 
national governments. We are also expecting work 
from the OECD, the UN, and professional organi-
sations such as the IEEE to contribute to the de-
bate. Then we will need to see how these proposed 
frameworks align and what gaps or inconsistencies, 
if any, they leave. At least in Europe, we can expect 
that the ethical framework and guidelines should 
be compatible with the EU principles and regula-
tory frameworks. 
In reviewing the issues, two new rights are suggested: 
1) The right to a meaningful human contact.
Every person should have the right to choose 
human contact and refuse to be cared for by 
a robot if he or she does not feel comforta-
ble with it (EP, 2016). At the same time, robots 
should respect the autonomy of humans in de-
cision-making. 
2) The right to refuse being profiled, tracked, 
measured, analysed, coached or manipulated 
(CoE, 2017; Rathenau Institute, 2017). 
Responsible AI design
The translation of values and norms into the 
design and operation of AI systems should be 
part of regulatory frameworks and guidelines. 
For instance, ‘privacy by design’ or ‘data protec-
tion by design and by default’ are now part of the 
GDPR. Similarly, we should think of designing AI 
applications that are ‘transparent, comprehensible, 
monitorable and accountable by design’, backed 
up by frameworks for auditing and evaluating with 
agreed international standards. 
This approach to responsible design is neces-
sary to build trust in the applications, but it is 
not by itself enough. As introduced in Section 6.1, 
technology is a social product which embodies and 
replicates social norms, values, and other economic, 
ecological, political, or cultural forces at any given 
time. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a multi- 
layered approach to AI design, including:
•  The critical engagement of civil society in 
 the development and use of algorithms in 
 different application areas with discussion 
 about who benefits, and what values should 
 be encoded into the systems (Jasanoff, 2013; 
 Boucher et al., 2014); 
•  The establishment of multi-stakeholder 
 fora to promote such pulic debate and trans- 
 late their outcomes into socio-political strate- 
 gies for AI enforcing ethical and social values 
 (Cath et al., 2018; Stilgoe, 2017);
•  The design practice of considering ethical 
 and social values (Aldewereld et al., 2015; 
 Van den Hoven et al., 2017; Nascimento et 
 al., 2016), and potential sources of bias in the 
 entire development process of the AI system: 
 from the selection of multidisciplinary and 
 diverse design teams, to the selection and 
 labelling of training data, evaluation of 
 outputs, and assessment of outcomes. 
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SUMMARY
In this chapter, we highlight the main legal issues raised by AI that concern, among others, 
fundamental rights, including personal data, the transparency and explainability of algorithms, 
and the suitability of existing liability rules. We also review the European legal frame- 
work with respect to data ownership, access and sharing regimes and intellectual property 
rights, and consider the different approaches to regulate disruptive technologies. We note the 
tensions between protecting rights of individuals and firms and encouraging innovation with 
trying to maximise openness and transparency. The task of policymaking is to manage change 
and regulate the adoption of new technologies to ensure that they are accepted to society 
and respect our fundamental values. We conclude that Europe is well placed to establish a 
distinctive form of AI that is ethically robust and protects the rights of individuals, firms, and 
society at large. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation, opposed by many when 
in preparation, is now perceived as a European asset and is inspiring similar approaches out-
side Europe. Extending this notion, we should consider the high standards of the European 
legal and regulatory landscape in a similar way as those in environmental quality which are 
an asset for Europeans and their future generations to build upon, not a barrier. 
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The GDPR has been a source of inspiration for legislators outside Europe 
 7.1 Main legal challenges identified  
 in European AI strategies 
As indicated in Chapter 4, several European Mem-
ber States, as well as the European Commission, 
are considering the challenges and opportunities 
afforded by AI. This section summarises the main 
legal challenges raised by widespread use of AI as 
identified in AI strategies and policy documents26. 
Section 7.2 and 7.3 develop more in detail data and 
Intellectual Property (IP) related issues.
 
One of the most critical issues in the strategies ex-
amined is how to ensure that AI algorithms operate 
in full respect of the European values and funda-
mental rights27 as well as of its ethical principles 
(see Chapter 6). Key elements of concern are po-
tential forms of discrimination by algorithms, and 
the need to develop not only ethical guidelines but 
also tools and design principles such as ‘ethics by 
design’. Other lines of action include mandating the 
assessment of impact on human rights or discrim-
ination when algorithms affect individuals or are 
used in public administration, or require algorithm 
auditing mechanisms. Within this context, there is 
a need to reflect on if and when automated de-
cision-making should be allowed. Naturally, some 
users and sectors (e.g. justice, health) are more 
sensitive than others in this regard.
In terms of personal data protection, certain pro-
visions in the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (EC, 2016a) have addressed some of the 
concerns mentioned above. These include: i) data 
protection by design and by default, ii) privacy im-
pact assessments, iii) (a relative) right to explan- 
ation as concerns the logic involved in automated 
decision-making, and iv) the right not to be subject 
to a decision based solely on automated process-
ing28. These provisions could serve as inspiration for 
other areas. As the GDPR has only recently come 
into force, there is a need to monitor its applica-
tion in the AI context. Some authors question the 
suitability of the GDPR to deal with AI (see Poullet 
2018a and b; Delforge et Gerard 2017; Watcher 
2017) on the basis of the difficulty to comply with 
the principles of purpose limitation (since AI sys-
tems are by nature general-purpose systems) and 
proportionality, as well as the requirement to ob-
tain legitimate consent. Criticism also concerns the 
perceived limitations as regards the so-called right 
to explanation. 
Within this context, transparency and explainability 
of algorithms are regarded as essential to under-
standing how decisions are made and give citizens, 
users and operators the possibility to challenge 
them. However, it is not yet clear how these re-
quirements should be addressed. Some referenc-
es may be found in public documents concerning: 
i) the processes to be put in place, (ii) the inter-
ference with IP protection, iii) the responsible ac-
tors to scrutinise algorithm decision making, and 
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iv) the development of guidance to assist in ex-
plaining AI. The EC is analysing the issue and has 
commissioned a study, AlgoAware29, to shed light 
on these (and related) aspects. 
Liability is another issue frequently raised in the 
legal literature and in policy debates. This is an es-
sential aspect to ensure that possible victims have 
efficient redress systems, but also that industry has 
legal certainty. The complexity of AI systems and 
the variety of actors intervening in the value chain, 
coupled with its self-learning and autonomous abil-
ities, can make it very difficult to allocate responsi-
bilities. Moreover, since the liability regime has been 
only partially harmonised, this subject is also a mat-
ter of national law. 
The main question is therefore: does the current 
liability and safety framework provide adequate 
mechanisms to deal with AI products and services 
liability? If not, what adjustments are necessary? 
This issue is being explored by the Expert Group on 
Liability and New Technologies, recently created by 
the EC (see Chapter 4) which is expected to report 
in mid-2019. The group is split into two assemblies. 
The first assembly will focus on the Product Lia-
bility Directive30 and will examine to what extent 
the provisions of the Directive are adequate to 
solve the questions of liability in relation to tra-
ditional products, new technologies and new so-
cietal challenges31. The second assembly, dealing 
with new technologies, ‘will assess whether and to 
what extent existing liability schemes are adapt-
ed to the emerging market realities following the 
development of the new technologies such as Arti-
ficial Intelligence […] and assist the Commission in 
developing EU-wide principles which can serve as 
guidelines for possible adaptations of applicable 
laws at EU and national level as regards the new 
technologies […]’.32
By mid-2019, the group is expected to issue a guid-
ance document on the interpretation of the Product 
Liability Directive in light of technological develop-
ments and to publish a report on the broader im-
plications for potential gaps in and orientations for 
the liability and safety frameworks for AI, the IoT 
and robotics.33
AI products or services, like everything else, can-
not be 100% guaranteed to be safe. A possible ap-
proach to manage safety is to define acceptable 
levels of safety for identified risks to be character-
ised by the probability of occurrence and severity 
criteria. This requires assigning quality levels for 
software and processes applicable from design to 
validation, according to the criticality of the soft-
ware modules and corresponding datasets contrib-
uting to the risks identified. Additional mitigation 
measures of a technical (e.g. diversified parallel 
developments) or operational nature (e.g. a cer-
tain level of human control) may need to be im-
plemented when residual risks are considered un-
acceptable. 
In addition to the areas mentioned above, nation-
al AI strategies also refer to the challenges posed 
by cybersecurity (see Chapter 10), and the need to 
facilitate testing platforms, including regulatory 
sandboxes, to support innovation as well as oth-
er legal areas such as consumer protection and 
competition law. Both legal commentators and the 
general press have recently warned of possible an-
ti-competitive behaviour that could take place in 
this context. Such concerns relate to collusion prac-
tices (including, for example, tacit collusion in price 
fixing), price discrimination, data concentration and 
to the role of privacy in competition assessment. 
National public authorities and stakeholders have 
recalled the need to remain vigilant in this regard 
(UK House of Lords 2018). The increasing power of 
certain platforms also raises concerns as regards 
their accountability as quasi-public actors in the 
digital society (EPSC 2018).  
The regulatory regime for non-personal machine- 
generated data (or sensor data) has been a recur-
ring question in the policy debate concerning AI or, 
more generally, the industry 4.0 revolution. This 
specific issue is explored further below.
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.  7.2 Ownership, access and data sharing
The discussion on the ownership of data has been 
extensively debated in the history of information 
technology law. The advent of the big data era 
brought a new impetus to this discussion both for 
both personal and non-personal data (Osborne 
Clarke, 2016). This section will focus mainly on 
the current discussion on the legal regime for non- 
personal machine-generated data although in 
certain cases the distinction may be artificial (see 
also Section 12.1).
The issue of the lack of a comprehensive legal 
framework for machine-generated data was raised 
in the Communication on Building a European Data 
Economy (EC 2017a). The EC, worried about the 
under-exploitation and lack of trade in machine- 
generated data, put forward a series of legislative 
and non-legislative options for discussion, among 
them the creation of a new data producer’s right. 
However, in the later Communication Towards a 
common European data space (EC 2018c), data 
ownership is hardly mentioned. Instead, the EC 
focuses on access to data and on fundamental 
measures such as a proposal to review the PSI 
Directive (EC, 2018d), a recommendation on ac-
cess to and preservation of scientific information 
(EC, 2018i) and a guidance document on the busi-
ness-to-business and business-to-government ex-
change (EC, 2018f). Recently, the EC has set up an 
expert group to assist in assessing issues around 
business-to-government data sharing.
There is no legal or statutory title providing for own-
ership of data either by traditional property rights 
or by intellectual property since data per se is not 
a copyright or patentable subject matter. At most, 
under certain circumstances data could become 
protected by the database’s sui generis right or by 
the Trade Secrets Directive (EC, 2016c), provided 
that certain conditions are met. In practice, provi-
sions on data access, use and sharing are regulated 
at the contractual level on the basis of a de facto 
ownership. Focusing on competition law, some au-
thors point out that the strict requirements of the 
essential facilities doctrine as well as the criteria 
developed to assess possible abuse of a dominant 
position in refusals to licence make traditional com-
petition law tests of limited use to promote access 
to data (Drexl et al., Drexl 2017, Poullet 2018b). Re-
cent studies predict that conflicts are likely to arise 
in the near future, but recognise that legal inter-
vention may be premature at this stage (Osborne 
Clarke, 2016 and in a more nuanced sense also 
Deloitte, 2018).
The need to create a new intellectual property right 
to incentivise data production and collection, com-
mercialisation, and access is something that has 
been explored by scholars with diverging views. 
For example, Zech (2016) and Van Asbroeck et 
al. (2017) favour the introduction of new owner-
ship rights for industrial data, while Drexl (2017a), 
Hugenholtz (2018) and Ramalho (2017a) are quite 
critical of such an idea. In short, recent economic 
research falls short of making a clear case for cre-
ating new IP rights for data (Kerber, 2016; Kerber & 
Frank, 2017; Duch-Brown et al., 2017).
While discussions on ownership are still inconclu-
sive, the debate has shifted to the issue of data 
access. In this regard, different options are being 
considered, including specific regulation, creating a 
new qualified right to access data, or a system of 
compulsory licences to grant access to data, either 
on a horizontal or sectoral basis34 (Drexl 2017b, 
JIIP 2018; Mezzanotte, 2017; Weber, 2017). Some 
scholars have even suggested a specific copyright 
exception, a fair use or an open norm that cover AI 
and other related uses without the authorisation 
of the copyright holders (among others, Geiger et 
al., 2018, and Schafer et al., 2015). Here we should 
recall that in 2016 the EC tabled a legislative pro-
posal that, among other things, proposed a man-
datory exception for text and data mining (TDM) 
for research purposes subject to a series of condi-
tions (Article 3 in EC 2016b).35 Although generally 
welcomed by the research community and by copy- 
right scholars, the proposal has not been exempted 
from criticism in relation to the conditions under 
which it should operate, being more restrictive than 
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the regime applicable in other countries (Geiger et 
al., 2018; Samuelson, 2018). All in all, copyright ex-
ceptions would only authorise the re-use but would 
not, strictly speaking, facilitate access to datasets.
As indicated at the beginning of this section, some 
scholars have noted that the distinction between 
personal and non-personal data is becoming more 
and more blurred. It is not only that non-personal 
data or anonymised data can be subject to tech-
niques linking them back to individuals, but also 
that recent reforms have made clear that the no-
tion of personal data includes data that allow in-
dividualisation, even if they do not reveal the indi-
vidual’s civil or legal identity36 (Poullet, 2018b). This 
must be taken into account when considering spe-
cific regimes for sensor or industrial data that may 
also include data susceptible to being considered 
as personal data.
 7.3 The protection of AI inventions/ 
 creations by intellectual  
 property rights
National AI strategies have so far paid little at-
tention to the challenges AI poses to the IPR legal 
framework. However, the increasing importance of 
AI technologies and the gaps identified by scholars 
in both the copyright and patent system (e.g. Guad-
amuz 2017; Michaux 2018, Ramalho 2018; 2017b; 
Schönberger 2018 or WEF 2018) reveal the need 
for further investigation. 
As regards the patentability of AI, the announce-
ment of the European Patent Office (EPO) of spe-
cific guidance on patentability criteria for AI is 
particularly welcomed. The new section on Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning provides some 
clarification on when AI-related subject matter has a 
technical character.37 The protection of AI-generated 
works or inventions seem to be more problematic. In 
light of the humanist approach of copyright law, it is 
questionable that AI-generated works deserve cop-
yright protection. As regards patent laws, although 
a priori nothing prevents AI-generated inventions 
from being patented, the assessment of the non- 
inventive step or the allocation of ownership may 
also raise issues that are not entirely solved.
While some copyright scholars clearly advocate for 
AI-generated works to be placed in the public do-
main, others have put forward a series of propos-
als aimed at ensuring a certain level of protection. 
With notable exceptions, these proposals are still 
too vague. They do not always sufficiently detail the 
possible elements underpinning such protection.
There is no doubt that certain AI-generated cre- 
ations/inventions may share the characteristics of 
information goods – non-excludable and non-ri-
valrous nature – that justify the creation of quasi 
monopolistic rights to foster innovation and com-
mercialisation. However, there are concerns whether 
incentives are needed, especially in cases where 
the investment cost is low, and what consequences 
such rights might have on the market, including on 
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creations or inventions made by humans. Would 
more property rights encourage or rather deter in-
novation? We clearly need to investigate these is-
sues further from a law and economics approach 
before favouring one solution or another.
 7.4 Regulatory approach
Every disruptive technology induces changes with 
an impact on society. Regulation is often consid-
ered necessary to address some of these impacts. 
The first difficulty when deciding about the most 
appropriate regulatory framework for AI is to an-
ticipate the impact it may have on society. The sec-
ond is to cope with the pace of AI advances. Other 
challenges include the level of complexity of AI, its 
autonomous and self-learning features and its per-
vasiveness across sectors. These features require 
both qualified interdisciplinary capacity (to better 
understand technologies and predict impact) and 
flexibility (to envisage frameworks that, while en-
forceable, can adapt with time) in policymaking. 
The implementation of regulatory sandboxes may 
be particularly useful in this respects.
While a hard-law approach may be needed in cer-
tain instances, co-regulation and soft-law schemes 
are often preferred in order not to stifle innovation 
– even if there may be cases where regulation also 
acts as an enabler for innovation. The role of cer-
tification and standardisation bodies, as well as 
that of other organisations representing stakehold-
er interests (notably citizens and consumers), are 
considered important. There is also a discussion on 
the approach of ‘regulation by design’, the need to 
act in an anticipatory vs. reactive way, innovation or 
precautionary principles, or to have either sectoral 
or horizontal regulation. While some institutions 
have proposed the adoption of regulation address-
ing part of the challenges highlighted in this section 
(EP 2017), most of them remain rather cautious.
In a global context, governance models should be 
explored in order to ensure that regulatory efforts 
are not isolated and to avoid regulatory patchworks 
leading to forum shopping (EGE 2018) or to a 
regulatory race to the bottom (Goldfarb and Trefler, 
2018a). Several actors have called for a global dia- 
logue on the establishment of norms and ethical 
rules or principles (e.g. UK House of Lords, 2017, or 
Mission Villani, 2018).
Considering the various issues at stake, and spe-
cifically their ethical dimension, it becomes crucial, 
whichever the approach adopted, to ensure stake-
holder involvement and, in particular, the engage-
ment of civil society in the law-making process. 
Inclusive and/or innovative platforms are being cre-
ated in an attempt to respond to these challenges. 
Thus, as already noted, the EC has recently estab-
lished the European AI Alliance to engage in a broad 
and open discussion of all aspects of AI development 
and its impact on the economy and society. The UK 
is ‘establishing a Ministerial Working Group on Fu-
ture Regulation to scan the horizon and identify the 
areas where regulation needs to adapt to support 
emerging technologies such as AI’, and a ‘Regula-
tors’ Pioneer Fund to support regulators to develop 
new approaches which enable emerging technolo-
gies’.38 Also in the UK, a recent report has proposed 
the creation of a new body, the Office for Responsi-
ble Technology, with three main functions: empower 
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regulators, inform the public and policymakers and 
support people to find redress (Miller et al., 2018).
 7.5 Summary and conclusion
AI is most likely going to have significant impacts 
on our lives, even more than past waves of digit- 
alisation. As with any major technological change, 
this will bring significant societal benefits, but will 
also pose new challenges across many economic 
segments, including transport, energy, healthcare, 
defence, education, leisure, farming and finance. 
The task of policymaking is to manage change and 
regulate the adoption of new technology in order to 
ensure that they are acceptable to society and re-
spect our fundamental values. The EU can provide 
guidance to the European countries on regulatory 
issues of AI while fostering the development of a 
single market for new technologies.
To foster the development and uptake of AI, citizens 
and industry operators need to be reassured that 
it complies with ethical and regulatory frameworks. 
Consumers and users of AI devices should benefit 
from mechanisms allowing redress in case of dam-
ages and from tools that allow them to supervise 
decisions taken by AI systems. Economic actors also 
need sufficient legal certainty to invest in AI tech-
nology. The initiatives adopted both at the European 
and national levels provide some hints on how these 
aspects may be addressed. 
The future EC guidelines on the ethical develop-
ment of AI and the findings of ongoing studies on 
transparency and explainability, along with parallel 
initiatives undertaken by others stakeholders, may 
lay the foundations for a fairer AI. The work of the 
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies is 
also expected to bring clarity on the most suitable 
rules to cope with unanticipated damages caused by 
AI systems. 
Compared with the other AI champions, such as the 
USA and particularly China, Europe is noted for its 
high regulatory standards for personal data pro-
tection. The GDPR is inspiring regulation across the 
world and informing good practices for the use of 
personal data even beyond EU data markets. The 
European policymaker can have a role in the setting 
of standards for human-centred AI, as has already 
been done in relation to privacy. 
Access and use of quality data are fundamental for 
many AI applications. However, empirical evidence 
shows that an optimal framework for trading and 
sharing of data has still to be realised (see Sec-
tion 12.1). Within this context, scholars have put 
forward a series of proposals to adjust the regula-
tory framework for non-personal machine-gener-
ated data. These go from enacting new ownership 
rights on data, to establishing access regimes or 
incentivising data sharing through soft-law instru-
ments. Sectoral approaches and solutions focused 
on regulating access (rather than on privileging the 
creation of new rights) are gaining prominence. In a 
context where the European data landscape is de-
centralised and fragmented (in comparison with that 
of other regions), the discussion on data governance 
becomes even more relevant and opens opportuni-
ties for different models to emerge. (See 12) 
In addition, the potential capacity of AI systems to 
generate inventions or creations has attracted the 
attention of scholars, some of them sceptical about 
the capacity of the existing IP framework to accom-
modate this phenomenon. Further economic and 
legal research is needed to assess to what extent 
adjustments to the legal framework or the creation 
of new rights are needed at all. 
Last but not least, we have briefly referred to the 
needs and tensions in the general debate on how to 
better regulate AI. In the discussion around regulat-
ing AI, the question is not only if there is a need 
for regulatory intervention but mainly which ap-
proach should be adopted to find a balance to 
support innovation and at the same time protect 
wider societal interests. The question is also how 
to ensure that policymakers are well equipped to 
make adequate and timely decisions in a rapidly 
changing, technology- and market-driven environ-
ment with an intrinsic global dimension.
SUMMARY
From an educational perspective, we observe in this chapter that AI has potential positive 
impacts on shortages of skills, learning, and teaching. Three crucial points stand out from 
the review: firstly, the need to understand better how the interaction with AI impacts human 
intelligence in cognitive capacities in both adults, and even more importantly, children. 
Secondly, we need to think beyond current needs and practices, and consider how AI is likely 
to change the relationship between education and work, and human development. Thirdly, we 
highlight possible risks related to AI in education, particularly privacy and ethical ones. In this 
chapter, we also provide an initial overview and geographic distribution of the academic offer 
of study topics related to AI. This is only the beginning of a monitoring and analysis process 
of academic supply but it already highlights potential priority areas where greater effort is 
needed to prepare society to fully harness the benefits of AI. 
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AI will change what and how we learn
 8.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s, and until re-
cently, educational applications of AI have mainly 
focused on the knowledge-based approach (see 
Sleeman and Brown, 1982). The most prominent 
line of research has been concerned with Intelli-
gent Tutoring Systems, or ITS (Woolf 2009). These 
systems have been successful mainly in relatively 
limited and unambiguous domains, such as mathe- 
matics and physics (Ritter et al., 2007; Graesser et 
al., 2005).
As student testing plays an important role in many 
educational systems, numerous projects try to 
use AI for automatic test generation and assess-
ment. AI is also used to diagnose student attention, 
emotion, and conversation dynamics in comput-
er-supported learning environments, for example 
for course development and management, in an 
attempt to generate optimal groups for collabora-
tive learning tasks, and to recognise patterns that 
predict student drop-out (Nkambou et al., 2018; 
Rosé et al., 2018). To do this effectively, large data-
sets are needed for training the systems, and the 
student behaviour needs to be actively monitored 
to provide feedback for personalised learning. This 
creates technical needs to monitor students unob-
trusively, for example using video processing and 
remote eye-tracking, with associated ethical and 
regulatory challenges. 
In special needs education, AI-based approaches 
have shown potential, for instance, in the early de-
tection of dyslexia (Drigas and Ioannidou, 2013). A 
well-published example is the Swedish company 
Lexplore that has developed a system that quickly 
scans for students at risk, and detects dyslexia by 
tracking reader eye movements (Jakobbson, 2017). 
AI-based systems have also been successfully de-
veloped for the diagnosis of autism spectrum dis-
order and attention-deficit disorders.
This section will take a closer look at some of these 
challenges related the impact of AI on skills de-
mand, and on learning and teaching. 
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 8.2 AI impact on skills demand, learning 
  and teaching 
 8.2.1 Direct AI impact on advanced skills 
  demand 
The development of new AI and ML models requires 
very high levels of competence in several areas. This 
is one of the reasons why AI experts are now being 
paid very high salaries. The number of AI neural ex-
perts may be doubling annually, but the basic knowl-
edge needed for state-of-the-art work in this area 
requires advanced levels of scientific, mathematical 
and technical skills that are not easy to acquire. De-
velopment of new AI methods requires a good un-
derstanding of statistics, linear algebra, differential 
equations, as well as computer architectures and 
esoteric39 programming approaches and tools. The 
required skill set is scarce, and estimates of the ac-
tual number of people with AI skills vary significantly, 
ranging from tens of thousands to a hundred thou-
sand. It is estimated that there are around 22 000 
PhD researchers in AI and some 5 000 people who 
have written academic articles or presented at AI 
conferences in recent years.40
It is expected that the high visibility of AI and the 
current demand will relatively rapidly direct talent 
to this area. As an example, since its launch in May 
2018, about 90 000 students from over 80 coun-
tries have enrolled in the six-week Elements of AI 
–course organised as part of the AI Education pro-
gramme at the Finnish Centre of AI.41 Due to the 
high wage differentials, current students in statis-
tics, mathematics, mathematical physics, computer 
and chip design, and perhaps neurophysiology may 
reconsider their career paths and find new opportu-
nities as experts in AI. Moreover, high-level AI com-
petences may also emerge from unexpected places, 
for example, through open software and open hard- 
ware communities. 
One rather immediate result of this situation is that 
high-level AI talent could probably be provided as a 
service, similarly to the Infrastructure of software 
as a service. This may mean that there is not going 
to be massive needs for high-level AI competences. 
Another issue is the likely impact of AI on changing 
skills demands for the existing workforce and the 
population at large. Some of these are mentioned 
in the next section on the impact of AI on learning. 
In Section 8.3, we report on a first scan of the type 
and distribution of AI-related study topics in Euro-
pean countries.
 8.2.2 Impact of AI on learning 
The way in which human intelligence and cogni-
tive capacities are affected by the interaction with 
machines and AI is an important area of research. 
Whilst recent scientific literature has focused on 
the interactions between AI systems and adults, 
there are important differences in the way chil-
dren deal with artificial systems that need to be 
researched further. 
In general terms, AI can be used in three different 
ways that may have different implications for the 
development of human cognitive capabilities both 
in children and adults. 
First, AI can support existing capabilities. When 
competences are understood as combinations of 
domain-specific expertise and behavioural reper-
toires42, AI can now reduce the need for domain spe-
cific knowledge and therefore make transversal and 
domain-independent generic skills more important. 
Second, AI can speed up cognitive development 
and create cognitive capabilities that would not be 
possible without technology. The mechanisation of 
human work has made possible things that would be 
impossible without technology; similarly, the mech-
anisation of cognitive work makes possible new ac-
tivities that have not been possible before. This has 
already happened. It would be impossible to design 
a modern microprocessor or a neural chip without 
computer-aided design tools that use extensive bod-
ies of design knowledge.
Third, AI may reduce the importance of some hu-
man cognitive capabilities, or make them obsolete. 
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For example, as AI can convert speech to text and 
vice versa, and do mathematical calculations, dys-
lexia or dyscalculia may become socially less im-
portant than it has been in the past. This has clear 
benefits for individuals, but the overall impact of 
making skills redundant through AI is not easy to 
predict. From a pedagogic point of view, it may be 
more beneficial to use AI to help people to develop 
competences that allow them to overcome diffi-
culties in reading and counting, instead of using AI 
to make redundant skills that underpin important 
cognitive capabilities.
It is also often assumed that AI systems enable 
new levels of personalisation and diversity for in-
formation systems. Much of this personalisation, 
however, results from fine-grained categorisation 
that puts users into pre-defined classes. Although 
these systems may be able to efficiently simulate 
personalisation, they do not necessarily support 
deeper levels of diversity. AI systems can be excel-
lent predictive machines, but this strength may be 
an important weakness in domains where learning 
and development are important.43  
 8.2.3 Impact of AI on teaching
There are some clear opportunities for AI in teach-
ing, such as student assessment in its various 
forms, and personalised tutoring systems. These 
systems use a knowledge-based architecture with 
a domain model that describes the area to be 
learned and a student model that describes the cur-
rent state of the student’s knowledge and learning. 
An expert system or pedagogical model manages 
the introduction of learning materials to the student 
through an adaptive and interactive user inter-
face. As student behaviour and learning can also 
be monitored in ITS environments in great detail, 
intelligent tutoring environments have also been an 
important source of data for research into learning 
(Porayska-Pomsta 2015). 
As these supervised AI learning algorithms are 
based on historical data, they can only see the 
world as a repetition of the past. This has deep 
ethical implications. When, for example, students 
and their achievements are assessed using such AI 
systems, the assessment is necessarily based on 
criteria that reflect cultural biases and historically 
salient measures of success. Supervised learning 
algorithms create unavoidable biases, and these 
are currently being debated extensively. 
The rapid advances in NLP and AI-based hu-
man-machine interfaces will also generate new 
pedagogical possibilities. For example, learning by 
teaching machines shows clear potential, while 
real-time machine translation also opens up new 
possibilities in language learning. 
Whilst it is possible to imagine many exciting pos-
sibilities for AI in teaching, without clear policies 
that put emerging technical possibilities in the 
broader context of the transformation of educa-
tion and the future of learning, educational AI 
will probably mainly be provided as solutions to 
existing problems. Instead of renewing the system 
and orienting it towards the needs of a post-indus-
trial economy and knowledge society, AI may there-
fore mechanise and reinvent outdated teaching 
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practices and make them increasingly difficult to 
change. It is therefore crucial to look beyond the 
current practices and ask fundamental questions 
about what competences and skills are needed in 
a digitally transformed society, and how we should 
teach them.
 8.3 AI skills and academic supply
To have a first understanding of the current academ-
ic supply on AI, we analysed all the 780 universities 
in the EU with a website containing both study pro-
grammes and keywords related to AI. A first screen-
ing showed that a higher number of bachelor studies 
have pages in local languages compared to English, 
while master studies are mostly advertised in En- 
glish and doctoral studies are almost only in Eng-
lish. This implies that our analysis, based on Eng-
lish only, has been able to capture almost all doc-
toral programmes in the EU countries, and most 
masters, but clearly underestimates the offering 
numbers from undergraduate courses in national 
languages. Notwithstanding this limitation, to be 
addressed in future work, we identified 693 study 
topics related to AI. 
Figure 10 shows the country profiles for academ-
ic offer (at all levels) by thematic field of the pro-
grammes, which are the result of the combination 
of techniques and application fields taught in the 
academic programmes in the AI domain: comput-
er vision and natural language processing, ML and 
DL, and robotics. The first one is a combination of 
two subfields: methods and developments in image 
processing, object detection and computer vision, 
and the field that treats natural language, including 
speech recognition, machine translation and com-
putational linguistics. The figures show that in most 
countries a high proportion of programmes focus 
on robotics (81% in all EU), followed by computer 
vision and NLP (12% in all EU) and computer vision 
and NLP (7%). 
Figure 10. AI thematic profiles in academic programmes (as % of total programmes)
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In Figure 11, we show a geographical distribu-
tion of universities offering study topics related to 
AI. The locations are superimposed on the distri- 
bution of science and technology skills at NUTS2 
level, to show where there are significant gaps and 
opportunities to upskill the local workforce (see 
also Chapter 13). It is worth underlying that this is 
only a preliminary analysis and that the academic 
offer is underrepresented where study topics are 
offered in the national language, as at this stage 
we only analysed material available in English.
 8.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we have identified that AI already 
contributes to education particularly through intel-
ligent tutoring systems, student assessment, and 
helping to identify potential learning challenges. 
We havee explored potential impacts on shortages 
of skills, on learning and on teaching. Three crucial 
points stand out from the review: firstly, the need 
to understand better how the interaction with AI 
impacts human intelligence in cognitive capacities 
in both adults, and even more importantly, children. 
Secondly, we need to think beyond current needs and 
practices, and consider how AI is likely to change the 
relationship between education and work, and human 
development. Thirdly, we have highlighted possible 
risks related to AI in education, particularly privacy 
and ethical ones (for further reading see Tuomi, 2018).
We have also provided an initial overview and geo-
graphic distribution of the academic offer of study 
topics related to AI. The academic supply of study 
topics related to AI shows a strong focus on robot-
ics, reflecting one of the current areas of strength 
in Europe. Further research is needed to improve 
on this analysis, which nevertheless provides some 
material for reflection on areas of the current low 
level of science and technology skills where rein-
forcing the provision of courses may be consid-
ered important. This is relevant to the discussion in 
Chapters 12 and 13 on possible strategies to start 
preparing society, and the most vulnerable regions, 
to the challenges that AI will bring.
Figure 11. Distribution of universities offering AI study topics over human resources in science and technology 2017. 
Source: Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2018, and JRC
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we analyse the literature and evidence available to date on the potential 
impacts, both positive and negative, with respect to work, growth and inequality. In relation to 
work, we find that neither theory nor evidence are very conclusive at the present time. AI could 
complement and enhance human activity, replace an increasing number of routine tasks, or 
both. Another area of uncertainty is the extent to which AI has the potential to spur economic 
growth. When considered as a general-purpose technology, AI could spread across many jobs 
and industrial sectors, boosting productivity, and yielding strong positive growth. To the extent 
that ML generates new insights from data, it may also contribute to the production of new 
ideas and innovation itself. Economic growth models are starting to explore various scenarios 
but there is no empirical evidence yet that favours one or the other. 
When it comes to inequality, we find that AI can affect unfavourably the distribution of income 
through many channels. The most discussed concern job polarisation, reduction in job quality 
at the lower end, and also greater difficulty for lower-skilled workers to adjust to change and 
find new jobs, with longer periods of unemployment than those with higher qualifications and 
skills. Some regions of Europe are more vulnerable to these challenges if no action is taken 
to prepare society. Therefore, a very proactive strategy needs to be put in place to build the 
resilience of regions across Europe. 
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AI has a wide range of potential economic implications for employment and income distribution.
In this chapter, we discuss the potential impact of 
AI on jobs, growth and inequalities, based on the 
scientific literature and evidence available to date. 
There are concerns over the potential impact of AI 
on the labour market and income inequalities. Some 
alarmist studies predict massive job losses as AI re-
places human labour. On the other hand, historic ev-
idence shows that previous waves of innovation re-
placing workers with machines ultimately generated 
more jobs and higher incomes. We examine if there 
are reasons why this time things could be different 
in the case of AI. AI is likely to improve productivity 
and economic growth over a wide range of sectors 
in the economy. This could give a welcome boost 
to the current productivity slow-down. At the same 
time, the non-rival and general-purpose character-
istics of AI could speed up change across multiple 
sectors and lead to greater impacts than past waves 
of innovation, creating more friction in labour mar-
kets. We also focus attention on the distribution-
al impact of AI and the risk that it may exacerbate 
among existing regional and income disparities.
 9.1 Potential impact of AI on jobs
Debates on the impact of technological change on 
employment go back at least to the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution. Back then, the Luddites 
attacked spinning machines because they displaced 
human labour in the textile industry. However, the 
long-run historical evidence eases our fears about 
being made redundant by machines. Ever since the 
Industrial Revolution, and despite many subsequent 
waves of innovation and mechanisation, human 
employment and incomes have strongly increased, 
not decreased. Still, with every major new inven-
tion, these fears resurge – as with AI. 
Do we have any reasons to assume that this time 
will be different, or can we continue to draw com-
fort from the historical evidence to date?  
Traditional economic theory revolves around the 
magnitude of the substitution effect between 
workers and machines. It suggests that machines 
(including AI algorithms in computers) and human 
labour are not perfect substitutes. Machines may 
replace workers but cannot do entirely without 
them; they are to some extent complementary.
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When the demand for machines increases be- 
cause they are more productive and cheaper than 
workers, this will also increase demand for keep-
ing workers who are necessary to operate the ma-
chines as the goods produced with the machines 
become cheaper. Moreover, machines will increase 
workers’ productivity and wages for the remaining 
human tasks. In this view, technological improve-
ment boosts the demand for labour. The long-run 
historical evidence seems to support this.
More recently, however, economists have started to 
look at this from a new perspective. First, recent 
evidence shows that while employment may be 
growing in advanced industrial economies, a rapid 
increase in the capital share is causing a relative 
decline in the labour share in value added (or in total 
income generated by the economy) (Karabarbou-
nis and Neiman, 2013). Evidence of rising income 
inequality lends further support to the sceptical 
view on the impact of recent technological ad-
vancement on labour markets. That triggered the 
search for new economic models to explain these 
observations.
A recent task-based model of employment (Ace-
moglu and Restrepo, 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b) 
provides a better explanation for these phenome-
na. This model starts from the observation that the 
primary effect of automation is to replace workers 
with machines when the latter are more productive 
at a specific task. That displacement effect inev- 
itably reduces the wage share of value added for 
that task and increases the share of capital or prof-
its in value added. However, technological innov- 
ation may also lead to the creation of new tasks for 
workers that did not exist previously and cannot be 
done (yet) by machines. This reinstatement effect 
may increase human employment. The combination 
of displacement and reinstatement effects reallo-
cates tasks between workers and machines. As such, 
displacement and reinstatement are in addition to 
the traditional effects in the substitution model. 
The crucial difference with the traditional substitu-
tion effect is that the latter changes the demand 
for workers and machines but without a realloca-
tion of these production factors to specific tasks. 
Other effects need to be added to complete the 
picture. Machines may increase the productivity of 
workers for their remaining tasks and thereby push 
up wages and/or reduce product prices. Changes in 
relative prices across products will affect demand 
for products from different sectors and change the 
composition of the product basket in the economy.
Recent empirical evidence (Acemoglu and Restre-
po, 2018c) based on USA data offers some sup-
port for this task-based model of labour markets 
effects of automation. The share of wages in GDP 
has been declining strongly in manufacturing, but 
not in services. The authors show that the tradi-
tional price-driven substitution and productivity ef-
fects are too weak to explain this decline. The main 
drivers of the decline have been the change in task 
content and, to a lesser extent, the sector composi-
tion effect. They decompose the task content effect 
in both a displacement and reinstatement effect. In 
the USA at least, displacement due to automation 
of existing tasks has been stronger than growth in 
new tasks. 
Evidence for newly created jobs is based on new 
occupational titles in job statistics. It is not clear, 
however, whether new titles represent new tasks 
or only a re-bundling of existing ones. There is no 
consensus on the definition of tasks that may 
vary across different levels of granularity. It is 
not clear how distinct tasks are from other related 
tasks, how skills that can be domain-specific or do-
main-general affect the ability to perform a task, 
and how the automation/replacement of particular 
tasks affects the structure of individual occupations.
Gregory et al. (2018) apply a comparable task-
based framework to EU data for the period 1999-
2010. They confirm the existence of a strong em-
ployment-reducing substitution effect but also find 
that complementary demand and spillover effects 
more than compensate for this, so that the net em-
ployment effect of technology is positive. However, 
this finding depends on capital income gains from 
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technological progress feeding back into product 
demand. If only wage income gains feedback into 
demand, the total labour effect is only half as large. 
This underlines the importance of income redistri-
bution policies (see Section 9.3). 
Note that the historical period covered by the USA 
and EU studies dates back long before AI emerged 
as an automation technology. As such, it offers only 
a general view on the impact of technological innov- 
ation on employment, not a specific AI perspective.
Economists have tried to find more recent empir-
ical evidence that is more closely related to the 
introduction of AI technology, in two ways. A first 
avenue was to try to be forward-looking and es-
timate the risk of automation of occupations. 
Some alarmist studies produced estimates of 
the percentage of human occupations at risk of 
being automated in the foreseeable future, vary-
ing from almost 50 % (Frey and Osborne, 2017) 
down to 13 or 9 % (Arntz et al., 2016; Nedelkoska 
and Quintini, 2018).44 A major problem with these 
studies is that they focus only on the displace-
ment effect and ignore all the positive employ-
ment effects that AI could induce – as explained 
in the task-based model by Acemoglu and Re-
strepo (2018c). Another problem is that the level 
of granularity of the definition of tasks creates 
high variability in the results. Occupational or even 
sub-occupational level approaches to skills are too 
coarse-grained to be reliable. Both problems lead 
to an overestimation of job displacement effects 
and excessively alarmist results.
The degree of routine in tasks is an important 
criterion to assess whether they can be replaced 
by AI (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018), although creative 
and social interaction tasks are not necessarily be-
yond the scope of today’s ML algorithms provided 
that large quantities of data are available to train 
the algorithm. The organisation of work in a par-
ticular social context, rather than the task itself, 
may also be an obstacle to automation (Fernan-
dez-Macias and Bisello, 2017).
A second research direction was to focus on the 
impact of industrial robots on employment and 
wages. Robots constitute a mechanically embod-
ied form of AI that is more easily observable and 
measurable than algorithms. However, they are an 
imperfect proxy measure for AI because robots are 
rival products that can only be used for one task at 
the time while AI algorithms are non-rival and can 
be used for many tasks at the same time. In fact, 
neither the task-based model nor the pure labour 
displacement studies consider the implications of 
the non-rival nature of AI. Also, robots are mainly 
employed in manufacturing, especially car manu-
facturing, not in services. This results in selection 
bias in the evidence. Some evidence from the USA 
suggests a negative impact of robots on employ-
ment and wages. There is conflicting evidence for 
the EU where one study suggests a negative im-
pact while a second study for Germany comes to 
the opposite conclusion (Chiacchio et al., 2018; 
Dauth et al., 2018).
Although the literature is not conclusive on the 
net employment effects of robotisation, there is 
ample evidence pointing to major reallocations 
and broad structural changes. The speed and ef-
ficiency of these changes can also influence the 
net employment effect: Korinek and Stiglitz (2017), 
for example, discuss the possibility of technolog-
ical unemployment as a transition phenomenon. 
Such a case gets strong support from the recent-
ly emerged view among scholars of globalisation 
that the reallocation of workers among sectors is 
not frictionless, it can take many years, and the 
implied costs may be equivalent to multiple years 
of lost income for workers (see Hornok and Koren, 
2017, for an overview). It is reasonable to expect 
that AI-induced reallocations would face similar 
challenges.
The speed of AI uptake is thus important not 
only for the expected productivity gains, but for 
the implied reallocation process, too. However, at-
tempts to predict this speed are subject to wide un-
certainty (McKinsey Global Institute, 2018).
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A final, more philosophical point is to recognise that 
employment is not just paid market work. It also in-
cludes work at home or in communities, and may 
have an intrinsic value. As stated by Korinek and 
Stiglitz (2017), “jobs provide not only income but also 
other mental services such as meaning, dignity and 
fulfilment to humans”. To counteract the potential 
loss of paid jobs, policies may need to promote other 
fulfilling ways to spend time (Stevenson, 2017).
 9.2 Potential impact of AI on growth
We tend to look at the employment effects of 
AI from a worrisome angle – the risk of workers 
being displaced by machines – and forget about 
the promising effects of AI: AI machines can 
boost productivity compared to human labour 
and therefore generate more economic benefits 
for all. This would be very welcome in the current 
period where economies are suffering from slowing 
productivity growth.
Economists see human labour, (AI) machines, and 
innovative ideas as production factors in the growth 
equation (Aghion et al., 2017). These factors pro-
duce an output that is sold, the value of which is 
shared between labour and machines (or capital). 
Growth economists look at the rate of growth of 
that production as well as the distribution of the 
value of production between capital and labour. 
They use existing models of economic growth to 
simulate two types of future AI-driven scenarios.
The first type of scenario focuses on the production 
of goods and services, and on the substitution or 
complementarity between humans and machines 
in that production process. Even an extreme scen- 
ario whereby nearly all human tasks would be car-
ried out by AI yields a reassuring outcome: the la-
bour share in the value of output will remain high 
because remaining human tasks become very pro-
ductive and highly remunerated. The ‘last’ human 
task will fetch an extremely high wage. That wage 
will have to be redistributed among unemployed 
workers in order to ensure some income for the lat-
ter.45 Economic growth will continue in that scenario 
at a steady pace, although an initial increase in the 
share of AI machines (capital) in the value of output 
may slow down growth.
The second type of scenario focuses on the impact 
of AI on the production of innovative ideas which, 
so far, has been the unique property of human la-
bour. The invention of new ideas can be seen as 
a production process with a series of tasks, some 
of which can be automated and taken over by AI. 
Again, we can simulate an extreme scenario where-
by all tasks for the production of new ideas are tak-
en over by AI. This would lead to a ‘singularity’46 
scenario whereby economic growth would become 
infinitely high in finite time. However, even that sce-
nario will run into constraints, including physical 
constraints to carry out an infinite number of ma-
chine tasks. Less extreme scenarios lead to a step-
wise increase in the level of the economic growth 
rate but without becoming explosive.
These growth scenarios remain rather theoretical. 
In terms of empirical evidence, they run into the 
same problems as employment forecasts: there 
are no data yet to gauge the impact. In addition, 
available evidence for previous episodes of mas-
sive mechanisation might not fit the peculiar fea-
tures of the AI revolution. Still, growth economists 
are trying to push forward the ‘time frontier’ in the 
empirical evidence, either by looking at past waves 
of innovation in other technologies or by examining 
the economic nature of AI as a new technology. 
Cockburn et al. (2018) find preliminary evidence 
that AI is a general-purpose technology47 that fits 
a wide range of applications and spreads rapidly 
across many sectors and industries. This could ac-
celerate the productivity and growth effects. They 
also find that AI can, unlikely any previous technol-
ogy, automate and accelerate the invention process 
itself, and thus the speed of innovation. This would 
ultimately translate into accelerated productivity 
growth. As an example, Agarwal et al. (2018) show 
how the use of AI in the pharmaceutical and chem-
ical industries speeds up the process of discovery 
of new molecules for useful applications. These 
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‘recombinant growth’ scenarios show how AI can 
be better than humans at detecting promising new 
combinations of existing technologies or knowledge. 
Other authors caution about the time it takes to 
roll out these optimistic forecasts. Brynjolfsson et 
al. (2017) argue that the Solow ‘productivity par-
adox’ - rapid growth in AI investments combined 
with slow increases in productivity benefits – ap-
plies to AI as well. The realisation of the full ef-
fects of AI on productivity may take many years 
because it requires the development of comple-
mentary innovations, organisational changes and 
new human labour skills. Brynjolfsson et al. (2018) 
find some evidence that the uptake of a general- 
purpose technology like AI follows a J-curve effect. 
The initial impact may be negative because heavy 
intangible investments in reorganisation and re-
training drag down growth that only rebounds in 
later years. Historical evidence suggests that ear-
lier general-purpose technologies followed a similar 
pattern. The fact that AI is a general-purpose tech-
nology would not be a reason to expect things to be 
different this time.
Besides its direct effects on the production of goods 
or ideas, AI can also affect growth by changing 
firm behaviour and market competition. If existing 
leading products or technologies are easily imitated 
by competitors in AI, it can either discourage poten- 
tial innovators, or lead firms at the technology 
frontier to innovate more in order to escape fierce 
competition by the imitators. At any rate, easier 
imitation implies that AI-intensive production sec-
tors might become congested in relatively little time. 
AI-driven platforms that handle massive amounts 
of data may adversely affect competition and lead 
to the emergence of a dominant platform – par-
ticularly if there are economies of scale, local exter-
nalities or rents. Algorithmic collusion may distort 
competition in some markets. This situation of mo-
nopoly, or at best oligopoly, may restrict access to 
the data collected by the platforms with non-trivial 
implications for trade and government regulations 
(Goldfarb and Trefler, 2017), and makes a case for 
antitrust considerations (Giles, 2018).
AI might also affect firm organisation along several 
dimensions. First, it might change endogenously the 
degree of complementarity/substitutability between 
workers with different skills – something that is 
considered fixed in the standard growth models. 
By facilitating the outsourcing of some low-skilled 
tasks, AI would at the same time strengthen the 
complementarity of those who are retained within 
the firm with the high-skill tasks that cannot be out-
sourced. By the same token, if AI reduces informa-
tion asymmetries and facilitates monitoring, it can 
promote downstream delegation of power and more 
decentralisation of authority. The end result for AI 
intensive sectors would be larger and more horizon-
tally integrated firms, with more profit centres, which 
outsource an increasing number of tasks to inde-
pendent self-employed agents (Aghion et al., 2017).
Finally, similarly to what has happened with the IT 
revolution, the effect of the diffusion of know- 
ledge from AI might disproportionately benefit 
high-tech sectors (Baslandze, 2016). 
  The realisation 
of the full 
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 9.3 Potential impact of AI on inequality
The majority of the literature predicts an un-
favourable impact of AI on the distribution of 
incomes. The most widely discussed and debated 
aspect is the increase in labour income inequality. 
Evidence suggests that labour market polarisation 
plays an important role in this. We observe polar-
ising labour markets because tasks that are not 
easily performed by AI tend to be found at opposite 
ends of the skills spectrum while AI tends to replace 
humans in tasks that correspond to the ‘mid-skill’ 
category (Autor et al., 2003). Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) and Autor and Salomons (2017) show sug-
gestive evidence from the USA on how job polar- 
isation translates into wage polarisation or even a 
polarisation in working conditions. 
There is evidence for Europe, too, that labour mar-
ket polarisation leads to a widening of wage gaps. 
Goos et al. (2014) find that improved technology has 
led to increased demand for both well-paid, high-
skilled as well as low-paid low-skilled jobs while the 
demand for middle-income jobs decreased, thus 
supporting the hypothesis that technological pro-
gress can lead to income inequality. Yet, there are 
substantially differing trends in labour market po-
larisation between European countries (Goos et al., 
2014; Darvas and Wolff, 2016), which can be ex-
plained by country-specific institutions and policies 
(Fernández-Macías, 2012; Fernández-Macías and 
Hurley, 2016).
A report by the OECD (2018) shows a different type 
of polarisation that is regional and occurs within 
countries. For instance, the share of jobs at high 
risk of automation varies by 12 % between regions 
in Spain but only by 1 % between regions in Canada. 
Technological progress tends to perpetuate the de-
velopmental divide within countries as regions that 
are expected to be more negatively affected by 
technological progress also exhibit low productivity 
growth and high unemployment rates.
Despite similar positive trends in labour demand 
for both high- and low-paying jobs, we observe di-
verging trends in respective job quality. On the one 
hand, technological progress leads to increasing 
wages in high-paying jobs that require skills which 
complement AI (Deming, 2017). In contrast, tech-
nological progress causes even further reductions 
in wages at the lower end of the wage distribution 
down to a level that does not support a reasonable 
standard of living (Autor and Salomons, 2017). The 
accompanying digitalisation of the economy and 
the emergence of platforms causes an increase in 
precarious forms of self-employment that are char-
acterised by a limited duration, such as seasonal or 
on-call work, as well as the absence of social secu-
rity coverage (OECD, 2018). This, too, contributes 
to increasing inequality even further.
As discussed in a previous subsection, the speed 
of adoption of AI in the labour market could cause 
box 7. The impact of AI on working 
 conditions
Because its use in actual work processes is still very limited, 
there is very little hard evidence yet on the impact of AI on 
working conditions. A recent Eurofound report based on the 
qualitative analysis of five emerging technologies in European 
manufacturing (including advanced robotics and the Internet 
of Things, which make intensive use of AI) concludes that there 
are some concerns in this sense, in particular with respect to the 
degree of autonomy, privacy and control of workers (Eurofound 
2018). Digital factories where all objects are equipped with 
connected sensors and where workers collaborate with 
advanced robots can easily become digital panopticons, where 
human operators feel permanently monitored and controlled. It 
seems difficult to maintain any sense of privacy 
at work if every object is a monitoring device. And 
while management through algorithms and big data analytics 
can significantly improve the efficiency of the labour process, it 
can also lead to routinisation of tasks, work intensification and 
the asphyxiation of any sense of autonomy. On the other hand, 
the introduction of advanced robots, connected 
devices and big data in the workplace can also 
contribute to a decline of repetitive and routine 
work, as well as a reduction in the number of hazardous tasks. 
AI-enabled workplaces are likely to be safer, with more skilled 
workers carrying out less repetitive work.
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transitional unemployment if AI makes workers 
redundant at a faster pace than they can move on to 
new jobs (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017). Differences in 
the pace of AI adoption across different regions 
and sectors, as well as differences between work-
ers in their ability and speed to adjust to occup- 
ational changes may further increase inequality. 
For instance, historical data suggests that low-skill 
workers are slower than high-skill ones in adjusting 
to sudden structural labour market changes and 
transitioning to new sectors and occupations. This 
results in longer period of transitional unemploy-
ment for low-skill workers (Goolsbee, 2018). The 
same has been established in the context of glob- 
alisation: Dix-Carneiro (2014) finds that female, 
less-educated and older workers face substantially 
higher costs of reallocation. 
New evidence from the impact of robots on the 
manufacturing sector in Germany suggests that 
transitional unemployment effects may not be 
that strong as a large part of the workers manage 
the transition within their firms and across occup- 
ations. Yet, this job security comes at the cost 
of reduced wage growth for adjusting workers 
(Dauth et al., 2018). 
Such significant reallocations can easily generate a 
sense of unfairness. Rodrik (2018) argues that so 
far this has been mainly associated with globalisa-
tion. Nevertheless, such sentiments may be evoked 
in the future with respect to automation and digital 
technologies, leading to a political backlash against 
technological progress, and AI in particular.
Job polarisation exerts its effect mostly on the dis-
persion of labour income. There are, however, add- 
itional channels through which the overall distribu-
tion of income (and hence inequality) may change. 
First, AI increases the share of capital income rel-
ative to that of human labour (Korinek and Stiglitz, 
2017; Sachs, 2017). Together with the high de-
gree of concentration of AI industries, it may lead 
to an increase in the inequality of capital income 
and also total income. Second, the extra wealth 
created by AI is likely be shared unequally across 
box 8. AI and digital labour platforms
Digital labour platforms can be defined as digital networks 
that coordinate labour service transactions in an algorithmic 
way (Pesole et al., 2018; Gomez et al., 2017). Although they 
are still marginal in terms of employment, they represent a 
radical departure from traditional forms of work and thus do 
not fit well into existing categories or regulations. Their use of 
digital technologies, such as geolocation, big data analytics and 
algorithmic management, allow them to break the traditional 
boundaries between markets and firms, performing functions 
of both mediation and management for the transactions they 
coordinate. They also imply a radical change in the nature of 
work, because their coordination efficiency facilitates the direct 
provision of labour services in small discrete tasks, breaking 
up the traditional bundling of tasks into jobs and occupations 
(Fernández-Macías 2018).
What is the role of AI in digital labour platforms? Since they 
rely on big data analytics and complex algorithmic rules, 
digital labour platforms already make intensive 
use of AI techniques. But the potential for advanced AI 
techniques to continue expanding the coordination efficiency of 
digital labour platforms is big, and will be crucial for its further 
development.
Digital labour platforms illustrate the potential effect of AI 
on employment which goes beyond the direct replacement or 
augmentation of existing labour input. The use of AI for the 
management and coordination of labour has the potential 
to change the organisation of work significantly, 
alter the very nature of employment contracts and further 
develop the division of labour and task specialisation.
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countries. Winner countries will have higher income 
levels, and more room for domestic redistributive 
policies (Lee, 2017). Third, as time evolves, AI may 
enable improved health and skills, leading to forms 
of human enhancement. If not limited by policies, 
the ability to ‘purchase’ skills and health will fur-
ther widen pre-existing inequalities (Harari, 2015; 
Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017).
It is commonly agreed that policy measures are 
needed to counteract the negative effects of tech-
nological progress on equality. Besides increasing 
access to high-paying jobs raising the overall skill 
level through increased education expenditures, 
policies should further ensure a reasonable stand-
ard of living. The literature discusses several types 
of policies to achieve this goal, such as universal 
basic income or guaranteed employment (Furman 
and Seamans, 2018), policies that aim at a redis-
tribution from ‘winners’ to ‘losers’ and policies that 
shift the taxation of human labour towards the 
taxation of capital (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017). In 
any case, the within-country regional variation of 
the impact of technological progress suggests that 
policies should be adjustable to local needs, where 
local offices can help in the design of targeted pol-
icies. It is important to be aware that such policies 
may lead to inefficiencies (equity-efficiency trade-
off), reducing the size of the pie to be distributed. 
Further empirical analysis is necessary to assess 
the effectiveness of these policies.
Despite these negative prospects of technological 
progress on equality, there might be some bene-
fits from the peculiar features of AI. As a general- 
purpose technology AI could yield equality en-
hancing effects. For instance, according to Acemo-
glu and Restrepo (2016), AI can create new tasks 
which can be performed by high-skilled workers in 
the short run. Yet, as these tasks become stand-
ardised in the long run, low-skilled workers can also 
benefit from them. In addition, AI shows potential 
to disrupt the spiral of labour market polarisation. 
It may be able to perform high-skill tasks that were 
previously beyond the abilities of technology, such 
as the classification of case documents for lawyers 
or the reading of medical images. Even creative and 
social tasks are not out of the realms of AI abil- 
ities (Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017). In the end, 
AI may produce depolarising effects.
 9.4 Summary and conclusions 
To date, the theoretical and empirical economic 
research literature is ambiguous on the growth, 
employment and wage effects of AI. It can be nega- 
tive if machines only substitute human labour, but 
positive if machines instead complement human 
workers and increase overall productivity. Empirical 
studies use historical data that go back long be-
fore the rise of AI. They can tell us something about 
technological change in general but little about AI 
specifically. A recent USA study finds a negative 
impact of technology on jobs and wages. An EU 
study finds a positive impact, also because capital 
gains feedback into overall demand. Studies that 
use robotics data as a (rival) proxy for (non-rival) AI 
investments generate inconclusive evidence about 
the impact of AI. Some forward-looking studies es-
timate the number of jobs at high risk of AI-driven 
automation. They produce excessively alarmist re-
sults because they only look at substitution and omit 
complementarity.
Focusing only on employment effects ignores the 
potential of AI for economic growth which could 
generate benefits for all. AI as a general-purpose 
technology can rapidly spread across industry sec-
tors and yield strong positive growth effects. To the 
extent that ML generates new insights from data, 
it may contribute to the automation of production 
of new ideas and innovation itself. The ‘productiv-
ity paradox’ becomes more apparent as the rapid 
growth in ML applications does not seem to be re-
flected yet in the productivity growth statistics. 
The macroeconomic outcomes of AI are likely to be 
shaped by firm behaviour. In this respect, the issues 
of market structure, organisation and sectoral re-
allocation seem particularly relevant. In perspect- 
ive, policy interventions might be needed precisely 
in these areas in order to: i) ensure a competitive 
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stance of the market that incentivises innovation; ii) 
avoid that economies of scale in data handling lead 
to excessive market concentration, and in general 
other competitive advantages stemming from dif-
ferences in national regulations; and iii) ensure that 
sectoral reallocation takes place with limited social 
costs, e.g. from job market displacement.
AI can unfavourably affect the distribution of in-
come through many channels. The most discussed 
are job polarisation, regional differences in AI 
adoption, or regional, sectoral or individual dif-
ferences in the speed of adjustment to structural 
labour market changes. Preliminary empirical ev-
idence seems to confirm these concerns. There is 
also a strong case for potential inefficiencies in 
the implied labour reallocation process, which are 
likely to hurt specific groups disproportionate-
ly. It is commonly agreed that policy measures 
are necessary to counteract the negative effects 
of technological progress on equality. Strong 
within-country variation in technological progress 
suggests that policies should also be adjustable 
to local needs. 
Whether or not policy will be effective in mitigat-
ing the potential adverse effects of automation is 
an empirical question. The nature of AI as a gen-
eral-purpose technology offers some room for 
hope that the effect of AI on equality may not be 
all negative. It can be positive if AI boosts the cre- 
ation of new tasks for low-skill workers and ex-
pands its abilities to perform high-skill tasks. 
Given these uncertainties, there is a need for a 
strong monitoring framework to also detect at 
regional and subregional levels the potential im-
pacts of AI deployment and to quickly put in place 
appropriate intervention. We return to this import- 
ant issue in Chapter 13 on resilience.  
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SUMMARY
In this chapter, we reflect on the transformations and impacts brought by the advent 
of AI to cybersecurity and, conversely, how AI algorithms themselves are affected 
by security concerns. When it comes to cybersecurity, it is crucial to be aware of the 
fundamental dual nature of AI. It will empower human operators, professionals and 
investigators and it will bring benefits to cybersecurity. However, those who seek to 
attack systems and networks are equally expected to take advantages of AI to carry 
out faster and smarter cyber-attacks. 
Moreover, AI systems based on ML techniques are often not robust enough against 
malicious attacks, introducing a range of new and poorly understood vulnerabilities. 
This could pose a danger for the security of the systems using them. To review all 
these developments in context, we describe a range of recent AI applications in cyber-
security, outline the specific vulnerabilities of AI systems and related attacks, and 
suggest ways of increasing AI robustness and introduce security and safety by design 
principles. 
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 10.1 Background: AI and cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is the field broadly concerned with the 
security of digital information, systems and services, 
including the security of cyber-physical48 systems. It 
encompasses notions such as resilience, deterrence 
against malicious actors or cybercrime and defence 
(see Chapter 13 for a societal perspective on resili- 
ence). In a recent joint Communication to describe 
the technological and policy dimensions of cyber- 
security, the European Union recognised its emerg-
ing importance for European societies (EC, 2017b). 
The application of partly autonomous algorithms 
in cybersecurity is not entirely new, although trad- 
itionally those systems were usually not referred 
to as ‘Artificial Intelligence’. Cybersecurity controls 
capable of functioning autonomously and taking 
intelligent decisions to protect information systems 
and services have existed for quite some time. 
They started to play a role many years ago with 
the development of smart security applications, 
for instance for deciding whether or not to allow 
a certain network communication, to autonomous-
ly filter spam messages, or adapt to new circum- 
stances such as the identification of previously un-
seen forms of cyber-attacks.
Since then, the field of cybersecurity has undergone 
rapid transformation due to the developments in 
ML, deep, and reinforcement learning, which have 
resulted in notable successes in addressing com-
puter vision, NLP and autonomous decision-making 
(see e.g. Goodfellow et al., 2016; Brundage et al., 
2018; Osoba et al., 2017; Mission Villani, 2018). It is 
likely that these transformations will continue and 
amplify the importance of cybersecurity even fur-
ther in the coming years.
The main lines of development we can expect in the 
coming years include:
•  New capabilities enabling cybersecurity to do 
 things that were not possible until recently, 
 including those increasing the resilience of 
 systems and services (see Section 10.2 for 
 more details on some recent developments) 
 as well as investigative tools and capabilities 
 to assist in the deterrence of crime, e.g. 
 aiding law enforcement in the prosecution 
 of criminals.
•  The integration of AI into widespread digital 
 products and applications, and into the con- 
 trols of cybersecurity itself, may introduce 
 new, and especially conceptually different 
 and not yet fully understood, vulnerabilities 
 that can be exploited by malicious actors 
 (see Section 10.4 for an overview). These 
AI will bring benefits 
to cybersecurity and 
the fight against 
crime, but will also 
introduce new 
challenges in the field.
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 vulnerabilities, given the crucial importance of 
  data for AI systems, also raise the importance 
 of data protection.
•  Challenges to private and public security 
 from the possible abuse of AI systems to 
 enhance cyber-attacks and malicious use. 
 Important examples include increased and 
 more extended cyber-attacks, more diffi- 
 culties to attribute attacks to a specific actor, 
 the targeting of human vulnerabilities 
 through autonomous social engineering, so- 
 cial media and propaganda manipulation, 
 the production of credible fake content in 
 news or reporting, attacks on cyber-physical 
 systems such as autonomous vehicles, or the 
 development of autonomous weapon sys- 
 tems (see, e.g. Brundage 2018).
 10.2 Applications of AI in cybersecurity
Early examples of AI systems applied in cyber- 
security include systems for network intrusion 
detection to identify previously unknown cyber- 
attacks (Paxon, 1998) and antivirus approaches 
to detect new malware (Sanok, 2005). The explo-
sion in the practical use of ML in the early 2000s 
brought further tangible benefits to the cybersecu-
rity domain. The most striking examples were prob-
ably the first robust adaptive systems to detect and 
filter spam and malicious messages autonomously 
(see also Box 1 in Chapter 2).
Most AI-based methods currently in use in opera-
tional controls are based on ML approaches, using a 
host of well-tested algorithms and expert schemes 
and are usually embedded within a traditional cy-
bersecurity architecture (for a recent example see 
IEEE 2017). They are largely supervised learning 
methods, i.e. AI systems that evolve their models 
using available labelled data as examples. Typical-
ly, they are performing classification of messages, 
digital events or computer code into acceptable or 
non-acceptable classes. These AI-based controls 
are capable of limited forms of adaptation, mostly 
through retraining on new samples.
With recent successes in DL, we are starting to 
see a number of AI methods based on neural net-
works and DL gradually moving from research into 
workable cybersecurity applications. They employ 
deep neural network architectures and big data to 
devise increasingly accurate cybersecurity learning 
systems, e.g. for anomaly detection in malware and 
computer network analysis, message filtering or in 
assisting human security operators (e.g. Crawford 
et al., 2015; Radford 2018; Meidan 2018). In all 
likelihood, these trends will continue, but will also 
come hand in hand with a proliferation of AI-backed 
cyber-attacks (Brundage, 2018).
 10.3 Deterrence and fight against crime
Recent developments strengthen the resilience of 
cybersecurity systems, reduce risks and increase 
their capability to withstand threads and malicious 
intent reliably. Another element is that research 
into AI in cybersecurity systems plays a crucial part 
in developing cyber deterrence capabilities. Firstly, 
AI systems are being and will increasingly be used 
by cyber criminals (e.g. Brundage et al., 2018), and 
thus research into their capabilities and weakness-
es (see Section 10.4) will play a crucial part in de-
fending against such malicious usage of AI. Sec-
ondly, of course, law enforcement will increasingly 
engage in active usage of AI systems to reinforce 
investigative capabilities and to strengthen digital 
evidence-making in court. Most developments aim 
at leveraging new tools for three main operative 
goals, the localisation of a crime, the identification 
of victims and perpetrators, and the determination 
of the content of the crime.
The most prevalent examples can be found in digi- 
tal forensics and in the employment of biometric 
systems for investigative purposes. The wide field 
of digital forensics encompasses very different ap-
plications, ranging from computer and hard-drive 
forensics to fraud detection in large databases. The 
spread of online services and digital devices has 
led to a proliferation of digital content relevant to 
the prosecution of criminal activities. In this con-
text, AI systems, for instance for image, audio and 
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text analysis, or for unsupervised analysis of un-
ordered data volumes, have the potential to assist 
law enforcement, not only in the investigation of 
cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crime, but also 
in traditional forms of crime where digital content 
can play a key role in the investigation.
 10.4 Robustness of AI algorithms against 
 malicious action
With an increasing number of AI systems employed 
in cybersecurity, not only are we making progress 
but we are also introducing new vulnerabilities that 
then open the window for new types of attacks. For 
this reason, these AI systems are now coming un-
der increased scrutiny.
In classical software development, the developer 
uses a computer language to create the program 
that implements a certain algorithm. This consti-
tutes a straight development process where we can 
use secure design principles, have a clear view of 
where vulnerabilities are likely to occur, and put in 
place effective security controls. In contrast, AI sys-
tems are fundamentally more complex, especial-
ly if they are based on ML architecture. They are 
composed of a possibly non-linear feedback loop 
system between a human-designed algorithm and 
a human (or even AI) assembled dataset. Together, 
these constitute a learning model that acts as the 
actual ‘AI’ and is basically a new algorithm. These 
AI models are then embedded into a program, of-
ten combined with other pieces of code or software 
and possibly implemented with a host of different 
programming tools. The situation is depicted in 
Figure 12.
Any vulnerability or design flaw in this complex sys-
tem will likely be of a very different nature than in 
classical systems. Tracing an event and its cause, 
such as an attack on the system and the vulner-
ability exploited becomes a much more complex 
Figure 12. Paradigm shift in the cybersecurity of systems following the introduction of AI components
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and demanding task (see Fig. 12). Moreover, once 
the AI system is embedded into parts of a classi-
cal system and different combinations of old and 
new types of vulnerability come together we may 
end up with new obstacles altogether. A different 
angle from which to see the complexity problems 
displayed in Figure 12 is that of algorithmic ex-
plainability, or interpretability: to what extent are 
the results of a given algorithm still understand-
able to a human or are even uniquely explainable 
(e.g. because of non-linear functions employed in 
many ML models)?
Explainability is a key area of fundamental research 
because we need explainable and interpretable 
models to increase the capabilities of AI systems 
to abstract and transfer knowledge, understand 
their robustness in terms of cybersecurity, assess 
possible bias, and crucially, build and retain trust 
in society (see Chapters 2 and 6 for a discussion 
on fairness and accountability in the context of AI).
The emerging fields of AI safety and adversarial ML 
are actively concerned with these new challenges. 
The former refers to the research branch concerned 
with designing safe AI systems from the start (see, 
e.g. Amodei, 2016). The latter is concerned with the 
new types of vulnerabilities exhibited by the most 
prevalent AI systems employing ML (see, e.g. Huang 
et al., 2011; Szegedy at al., 2013). Typical vulnera-
bilities, exclusive to AI systems, include the following 
(see, e.g. Biggio et al.,  2012; Szegedy et al., 2013; 
Huang et al., 2017):
•  Data poisoning, the deliberate introduction 
 of false data in the training of the model, 
 especially dangerous for autonomous AI 
 systems that employ online re-learning pro- 
 cedures. This effectively means that the data 
 itself becomes a major vulnerability of such 
 systems. In Figure 12, this type of vulnera- 
 bility would conceptually be introduced in the 
 ‘data’ part of the AI system. 
• Adversarial examples, input in the trained 
  ML system, which is deliberately designed 
  to be misclassified or to fool the algorithmic 
 procedure in which the model is being used. 
  In Figure 12, this type of vulnerability would 
  conceptually be introduced in the right part of 
  the AI system, after the ‘data’ and the ‘model’ 
  have interacted.
• Design flaws in the underlying mathematical 
 procedures that optimise the learning pro- 
 cess of the model, leading to model attacks. 
 For instance, the usage of a loss function or 
 likelihood model that is known to be suscep- 
 tible to certain types of input could create an 
 easy path for adversarial examples. 
 Moreover, insecure systems might allow 
 a malicious user to steal the mathematical 
 structure of a model. In Figure 12, this type 
 of vulnerability would conceptually be intro- 
 duced in the ‘model’ part of the AI system.
There is growing evidence of how easily these vul-
nerabilities can be exploited in real applications, 
especially in ML-based models. Thus, designing 
AI-specific security controls is an active, albeit 
young, field of research. Research on adversarial 
ML currently focusses on two main measures de-
pending on circumstances, such as the intention of 
the attack and the type of vulnerability (e.g. Paper-
not et al., 2015):
•  Data sanitisation: cleaning the training data 
  of all potentially malicious content before 
 training the model. In most realistic cases, 
 another AI system is employed to act as a 
 filter, but in very critical circumstances 
 human intervention might be inevitable.
• Robust learning: redesigning the learning 
 procedure to be robust against malicious 
 action, especially adversarial examples. This 
 either entails explicit training against known 
 adversarial examples, or redesigning the 
 mathematical foundation of the algorithms 
 and employing techniques from statistics, 
 known as regularisation and robust infe- 
 rence. This approach actually follows the 
91 10 Cybersecurity Perspective
 well-known security-by-design principle, i.e. 
 taking the security of a software or appli- 
 cation into account from the beginning of the 
 design process. It should be noted that for 
 ML based AI systems this approach usually 
 implies a degradation of performance.
 10.5 Summary and conclusions
The advent of the AI revolution is expected to have 
an increasing impact on cybersecurity. The existing 
landscape will be subject to many transformations 
in terms of more effective and efficient cyber de-
fences, but at the same time more sophisticated 
cyber-attacks. Key conclusions from these devel-
opments are:
AI will not replace humans in cybersecurity any- 
time soon but rather empower them. Expect- 
ations about AI are high, and for good reasons, 
given the latest advances in the field and the 
growing number of successful cases of its appli-
cation in several domains, including cybersecu-
rity. However, it is important to understand the 
limits of the new generation of AI algorithms.
   AI will not 
replace humans 
in cybersecurity 
anytime soon  
but rather 
empower them.  
It is important  
to understand  
the limits of the new 
generation of AI 
algorithms.
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We have summarised the key issues above, and 
we clearly still need human operators to com-
plement the capabilities of AI for cybersecurity. 
AI will bring clear benefits to cybersecurity and 
the fight against crime, but will also introduce 
new cybersecurity challenges. ML algorithms have 
altered the classical paradigm of software devel-
opment. When using them, human developers no 
longer program an algorithm to tell the comput-
er how to solve a given problem but instead they 
program it to learn how to solve the problem. As a 
result, the AI system behaves as a new algorithm, 
not directly programmed by the human developer: 
this is the result of a learning process from training 
data carried out by the ML algorithm originally de-
veloped by the human. Recently, it has been found 
that, despite their effectiveness, AI systems based 
on ML techniques are often not robust against 
malicious attacks that exploit the specific way in 
which the AI system behaves by presenting it with 
specially crafted input, manipulating the data that 
is used to train it, or abusing biases in the statistical 
algorithms used to perform the training. These are 
new classes of vulnerabilities, specific to ML algo-
rithms, which need to be further understood and for 
which specific organisational and technical controls 
need to designed and implemented.
Secure software development practices, security 
certifications, security audits and cybersecurity 
controls need to consider these new kinds of vul-
nerabilities specific to the AI components of the 
digital systems. Further research is needed in the 
emerging field of adversarial ML in order to better 
understand the limitations in the robustness of ML 
algorithms against malicious action and design 
effective strategies to mitigate these vulnerabili-
ties. This is of particular relevance when AI is used 
in cybersecurity controls or to assist human actors 
in the identification, localisation and prosecution of 
cybercrime.
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There is a need to secure the availability of up-
to-date high-quality datasets in the domain of 
cybersecurity. The latest techniques in ML such 
as DL or reinforced learning can produce impres-
sive results but require huge quantities of train-
ing data to work and be effective. As is the case in 
other domains, there is a scarcity of large enough 
high-quality datasets in the field of cybersecurity. 
The availability of such datasets to the scientific 
community is crucial to ensure future advances in 
the field.
Moreover, the creation of up-to-date reference 
datasets in the several areas of the cybersecur- 
ity domain can also boost research and innovation 
by enabling agile and effective benchmarking and 
evaluation of state of the art AI techniques.
The dual nature of AI. It is crucial to be aware 
of the fundamental dual nature of techniques, 
tools and systems employed in cybersecurity 
and AI, especially when both have to be considered 
together. AI can improve security, but cybercrim- 
inals are equally expected to take advantage of the 
latest advances in AI techniques to carry out faster 
and smarter cyber-attacks.
This situation does not necessarily require restrict-
ing research. An effective defence can only be 
designed knowing how attacks might take place. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that further 
public research is conducted in the field of AI and 
cybersecurity, also considering the offensive side, to 
study emerging and potentially AI-powered cyber- 
attacks and devise corresponding countermeasures.
Furthermore, the research landscape on AI is al-
ready highly dominated by the USA and China (see 
Chapter 3) and the ongoing general drain of re-
search and researchers from Europe needs to be 
reversed, especially in fields already lacking know- 
ledgeable experts in the market, such as cyber-
security and AI. Focusing research on the ethical 
use of AI and the role of regulation can become an 
asset to strengthen European leadership in these 
areas, and retain expertise in AI and cybersecurity.
AI in cybersecurity requires a multidisciplinary 
approach. On the highly technical matters that sur-
round the application of AI in cybersecurity, strong 
interactions of policymakers with researchers and 
engineers seem immensely important. The fields of 
AI and cybersecurity are rapidly changing, and re-
ports will quickly become outdated, making a con-
stant information flow from the technical level to 
decision bodies almost mandatory. As an extension 
of this, we also need to foster a culture of cross- 
collaboration between AI and cybersecurity devel-
opers and, on a broader level, researchers from 
other related fields such as philosophy, economics 
or social science.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we analyse one of the often-ignored aspects of AI, i.e. that the opportunities 
created by great data volumes and advanced analytics come at an increasing environmen-
tal, economic, and geopolitical cost: energy. The introduction of the IoT and 5G networks will 
increase the problem significantly. Energy is recognised as a main determinant of the long-
term sustainability of AI. Therefore, we need to take early action to address this aspect of the 
development of AI and its related technologies. While some actions can be done using today’s 
technology, more power-reduction innovation is needed to fulfil future demand. It is necessary 
to introduce advanced technologies in the hardware, software, and services areas, to develop 
intensive-computing ecosystems that are ‘green’.
These ecosystem solutions must face four important energy-consumption areas: reduce 
the energy consumed by the existing big data centres; limit data movement reducing the 
energy consumed from machine-to-machine communications; reduce the embodied energy; 
reduce the obsolescence of digital technologies (see, for example, the short lifespan of mobile 
phones, replaced every one to three years), which is perhaps the main energy consumption 
voice for digital technology.
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Intensive computing needs to be energy efficient





 11.1 Introduction 
There are several studies (SIA, 2015; Mayer 2009; 
IEE, 2012) showing that the digital economy is 
facing an increasing problem: a severe mismatch 
between the processing and storage needs of the 
escalating volumes of data available, and a sus-
tainable energy footprint. A report prepared for 
Greenpeace (2012) claimed that if the cloud were 
a country, it would have the fifth largest energy 
demand in the world, while Vidal (2017) suggested 
that the data tsunami could consume one fifth of 
global electricity by 2025.
These estimates maybe somewhat off the mark, but 
there seems to be a consensus that data growth 
will largely outpace foreseeable improvements 
in computational power and the associated en-
ergy footprint. For example, between 2002 and 
2009, data traffic grew 56-fold, compared to a cor-
responding 16-fold increase in computing power 
(largely tracking Moore’s law) as shown in Figure 
13 (Short et al., 2011; and Kambatla et al., 2014). 
The development of the IoT is expected to widen 
the fork between data and processing power in the 
coming years with an increasing energy bill. There-
fore, the computing and energy consumption gen-
erated by AI and IoT (including devices, networks, 
and data centres to which they are connected) 
must be optimised significantly. In this chapter, we 
explore three main approaches to reduce the ener-
gy footprint after reporting in more detail the en-
ergy challenges of one important part of the data 
chain: data centres.
There is a paradigm 
shift in computing 
to bring processing 
at the level of smart 
sensors, opening 




standards to shape 
these developments.
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 11.2 Assessment of data centre (DC)  
 energy consumption 
AI requires a considerable amount of data and 
processing power, which often implies the need 
for dedicated facilities such as data centres (DC). 
DCs host IT equipment for data storage and pro-
cessing (e-mail, financial transactions, social me-
dia, computing, etc.) including computers (servers) 
and other components, such as communication and 
storage equipment. Normally the DC is hosted in 
a controlled environment requiring air cooling and 
conditioning, in order to extract the heat generated 
in processors. In addition, power has to be distrib-
uted to the IT equipment, including conversion from 
AC to DC, battery storage and uninterruptable pow-
er supplies (UPS) to cope with very short power dis-
ruptions. There is a high level of redundancy in DCs 
for both power distribution and cooling to increase 
power availability and reliability, including provision 
for standby generation (usually diesel-powered). 
These redundancies and the need for a controlled 
environment are typically doubling the power and 
energy consumption of the IT part (i.e. twice the 
IT power is required by a typical data centre).49 In 
extremely efficient DCs this additional consumption 
is only 10 %.
The global energy consumption of DC was esti-
mated at 194 TWh in 201450, which is around 1 % 
of annual global electricity consumption, i.e. more 
than the electricity consumption of several EU 
Member States.
DC energy consumption in the USA (largest mar-
ket in the world) has been estimated at 70 TWh, 
representing, about 1.8 % of total US electricity 
consumption.51 In Europe, the number of DC has 
dramatically increased in the last 10 years, particu-
larly with the development of cloud computing. DC 
energy consumption in the EU (second or third mar-
ket in the world) was estimated in 2014-2015 to be 
at between 43 and 49 TWh i.e. between 1.5 % and 
1.8 % of EU total consumption. This is a calculation 
by the JRC based on an assessment of national ex-
perts and published reports. 
These estimates do not include the energy consump-
tion to transfer the data from one DC to another or 
to the end-users. This is part of the broadband op-
erators’ consumption (e.g. telecoms, over fibre, DSL, 
cable or mobile-4G) and end-users (e.g. modems, 
routers, switches at home and offices). The data 
transmission energy consumption is comparable to 
the total DC energy consumption. Altogether, there-
fore, DCs and data transmission could account for 
3-4 % of all EU power consumption. 
DC consolidation, outsourcing and cloud computing 
are helping to keep energy consumption in DCs flat, 
Figure 13. Projection of data and computing growths (logarithmic scale)  
Source: JRC based on Kambatla et al., 2014
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notwithstanding the increase of data and process-
ing, as larger DCs tend to be more efficiently de-
signed and managed.
 11.3 Options to improve the energy  
 efficiency of the increasing  
 demand for HPC
There are different approaches to address this 
problem:
(a) advance CPU capabilities to process big 
 data, run AI/ML jobs, and consume less 
 energy;
(b) improve the energy consumption of DCs 
 necessary to cool the systems; 
(c) move the intelligence from the centre to 
 the edge by optimising (cloud-based) com- 
 puting infrastructures and bring AI closer to 
 the data. 
 11.3.1 CPU advancements: energy-saving 
 and parallelisation computing 
With respect to CPU advancement, there are sev- 
eral lines of action:
• Graphics Processing Unit (GPU): a specialised 
 electronic circuit designed to accelerate 
 the creation of images intended for output 
 to a display device. GPUs are used in mobile 
 phones, personal computers, workstations, 
 and game consoles. Modern GPUs are very 
 efficient at manipulating computer graphics 
 and image processing, and their highly 
 parallel structure makes them more efficient 
 than general-purpose Central Processing 
 Units (CPUs) for algorithms where the pro- 
 cessing of large blocks of data is done in 
 parallel, as for ML and DL.
• AI accelerators, the Tensor Processing Unit 
 (TPU): an AI accelerator developed by Goo- 
 gle specifically for neural network ML. 
 The chip has been designed to use Google’s 
 TensorFlow framework, an open math library 
 which is used for ML applications such as 
 neural networks. Other AI accelerator de- 
 signs are starting to appear from other 
 vendors aimed, for example, at the robot- 
 ics markets.
• Advanced cloud (multi-core) chips that com- 
 bine the advantages of CPUs with GP-GPUs, 
 and specialised AI chip. This new breed of 
 chips promises to reduce ten-fold the 
 times the processing power per watt (e.g. 
 through a fine-grained power manage- 
 ment) to be capable of running the most 
 complex computing tasks.
• Embedded processors for smart sensors 
 by using new microcontrollers designed for 
 AI, which are the brains of billions of ‘smart 
 things’. Trained DL models are com- 
 piled to generate optimised neural net- 
 work code that is embedded in advanced 
 microcontrollers. Embedded processors are 
 usually simpler in design and have minimal 
 power requirements. In addition, moving the 
 computation from the centre to the edge of 
 the network contributes to reducing the 
 energy footprint of the IoT.
• Neuromorphic computing: a technology 
 based on the use of very-large-scale inte- 
 gration systems that mimic neuro-biologic- 
 al structures present in the nervous system. 
 Recent solutions focus on models of neural 
 systems for perception, motor control, or 
 multisensory integration. 
• Reversible computing: a model of computing 
 that tries to minimise the amount of energy 
 dissipated as heat during processing. They 
 are based on low power circuits, known 
 as ‘adiabatic’ circuits, that are designed to 
 conserve energy.
• Quantum computing: a form of computing 
 exploiting some of the physical properties of 
 quantum mechanics. Classic computers 
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 store information in bits that can either be 0 
 or 1. Qubits, which are the quantum equi- 
 valent of transistors, are capable of ‘super 
 position’, i.e. they can be both 0 and 1 at the 
 same time, and are therefore able to store 
 a lot more information. ‘Entanglement’ is 
 the other key property, which means that 
 qubits are connected to each other, so that 
 operating on one affects those that are 
 connected. This property allows for very fast 
 parallel processing. Quantum computing is 
 already used for cryptography, but other 
 applications are starting to emerge. 
 11.3.2 Innovative and more efficient  
 cooling systems/engineering  
 solutions
Efficient cooling: the first solution is to raise the DC 
temperature so that there is no need to over-cool 
servers and other equipment. Another is to use 
fresh outdoor air (free cooling, direct or indirect) or 
cold water provided by lakes, rivers, the sea, or un-
derground aquifers (the final cooling to the racks 
is still provided by air through a heat exchanger). 
Finally, ‘adiabatic’ or evaporative cooling can also 
be a good alternative to compressor-based cooling. 
There are an increasing number of DCs with no- 
compressor-based cooling system, running all the 
time on free cooling mode, which is highly efficient. 
For high-performance computing, the air cooling is 
limited because of the poor conductivity of air and 
the very large power densities and heat generated 
by the processors. The use of water cooling can dra-
matically reduce the cooling energy consumption. 
Other solutions: removing old servers and install-
ing newer and more efficient ones (e.g. with En-
ergy Star), installing more efficient software, and 
more efficient power distribution, e.g. batteries on 
servers. Efficiency has also improved thanks to the 
EU Code of Conduct on Energy Efficiency in Data 
Centres52, adopted voluntarily by more than 350 
DCs in Europe.
 11.3.3 Innovative infrastructures,  
 architectures and configurations
AI and IoT are going to change the nature of the 
internet as we know it. The expected growth in 
data, computing processing, and energy con-
sumption are changing the present paradigm ‘do 
everything in the cloud’ to a new one that can be 
called ‘bring computing to where the data are’.
Edge and fog computing: many use the terms fog 
computing and edge computing interchangeably, 
as both involve bringing intelligence and processing 
closer to where the data are created. The key differ- 
ence between the two is where the intelligence and 
computing power is placed.
•  Edge computing: a methodology for optimis- 
 ing cloud computing systems by performing 
 data processing at the edge of the net- 
 work, near the source of the data. For 
   The expected 





is changing the 
present paradigm.
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 example, performing more computation at the 
 level of the sensors capturing the data, or 
 mobile devices like mobile phones. In this 
 way, there is less need to transfer data to 
 centralised servers or clouds, and only the 
 result of the processing is then transferred, 
 reducing the data traffic considerably. This 
 approach can also leverage resources that 
 are not continuously connected to a network,
 such as laptops, smart phones, tablets and 
 sensors.
• Fog computing: implements a decentralised 
 computing infrastructure in which data, com- 
 puting, storage and applications are distri- 
 buted in the most logical, efficient place 
 between the data source and the cloud. Fog 
 computing essentially extends cloud com- 
 puting and services to the edge of the 
 network, bringing the advantages and power 
 of the cloud closer to where data is created 
 and acted upon. In other words, fog comput- 
 ing acts as midway in the processing chain 
 between the edge (e.g. sensors, mobile phones) 
 and the cloud. 
Fog and edge computing architectures have been 
introduced recently recognising the potentially 
massive increase in data traffic to be expected with 
the adoption of the IoT, where billions of devices 
used on a daily basis will be connected to each- 
other using new-generation wireless technology 
and embedded AI. The benefits of decentralisation 
include: scalability (less data moved through the 
internet), latency (AI closer to data sources), data 
security (local scope), and cost. Fog and edge com-
puting are different from traditional cloud comput-
ing and, hence, they will require different solutions. 
They introduce a different cloudification (business) 
level dealing with more local and less powerful 
clouds, which are closer to the smart edge devic-
es and to the users – they are called edge clouds 
or cloudlets. This type of infrastructure, which will 
be crucial for the future development of IoT and AI 
in Europe, is only emerging now. The approach and 
frameworks commonly used for data processing and 
AI in the cloud are not good for the cloudlets. We 
have therefore a (narrow) window of opportunity to 
make sure European industry takes a lead in devel-
oping this new infrastructure and collectively (Eu-
ropean Commission, Member States, and industry) 
sets the rules of the game, including:
• A European open reference architecture for 
 fog and edge computing, complementing 
 the traditional cloud (DCs) approach.
•  Reinforcing research on transportable DCs, 
 to support cloudlets and edge architectures.
•  Respecting European values (transparency, 
 privacy, and ethics) at the fog computing 
 level – i.e. fog nodes and cloudlets.
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• As to cloudlets’ energy consumption, small 
 amounts of energy are consumed in a 
 plurality of locations. Often the organisation 
 paying for the energy may not be the same 
 one running the infrastructure or the service. 
 Therefore, energy efficiency policies need 
 to consider new business models and pos- 
 sibly new regulations.
 11.4 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, we have analysed one of the often- 
ignored aspects of AI, i.e. that the opportunities 
created by great data volumes and advanced 
analytics come at an increasing environmental, 
economic, and geopolitical cost: energy. The in-
troduction of the IoT, and 5G will increase the prob-
lem significantly. Energy is recognised as a main 
determinant of the long-term sustainability of AI. 
We need therefore to take early action to address 
this aspect of the development of AI and its relat-
ed technologies. While some actions can be taken 
using today’s technology, more power-reduction 
innovation is needed to fulfil future demand. It is 
necessary to introduce advanced technologies in 
the hardware, software, and services areas, for 
realising intensive-computing ecosystems that 
are ‘green’.
These ecosystem solutions must face four import- 
ant energy consumption areas: 
(a) Reduce the energy consumed by the existing 
 big data centres, for example, reducing data 
 centralisation and pushing data and com- 
 puting distribution towards the edge of the 
 cloud. Another promising area is the im- 
 provement of the existing cooling tech- 
 nologies.
(b) Limit data movement reducing the energy 
 consumed from machine-to-machine com- 
 munications; this can also be achieved by 
 pushing data and computing towards the 
 edge of the network. Important improve- 
 ments in this direction come from smart 
 sensors (e.g. embedded-AI systems) and 
 fog and edge clouds (cloudlets).
(c) Reduce the embodied energy (i.e. energy 
 consumed in the production of goods) of 
 digital technology by implementing the 
 Industry 4.0 Smart Factory principles and 
 in particular the smart energy pillar.
(d) Reduce the obsolescence of digital tech- 
 nologies (see, for example, the short life- 
 span of mobile phones, replaced every one 
 to three years), which is perhaps the main 
 energy consumption voice for digital tech- 
 nology.
We need to accelerate the speed of energy con-
sumption reduction through energy efficiency, sup-
porting a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach 
e.g. by introducing and using innovative semi- 
conductor technologies, smart sensors, efficient 
data transmission and DCs, and advanced comput-
ing architectures, to compensate for the speed of 
data traffic increase. For that we need to carefully 
estimate the amount of energy required by AI (and 
the IoT), taking into consideration all the required 
phases – e.g. data generation, moving, storing, pro-
cessing, and insight generation and provision. 
101  11Computer Processing and Energy Perspective
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we review the key economic characteristics of digital data, including 
economies, of scale, of scope, and non-rivalry. The first two point to an increase 
concentration of data, and hence information and power, in the hands of a few actors 
in the internet economy, while non-rivalry creates potential tensions between opening 
access to the data so that society benefits the most, and restricting access so that 
the data holder benefits most. These tensions are reflected in the legal framework, 
as discussed earlier, and make the development of data strategies in an open and 
globalised environment a particular challenge. We argue, however, that if we apply 
the lessons of successful internet companies to the European public sector and de- 
velop ecosystems based around public platforms, it is possible to create large pools 
of shared data that are semantically well-structured and labelled, and can fuel new AI 
applications in different domains. In this way, we can open access to the data, develop 
the market, serve the public, and enrich the data commons at the same time.
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Good quality shared data is essential to develop socially responsive AI
 12.1 The law and economics of access  
 to data 
ML is a data-driven technology, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. It is necessary for us to make sense 
of the enormous volumes and range of data be-
ing produced daily, but at the same time ML needs 
large volumes of data to learn. For this reason, as 
we have seen in Chapter 4, all the countries devel-
oping AI strategies put access, and adding value to 
data as key concerns. 
Developing such strategies is not easy because 
they need to balance the often-competing inter-
ests between opening access to data to promote 
innovation and transparency, and restricting it to 
protect privacy and commercial confidentiality. 
Europe is also in a particularly difficult position 
because the global data market is characterised 
by a few dominant non-European players and plat-
forms that strengthen their power as they gather 
more and more data from European customers and 
governments. 
There are many facets to this problem. Therefore, 
in this chapter, we outline the key economic char-
acteristics of digital data, review the EU regulatory 
settings and their influence on the trade-offs be-
tween openness and restriction, and then put for-
ward the elements for a data-sharing strategy for 
the public sector.
 12.1.1 The economic characteristics  
 of data
Digital data has three main economic characteristics: 
Economies of scale: ML shares many similarities 
with statistical modelling. Statistical estimates be-
come more reliable as the size of the underlying da-
taset increases and variation in the data decreases. 
With a high variety of observations and many ex-
planatory variables in the dataset, achieving robust 
predictions may require very large datasets. Typ-
ically, ML algorithms need much more data than 
humans in order to train for comparable skills. For 
example, an automated driving algorithm may re-
quire millions of kilometres of driving data while a 
human driver needs only a few thousand kilometres 
of experience to become a proficient driver. Collect-
ing and annotating large datasets is difficult, the 
quality of raw data is often poor and needs clean-
ing and structuring, and a lot of the data are often 
useless. Investing in high-quality datasets for train-
ing ML algorithms is costly and implies high fixed 
costs. Once they are trained, however, the margin-
al cost of additional use of the algorithm can be 
very low. Common ML methods do not perform well 
with small data sample sizes, especially when data 
are noisy, i.e. contain many irrelevant variables. 
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DATA PERSPECTIVE
Data is the lifeline of 
AI. Europe is data rich 
but the economics 
and legal framework 
create complex 
challenges. Opening 
access to data and 
building interactions 
among participants  
is key to succeeding.
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ML models tend to ‘overfit’ in these cases, reducing 
the efficiency of algorithms once they are applied 
in real-life settings. One way to address this is to 
try to understand the underlying mechanisms in 
the data through causal inference. This potentially 
increases the interpretability and fairness of algo-
rithms (Kilbertus et al., 2017; Athey, 2017).
Economies of scope: these occur when the benefits 
of analysing a merged dataset are higher than the 
analysis of each dataset separately. These benefits 
only occur when there is a relationship between the 
two sets, i.e. when they are not completely separa-
ble and data that pertain to one situation may also 
be relevant for another situation. For example, web- 
surfing data may produce insights on consumer be-
haviour. Merging these with mobile phone data may 
produce more insights when compared to studying 
both datasets separately. Merging with pay data in 
shops adds further insights, etc. Economies of scope 
explain why data-driven firms are so data-hungry 
and collect all the data they can get: the wider the 
coverage of the available datasets in terms of varie-
ty of situations and observations, the more accurate 
and insightful the predictions that can be made with 
these datasets. 
Non-rivalry: whilst goods and services are rival 
products, i.e. they can only be used by one person 
at a time, an idea, a piece of information or an al-
gorithm are non-rival: they can be used by many 
people at the same time. As a result, the benefits 
derived from data are higher when used by a group 
of people compared to used by an individual. From 
a societal perspective, it may therefore be better 
to share data and algorithms as widely as possible 
rather than keeping them private. However, the flip 
side of wide sharing and easy access is the lack 
of incentives to invest in production of data and 
algorithms. Data may be a by-product of ongoing 
activities and require no additional incentives. For 
instance, e-commerce firms store consumer behav-
iour data on their websites as part of their online 
transactions. Public administrations collect loads of 
data while carrying out their duties. In other cases 
however, firms may deliberately invest in collecting 
data by installing sensors and setting up servers to 
collect, store, transmit and process the data. With-
out the ability to monetise revenue from the data 
there would be no incentive to collect them. This 
problem was first discovered by authors and pub-
lishers of books and by inventors of new technolo-
gies. All these innovative ideas and artworks could 
easily be copied by others, leaving the original cre-
ator without any remuneration for his/her efforts. 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) were introduced to 
avoid these situations. 
Should we apply the same economic principles 
of IPR to data and assign exclusive rights to data 
holders, possibly even full ownership rights? As in 
the case of IPR, these rights should keep a balance 
between granting exclusive rights as an incen-
tive for the production of data and ensuring ac-
cess to data and algorithms in order to produce 
wider benefits for society. The applicability of IPR 
to ML algorithms was discussed in Section 7.3. We 
come back to legal protection of data rights be-
low in 12.1.3. First, we explore various meanings 
of ‘data access’. 
 12.1.2 Applying economic reasoning  
 to data access
The modalities and conditions for access to data 
vary considerably, with potentially very different 
economic outcomes for individuals and for society 
as a whole (Bergmann and Morris, 2017). We should 
therefore be careful and more precise in what we 
mean when we use the word ‘access’.
A data holder may not perceive any benefits in dir- 
ectly sharing or selling data to others and decide to 
keep them private, protected by legal and/or tech-
nical protection measures. Rather than selling data 
directly, they can be used indirectly as input in the 
production of a commercial service. For example, 
Google does not directly sell or share consumer 
data but uses them for selling advertising slots. 
Consumers benefit from the information services 
while advertisers pay for the advertising service. 
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In this way, even non-accessible data can generate 
benefits for individuals and for society. 
Data holders can also make the data directly avail-
able. If the data are rather exclusive and valuable, 
they may fetch a price in the data market. Since 
data are non-rival they can be sold many times. 
Monopolistic sellers of exclusive data can either sell 
at a fixed price or adjust prices according to each 
buyer’s willingness to pay. In that case, everyone 
has access and there is no welfare loss to society. 
The data monopolist maximises monetary benefits 
from the data. A welfare distribution issue may oc-
cur when most of the benefits accrue in monetised 
form to the data holder and less so to data users or 
the person whose behaviour generated the data. If 
the data are less exclusive and competing sources 
for (partial) substitute data are available, the mo-
nopoly can be weakened and more benefits will ac-
crue to data users. The choice between direct and 
indirect data sales is often not straightforward for 
data holders; some may do both in parallel. For ex-
ample, many data firms sell data directly and pro-
vide data analytics services.
A different situation occurs with open or free access 
that makes data available to all potential users at 
zero cost. Benefits are distributed across the widest 
possible group of users, similar to the perfect price 
discrimination case above, except that all benefits 
accrue to data users, not the data holder. If data 
are a by-product of the data holder’s ordinary ac-
tivities and can be collected at low or zero cost, 
free access will not affect the welfare of the data 
holder. Even when publishing the data carries a cost 
to the data holder, open access may prove bene- 
ficial to the holder because greater use of the data 
can act as an advertisement, and improve data 
quality through validation and error detection at 
limited cost for the data holder. However, if data 
collection is costly and their use is very valuable, 
the holder may not have an incentive to grant free 
and open access. Losing revenue may also reduce 
incentives for data collectors to invest in innovative 
services that could be produced with the data. 
Another scenario occurs when data are extracted 
from data holders against their will, possibly with-
out their knowledge and at a cost to them, but may 
be of benefit to society. Examples include manda-
tory open data access for environmental reporting 
and access to private data to detect or prevent 
crime. Individual data holders may incur costs but 
the net benefit to society is positive. Another ex-
ample is online firms that test various commercial 
strategies on a small sample of consumers before 
deploying them on a larger scale. The consumers in 
the test sample may gain or lose from the experi-
ment, without knowing it, but the firm may benefit 
from extracting behavioural information from users. 
Trust is an important factor in data sharing and 
access. A variety of initiatives have been deployed 
to strengthen trust while sharing data. Experi-
mental personal information management spaces 
(PIMS) give individuals more control over the use 
of their personal data. Similarly, ‘data trusts’ seek 
to provide trusted exchange mechanisms via legal 
conditions, storage formats and mutual oversight 
organisations.   
 12.1.3 Policy intervention in the data  
 market
Extracting insights from datasets by means of ML 
or other techniques can be very beneficial for some 
but the insights can also be exploited to redistribute 
benefits between parties. Sharing access to data 
can potentially increase the benefits but may also 
result in more redistribution. Should policymakers 
intervene in data ownership and access markets, 
or should they be left to operate freely? Translat-
ed into economic jargon, this raises the question 
of potential data market failures that reduce social 
welfare and require policy intervention. Such fail-
ures may not only occur in primary data markets 
but also in downstream markets for goods and ser-
vices where transactions depend on access to data. 
The extent of access and competition in upstream 
data markets may have implications for competition 
in downstream goods and services markets. 
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Data may have very beneficial uses for society in 
terms of innovation and welfare.  However, data can 
also be used to reduce competition in markets and 
nudge consumers into decisions that are not neces-
sarily to their advantage. There is often a trade-off 
between short-term price efficiency and longer-term 
innovation incentives.
Regulators can create exclusive control rights for 
data holders or they can soften these exclusive 
rights and punch some holes in them to facilitate 
access to the data. In reality, regulators often do 
both at the same time – as we will now illustrate 
for the case of the EU.
In the EU, there are two general horizontal legal 
instruments that have something to say on data 
rights: the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (EC 2016a) for personal data of natural per-
sons and the Data Base Directive (DBD) (EC, 1996) 
for any data collected by firms (see Section 7.2).
The EU GDPR sets some rules regarding the use 
of personal data. Any data that can be linked to a 
natural person is considered to be personal data, 
irrespective of the source, storage or transmission 
mechanism. The GDPR does not grant ownership 
rights to personal data but gives data subjects a 
number of control rights over their personal data, 
including the right to obtain consent from the data 
subject before accessing the data, to the right for 
data subjects to access their personal data and 
delete them, to port their data to other uses, etc. 
Privacy Personal data protection is considered to be 
a basic and inalienable human right that cannot be 
traded away. For this reason, personal data are as-
sumed not to be the subject of an economic trans-
action. However, a frequently used online business 
model involves the exchange of personal data in 
return for a data-based service. The data subject 
can accept or refuse the exchange, depending on 
whether s/he perceives it as a fair and credible deal 
that will bring more benefits than potential harms 
from reduced privacy.
Some provisions in the GDPR reduce access to per-
sonal data. For example, they prohibit the use of 
personal data for purposes other than the original-
ly intended purpose, unless they are anonymised. 
This makes it difficult for holders of personal data 
to aggregate them into larger databases or share 
them with other types of data services for the pur-
pose of aggregation and analysis by means of ML 
algorithms. Other provisions in the GDPR facilitate 
access to data. For example, Article 20 mandates 
portability of personal data. At the request of the 
data subject, the data holder has to transfer the 
personal data to a destination of choice of the data 
subject. The data subject can thus choose to give 
wider access to his/her data. Anonymous data can 
be transferred or used for other purposes. A good 
example is navigation apps. An important source of 
road traffic data is the movement of mobile phones 
in cars. Telecom service operators track the pos- 
itioning of mobile phones as a technical measure 
to keep the phones connected to the antennas of 
the mobile phone network. The GDPR allows the 
transmission of anonymous data about movement 
of mobile phones. The GDPR puts no restrictions on 
cross-border transfers of data within the EU. How-
ever, transfers outside the EU can only be made 
to operators that respect the GDPR.
The EU Database Directive (DBD) (EC, 1996) con-
tains two provisions: copyright and a sui generis 
right. Copyright protects the structure of data- 
bases which, if original, constitutes the author’s 
own intellectual creation. By contrast, the more 
controversial sui generis right protects databases 
regardless of their originality, as long as there has 
been ‘substantial investment in obtaining, verifying 
or presenting the contents’. Both the copyright and 
the sui generis right in the DBD put the database 
owner in a position of exclusive access and there-
fore reduce access to the data. A recent evaluation 
of the DBD (EC, 2018g) concluded that it has been 
effective in harmonising the EU legislation on data-
bases and avoiding fragmentation, and that it still 
provides an appropriate balance between protect- 
ion of investment and interests of users. On the 
other hand, it also notes that as a result of a 2004 
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decision of the Court of Justice53 clarifying that the 
sui generis right does not apply to databases that 
are the by-products of the main activity of a firm, 
it must be assumed that these rights do not apply 
broadly to the data economy (machine-generated 
data, IoT devices, big data, AI, etc.). The evaluation 
concluded that at this stage reforming the sui gen-
eris rights would be largely disproportionate. The 
debate among scholars on the benefits of recognis-
ing such rights particularly for machine-generated 
data is still very open (see Section 7.2.).
The text and data mining (TDM) exception to copy- 
right protection could also be considered as a 
measure that opens access to data. In the EU, the 
TDM exception is limited to non-commercial use of 
the data by public sector research institutes and 
organisations. That is an opening combined with a 
restriction. In the USA, the ‘fair use’ provisions al-
low for wider use of data obtained through TDM, 
provided they do not compete with the services of-
fered by the data holder (Section 7.2).
The EU Public Sector Information (PSI) Directive 
(EC, 2003) seeks to make data held by public- 
sector organisations more accessible to citi-
zens and firms. To the extent that some of these 
organisations may be involved in the production of 
commercial services – for instance public utilities 
in transport and energy – it may also cover some 
commercial operations. Providing public access to 
these commercially sensitive data may entail op-
portunity costs for the data holders. The Directive 
suggests that pricing of data access should incur 
marginal costs. Digital datasets are often charac-
terised by the high fixed costs of creating the data-
set and virtually zero marginal costs of replicating 
and transmitting it. As a result, the marginal cost 
rule may not cover the actual cost of producing 
public-sector data but, as argued earlier, much of 
this data is generated to fulfil a legal mandate in 
the first place, so its reuse becomes a by-product, 
and can benefit the public administration much 
more than keeping the data closed. This is the case, 
for example, if the data generates new products 
and services that the public administration can use 
to extract additional information and/or serve the 
community better. A 2015 study funded by the EC54 
supports the view that public administrations will 
be by far the largest beneficiaries of opening up the 
data they hold.
Since data are non-rival and can be transferred 
at virtually zero cost all over the world, the ques-
tion of ‘data sovereignty’ has become an issue. 
This revolves around the idea that data are subject 
to the laws and governance structures in the na-
tion where it is collected55. Within the EU, the GDPR 
allows transfer of personal data between Member 
States. The recent EU Free Flow of Data policy in-
itiative aims to extend this to all types of data in 
order to avoid national fragmentation of data mar-
kets. Personal data transfers outside the EU re-
quire that the recipient complies with GDPR rules. 
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(Big) datasets are a necessary input into ML algo-
rithms. Access to data is important for the develop-
ment of AI. Access and wide data sharing can occur 
in markets for direct and indirect data sales, across 
a wide spectrum of modalities and economic con-
ditions, even when data holders have exclusive con-
trol over their data. 
EU regulatory interventions in data markets are 
caught between two poles: (a) offering more ex-
clusive rights as an incentive for data producers 
and holders to invest more in data collection & 
analysis, and (b) making data more widely avail-
able and accessible to facilitate the extraction 
of new insights from data, including with AI/ML. 
There is a wide-open unregulated space between 
personal data rights under the GDPR and general 
database ownership rights under the DBD where 
market-based data exchanges, bilateral contracts 
and technical protection measures rule. There is an 
ongoing debate in the EU as to whether this open 
space contains some market failures that need to 
be filled up with further regulation. That debate 
ranges from expanding exclusive data ownership 
rights (European Commission, January 2017) to 
facilitating access to data (European Commission, 
April 2018). The rapid rise of AI/ML as a very prom-
ising data-processing technology to extract more 
insights and value from data is fuelling this debate. 
When data and data analytics technologies be-
come cheaper and more widely available, the need 
for protection as an incentive to investors may di-
minish in favour of more access to stimulate innov- 
ation. Finding a new balance between these two op- 
posite poles in the debate requires more societal 
and policy debate.56
In the next section we consider some possible strat-
egies to extract value from the data while sharing 
them. 
 12.3 Towards a data strategy for public  
 administrations 
 12.3.1 Setting the scene
At several points in this report we have highlighted 
that data is crucial to the development of AI in gen-
eral and ML in particular. Robust algorithms need 
large volumes of good-quality data for training, 
where ‘good’ means data that is well organised, se-
mantically labelled, free of bias and open, as dis-
cussed in Chapters 2 and 6.
Public administrations could benefit significantly 
from the use of data science and AI, for example 
to design policy that is targeted to groups and geo- 
graphical areas that are in greatest need of inter-
vention, modelling the potential cumulative impact 
of policy in different areas, and developing policies 
that ‘learn’ from feedback loops from policy imple-
mentation in analogy to the way ML adapts based 
on data feeds (Craglia, Hradec and Troussard, 
2019). For this reason, most national AI strategies 
summarised in Chapter 4 consider AI as a great op-
portunity to modernise public administration, pub-
lic services and research centres like the Alan Turin 
Institute in the UK, which has developed an active 
public policy programme.
In the previous section, we have highlighted the 
tensions between opening up data and restricting 
access and use, from both an economic and legal 
perspective. These tensions are exacerbated by the 
international dimension: in the global competition 
between the USA and China, and among the key in-
dustrial players (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple 
and Microsoft on the one hand, and Baidu, Alibaba, 
Tencent and Xiaomi on the other), Europe is notably 
absent. As noted by the Mission Villani (2018), whilst 
most data captured in the USA and China, and to 
an extent Russia, stays in their respective countries 
because of market dominance, policy, or both, in Eur- 
ope the vast majority of data provided by European 
citizens, companies and governments ends up out-
side Europe. Potentially, the more the public and re-
search sectors pursue an open data policy, the more 
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they feed this flow of data outside Europe. In this 
context, we face a real challenge, if want to stay 
open, in developing a data strategy for Europe that 
increases the pool of European data, adds value to 
it by structuring and semantically annotating it, and 
trains AI applications that benefit European society. 
Many countries are grappling with this challenge, as 
indicated in Chapter 4. One country that has better 
articulated a possible response is France where the 
report by the Mission Villani (2018) put forward a 
three-pronged data strategy (see Box 9).
This proposed strategy is interesting because it 
builds on three key dimensions:
1) Using the EU legal framework, including the 
 GDPR, as an opportunity not just to safe- 
 guard European interests but also to nurture 
 European companies. 
2) Framing the opening of public-sector data in 
 a two-way relationship of reciprocity with 
 the commercial sector to gain increased 
 access to some commercial data of public 
 interest. 
3) Exploring new forms of partnership with the 
 public to share personal data, leveraging 
 their increased control on access to such 
 data provided by the GDPR.
Opening and sharing data across all key stakeholders 
– public sector, commercial sector and the public – is 
very important and already a challenge. Adding value 
to the data while sharing it is an additional crucial 
dimension to support the development of AI bene- 
ficial to Europe. In this respect, we can learn from the 
private sector as outlined in the next section.
 12.3.2 About platforms and APIs
From an economic perspective, a (digital) platform 
is where two or more types of users (consumers, 
suppliers, advertisers, software developers, etc.) 
come together to exchange goods, services and in-
formation. Successful platforms make use of net-
work effects to attract more users on several sides 
of the market: more consumers attract more sup-
pliers and vice versa. They also leverage the data 
that they collect on user behaviour on the plat-
form to reinforce their own position. Economies of 
scope in data collection and analysis give them an 
box 9. Summary data strategy from the Mission Villani Report (2018)
1. Encourage companies to pool and share their data
The government must encourage the creation of data commons 
and support an alternative data production and governance 
model based on reciprocity, cooperation and sharing. The goal 
is to boost data sharing between actors in the same sector. 
The government must also encourage data sharing between 
private actors, and assist businesses in this respect. It must 
organise for certain data held by private entities to be released 
on a case-by-case basis, and support data- and text-mining 
practices without delay.
2. Create data that is in the public interest
Most of the actors heard by the mission were in favour of 
progressively opening up access to some data sets on a case-
by-case and sector-specific basis for public interest reasons. This 
could be in one of two ways: by making the data accessible only 
to the government, or by making the data more widely available, 
for example, to other economic actors.
3. Support the right to data portability
The right to data portability is one of the most important 
innovations in recent French and European texts. It will give any 
individual the ability to migrate from one service ecosystem 
to another without losing their data history. This right could be 
extended to all citizen-centred artificial intelligence applications. 
In this case, it would involve making personal data available to 
government authorities or researchers. 
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informational advantage over individual suppliers 
and consumers (see Martens, 2016).
From a computation perspective, a (web) platform 
is an evolution of the web from a medium to pub-
lish information to an infrastructure to build ap-
plications. One of the major components of web 
digital platforms is the use of web application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs). APIs allow third-party 
developers to access selected data and functionali-
ties available on the platform, and build new appli-
cations. APIs let the data provider keep better con-
trol of how the data is used, and let the third-party 
developer build applications without the need to 
download the entire set of data. 
A good example is GoogleMaps, which is accessible 
to developers via an API. In this way, the developer, 
for example, of a hotel’s website does not need to 
download the map data showing where the hotel is 
located or how to get there. It embeds the Goog-
leMaps API in the application to call its functional-
ities, and shows the locations at different scales or 
directions to get there from anywhere in the world. 
This provides a clear advantage to the developer, 
but also to the Google platform because it can read 
every call on the application and see how popular 
the hotel is, from where it gets its customers, how it 
is associated with other facilities, and so on. In oth-
er words, the platform gains intelligence by moni-
toring the use of the API. This links to the economic 
perspective above: the more users of the APIs, the 
more intelligence the platform gathers, the more it 
reinforces its position, and the more it attracts new 
developers and customers. 
Public administrations across Europe are starting 
to use APIs to provide access to their data in ma-
chine-readable form. When they do, they often see 
a significant increase in the use of their data com-
pared to publishing it as downloadable datasets 
(see Box 10).
 
 12.3.3 From opening data  
 to smart sharing
Using APIs to make the data available to third par-
ties is an essential step towards developing the 
data economy, but is not enough to underpin an AI 
strategy. What is necessary is for the European 
public sector, in particular, to move from pushing 
the data out – a broadcasting model – to drawing 
the users in, both third-party developers and the 
public, and to develop interaction, the interactive 
model. 
We see from the example of commercial platforms 
that users interact in different ways:
• Providing new content.  
• Annotating/tagging/classifying the content 
  already available on the platform.
• Using the services offered.
• Building/using new apps and functionalities 
 based on the platform APIs.
box 10: Examples of APIs in local  
 government
Denmark’s Addresses Web API (DAWA): DAWA is a service 
allowing public authorities, businesses and citizens to use 
authoritative addresses in their IT systems. In 2017, it received 
1.5 billion requests and approximately 350 000 unique users per 
week. The number of API requests is limited to 100 requests per 
second. There are approximately 5 000 IT systems drawing data 
concerning Danish addresses through DAWA.
Madrid MobilityLabs: this is an open and interoperable platform 
from the city council allowing third parties to develop applications 
in the field of urban mobility. It receives 480 million requests per 
year. 2 500 developers are registered in the system, and around 
100 apps have already been developed. 
Source: ELISE project, Joint Research Centre. 
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Users’ behaviour (interaction) and content generat-
ed (or exchanged) contribute to form the enhanced 
data that is so important for AI. Raw data as such is 
frequently of little value, but this increases when it 
is contextualised and cross-referenced. Facebook is 
the biggest content manager in the world, but does 
not produce any content. Its users do it.
If we want to take advantage of the enormous di-
versity and richness of European data, we should 
learn from the examples of successful internet 
companies and develop European data ecosystems 
bringing together the public sector, the commercial 
sector, academia and the third sector and the gen-
eral public. Developing such ecosystems requires a 
new partnership, for example, in the form of a social 
 
contract among all the key stakeholders so that 
each agree on the sharing and use of their data for 
clear purposes and clear benefits. 
We have seen in the review of national AI strate-
gies in Chapter 4 that several countries are already 
reflecting on how to share data between the public 
sector, private sector and the public, for example 
through data trusts (UK), social contracts (France) 
or MyData (Finland). Each country may have its 
own model but we need to share the best practices 
and synergies and agree a framework to then en-
rich this data for the public good.
There is general agreement that European AI appli-
cations must be based on, and reinforce the Euro-
pean values enshrined in the Treaties. These values 
and the European legal framework must be seen as 
a source of strength and global competitive advan-
tage, not a limitation for AI. They must permeate 
all the facets of a European ‘datafication’ process, 
i.e. the process of transforming the information we 
generate into new forms of value or insights. From 
the existing scientific literature (e.g. Tan et al., 2016; 
Roy et al., 2018; Opher et al., 2017) we see that this 
process can be organised into three main phases, 
(see Fig. 14): data collection and aggregation, data 
transformation/enhancement, and insight genera-
tion and provision. 
Data collection and aggregation phase
The first datafication phase involves setting up ef-
ficient and long-term data collection and storage 
solutions. This is essential to provide a stable foun-
dation for any analytical process. Infrastructure is 
necessary to facilitate and support the formation 
of collaborative ecosystems, at different levels 
(national, European, and community or sectoral 
ones), to constitute a reliable, flexible, and scalable 
supply-chain system for data, and processing. Valu- 
able examples could include public administration 
data ecosystems, industrial data ecosystems, for 
example, in the space sector, Industry 4.0, health, 
etc. In the latter, data collected and provided by the 
public would also be crucial. 
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Figure 14. Datafication process enabling the AI revolution.
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As discussed in Chapter 13, if we want to use the 
opportunities afforded by AI to build competences, 
skills, and resilience at the local level, particularly in 
peripheral regions, we also need to consider local- 
level ecosystems bringing together public adminis-
trations, local firms, academia, and local commu- 
nities to share and enrich local data and build appli-
cations addressing local needs. 
Data transformation/enhancement phase
In this phase, different data streams and types need 
to be transformed, harmonised and aggregated to 
increase the value of the data collected and make it 
useful for AI application. This transformation phase 
requires domain expertise, which may not be avail-
able everywhere in the same way. Therefore, it is 
important to develop the transformation algorithms 
from the outset so that they are transparent and 
reusable. This is the key level where we need to ad-
dress the concerns of transparency, explainability, 
accountability and fairness expressed in Chapter 2.3 
and also also discussed in Chapters 6. To do so, re-
quires the adoption at the European level of proto-
cols to document, share and reuse algorithms, and 
agreed evaluation frameworks for algorithms.
Insight generation and provision through 
the platform
This last development phase is essential to match 
demand and supply and create real economic val-
ue. In this context, a platform is the place that en-
ables interactions between customers and service 
providers, where the latter can be the public admin-
istration or third-party developers. In this phase, 
ML algorithms are developed and trained with 
the pool of data available to respond to user de-
mand or local needs, tested, and deployed to pro-
vide a service. Important aspects to achieve a Euro 
pean-level strategy for data services and boost the 
European AI economy would include developing a 
framework for sharing and reusing AI/ML training 
datasets and algorithms, defining minimum quality 
of service, and ensuring platform interoperability 
and portability of data.
 12.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we review the key economic char-
acteristics of digital data, including economies of 
scale, of scope, and non-rivalry. The first two point 
to an increase in the concentration of data, and 
hence information and power, in the hands of a few 
actors in the internet economy, while non-rivalry 
creates potential tensions between opening access 
to the data so that society benefits the most, and 
restricting access so that the data holder bene-
fits most. These tensions are reflected in the legal 
framework, as discussed in Chapter 7, and make 
the development of data strategies in an open and 
globalised environment a particular challenge.
To address this challenge, we have put forward 
some key elements of a possible strategy to make 
the best use of the vast richness of European 
society and data. We suggest that the tensions 
and dilemmas between openness and restrictions 
outlined in Section 12.1 can be navigated by learn-
ing from the most successful companies on the in-
ternet. We need to add value to the data we have, 
particularly in the public sector, by moving from the 
broadcasting model to the interactive one in which 
users contribute to enrich the data whilst using it, 
and providers gain intelligence from the feedback 
they receive. This means developing European data 
platforms with a clear datafication strategy ar-
ticulated around data collection and aggrega-
tion, transformation and enhancement, insight 
generation and provision. Through these phases 
we can also address the concerns over transpar- 
ency, accountability, and fairness expressed in 
Chapters 2 and 6 and find a European way to AI 
development that is consistent with our values.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of resilience which is useful to frame a 
European approach to AI addressing different phases: prevention, anticipation, prepa-
ration, but also adaptation and transformation to bounce back from the effects of a 
shock. It is important to both measure and monitor resilience, and we introduce some 
examples of how this could be done even though there are a number of methodologi-
cal and data-related limitations that need to be addressed.  
As we show in Chapter 9, we do not know what impacts AI will have on work and 
society, but we do know we need to increase our resilience to AI, particularly in regions 
of Europe already more vulnerable. We put forward some elements of a possible 
approach centred on the network of Digital Innovation Hubs. There are already several 
hundred hubs at the present time which are expanding rapidly with a target of one 
for each region in Europe, many of which are focusing on AI. Their purpose is to faci-
litate access to technology and know-how to public administrations and firms, SMEs 
in particular, in combination with the planned AI-on-demand-platform. We suggest 
putting these hubs at the centre of local ecosystems which could create local pools of 
shared data so that the AI skills developed/upgraded locally could be put to good use 
in developing AI algorithms and solutions trained on local data to address local needs.
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‘In winter, snow falls on the bamboo trees. They bend but never break, and come spring, the trees 
start to grow straight again.* 
Address by Norio Mitsuya, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MCM Chair); OECD Southeast Asia Regional  
Forum, 26 March, Bali, Indonesia, 2014. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000033886.pdf
 
 13.1 The need for resilience
As we discussed in the previous chapters of this re-
port, AI offers many potential opportunities to im-
prove our lives but also raises a number of challeng-
es to society. We are preparing ethical guidelines for 
the development of AI systems that are account- 
able, responsible and transparent but we must also 
recognise that future change may be unpredictable 
and sudden. Therefore, we should not only try and 
shape the development of technology so that it bene- 
fits our society, but also prepare our institutions, 
policies, people and society at large to become 
more flexible, adaptable and ready to transform. 
Basically, we need to become more resilient.
Interest in resilience has been rising rapidly dur-
ing the last 20 years as a response to increasing 
challenges like climate change, globalisation, im-
migration, and digital transformation that test our 
coping capacities as individuals, regions, countries 
and institutions.
Resilience is a key concept in the policy discourse of 
the EU57, and the JRC has developed a framework 
(Manca et al., 2017) for societal resilience that in-
cludes not only prevention, anticipation and prepa-
ration but also adaptation and transformation, i.e. 
the need to reform and potentially bounce back af-
ter a shock. According to this framework, a system 
(or society) is resilient if it can face shocks and per-
sistent structural changes without losing its ability 
to deliver societal well-being in a sustainable way 
(i.e. deliver societal well-being without compromis-
ing that of future generations). 
This framework may prove very useful in addressing 
the multiple challenges and opportunities of AI. For 
example, many workers will need both protection 
(absorptive capacity), and support for their potential 
retraining (adaptive capacity). This also highlights 
the centrality of individual resilience capacities. 
Preparation is also a major element, including the 
right policy frameworks (as advocated in the con-
text of globalisation by Baldwin and Vihriala, 2017, 
or Giles, 2018 for antitrust policies) and the neces-
sary public debates about the ways forward as a so-
ciety (as raised by, among others, Guillén and Reddy, 
2018; University of Melbourne, 2018).
We also need to consider that the effects of AI may 
transcend geographies and sectors. It is expected 
to give a new boost to globalisation (Baldwin and 
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Vihriala, 2017), but could also lead to a repatri- 
ation of jobs previously delocalised in cheaper 
countries. In any case, job losses and reallocations 
will reshape communities (Alexander, 2018). As an 
example, self-driving cars will not just enable driv-
ing without a steering wheel, but will change a ma-
jor ecosystem built on car ownership and use (Finn, 
2018). Inequality may have an even stronger global 
component (Lee, 2017). This calls for a holistic and 
complex approach (the system view).
Moreover, the development and use of AI is set to 
rise and continue for a long time. We need to look 
into the future, assess its effects on people, com-
munities, countries and humanity (societal well- 
being), and we need to influence its future devel-
opment (the dynamic reaction) wisely. As argued 
by Melvin Kranzberg, ‘technology is neither good nor 
bad; nor is it neutral’, so it is crucial to actively steer 
the development of AI to ‘improve the quality of our 
products and our standard of living’ (Goolsbee, 2017).
Finally, we need not only to become more resili- 
ent in the face of AI but also to use AI to become 
more resilient, for example by extending the use 
of AI-enabled predictive analytics in public policy, 
infrastructure maintenance, disaster risk manage-
ment, agriculture, crime prevention or traffic control 
(Prakash, 2017). AI can also provide improved tech-
nologies to foster citizen engagement in building up 
a resilient EU society.
 13.2 Measuring resilience to AI
It is important to both measure and monitor resili- 
ence. Alessi et al. (2018) provide one of the first 
examples of a full measurement strategy aligned 
with the JRC conceptual framework focusing on the 
2008-12 financial and economic crises. The two-
step approach adopted by Alessi and colleagues 
creates resilience indicators based on the proper-
ties of the system’s components, and then looks 
for statistically significant and robust predictors 
(resilience characteristics)58 of resilient behaviour. 
The more widespread approach is to identify, typ-
ically by expert assessments, such characteristics 
directly. One such example is JRC’s INFORM Index 
for Risk Management (De Groeve et al., 2014).
In the case of AI, expert-based indicators are al-
ready being developed. One example is Pau et al. 
(2017) who looked at a set of Asian countries, and 
prepared two composite indicators, for AI prepared-
ness and resilience. Preparedness is ‘the ability of 
companies and talent to capitalise on opportunities 
brought about by AI’, while resilience – in their ap-
proach – is the ‘ability to adapt to and withstand 
structural changes brought about by AI’.
The main ingredients for preparedness are start-
up activity, AI funding (venture capital), students 
enrolled in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) subjects at top-ranked uni-
versities, and AI publication volume. Resilience is 
assessed using relevant government policies and 
the job structure. In our terminology, preparedness 
can be viewed as a part of resilience, as it signals 
the ability to respond well to AI penetration. Below 
we present three illustrative examples of similar in-
dicators for the EU.
As an attempt to assess the penetration of, and the 
dynamic response to AI in Europe, Figure 15 shows 
the shares of manufacturing versus healthcare in 
employment, comparing the USA and the EU (un-
like the Asian example, we look at the structure by 
sectors and not by job types). A major decline in 
manufacturing and a rise in healthcare can be seen 
in both entities. The EU still has a larger share of 
manufacturing and a smaller share of healthcare. 
This indicates the possibility of further declines in 
manufacturing, but also in the absorption capacity 
of healthcare. The degree of relative shift was larger 
in the USA (6.8 percentage points, as opposed to 
5.6), which may explain the higher degree of pes-
simism (and also the change in inequality) in the 
USA. Although the underlying mechanisms require 
further analysis, the decline in manufacturing is 
informative about the penetration of automation, 
while the increase in healthcare and its further ab-
sorption capacity can be linked to resilience.
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Figure 16 shows a second measurement attempt, 
this time looking mostly at preparedness at the 
Member State level. It combines various aspects of 
AI-oriented government efforts (based on the 2016 
edition of the Open Data Barometer) and data on 
the share of relevant fields in higher education.59 
The figure shows that for about half of the coun-
tries all variables point to the same direction60, so 
government efforts and education patterns portray 
a coherent picture of preparedness.
Finally, Figure 17 looks at preparedness at the level of 
EU regions, showing the share of people employed 
in science and technology61, as a percent of the eco-
nomically active population. Some regions in the 
Southern and Eastern part of the EU look particu-
larly unprepared. This calls for upskilling, but also 
action to reduce the brain drain from the South 
and East to the North. The network of Digital In-
novation Hubs, which is currently expanding from 
few hundreds to potentially over 1 000, could offer 
an opportunity to bring together the training supply 
from academia and technical centres, with poten-
tial employers in the private and public sector, and 
local banks of shared data. In this way, local AI skills 
and applications could be developed together to 
address local needs, and strengthen resilience at 
the same time. It is worth noting that at the present 
time, some of the countries with the low science and 
technology employment regions, like Bulgaria and 
Romania, still lack such hubs, suggesting directions 
for possible future action. In Figure 18, we bring 
together both Digital Innovation Hubs and current 
academic supply of study topics on AI, as qualified 
in Chapter 8. In this way, we can start reflecting on 
potential synergies, gaps and priorities to develop 
such local ecosystems. 
Figure 15. Employment in manufacturing and healthcare: EU and USA 
Source: Eurostat for the EU, OECD for the USA
Figure 16. AI preparedness in EU Member States 
Source: Source Open Data Barometer and Eurostat.
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Figure 17. Human resources in science and technology and Digital Innovation Hubs 
Source: Eurostat regional yearbook 2018 and JRC.
While we are making some progress in understand-
ing how to measure resilience to AI, there are some 
difficulties in applying to AI the causal, two-step ap-
proach that Alessi et al. (2018) used to measure the 
response to the financial crisis. For the first step of 
the approach, which involves assessing the strength 
of the phenomenon, we lack a long-term time series 
of AI adoption in different countries. The AI Index 
and its planned EU extension by the JRC may offer 
a starting point to address this limitation. Anoth-
er possibility is to use corporate- and citizen-level 
surveys: Morikawa (2017) presents such examples 
for Japan, while various special issues of the Euro-
barometer survey (SP382 in 2012, SP427 in 2014 
and SP460 in 2017, for example) are indicative of 
public opinion in different European countries. For 
example, the three surveys above show that only a 
small share of EU citizens (around 22 %, quite sta-
ble in time) would be comfortable having a medical 
operation by a robot, while a somewhat bigger share 
(47 % in 2012 and 2014, but declining to 35 % in 
2017) would be comfortable with robots at their 
workplace. On a more positive note and looking at 
the broader public perception of digital transform- 
ations, the 2017 Eurobarometer survey (SP460), in-
dicates that three quarters of the respondents think 
the digital transformation has a positive impact on 
the economy. Two thirds (67 %) think that the im-
pact is also positive on their quality of life, while 
64 % also find a positive impact on society. Taken 
together, these results make it possible to start per-
forming some first resilience analysis while building 
up the time series on AI adoption. 
Another set of challenges relates to the second step 
of the Alessi et al. model, which involved robust stat- 
istical predictors of resilient behaviour. Here the 
main problem is that AI is already pervasive across 
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Figure 18. Human resources in science and technology, Digital Innovation Hubs, and academic supply in study topics related to AI
Source: Eurostat regional yearbook 2018 and JRC.
many sectors of the economy and society and there-
fore it is very difficult to disentangle process from 
response, and attribute causality. The way we re-
spond to the effects of AI may influence and steer 
the extent and severity of the effects themselves. 
This steering process is a key aspect of resilience. 
One possibility for measuring the effectiveness of 
steering is to keep track of predictions and then 
compare them to realised outcomes some time af-
terwards. For example, the predictions of job dis-
placements and replacements, which are based on 
current forecasts of technology developments, could 
be recorded. Systematic differences between the re-
alised and forecast numbers may be indicative of 
changes in the automation process. Other possibili-
ties may emerge as we apply the resilience frame-
work to AI and progress in practice.
 13.3 Lessons from the analysis  
 of AI for understanding resilience
Looking at AI from a resilience perspective does not 
only enrich our understanding of, and preparedness 
for AI, but also advances the analysis of resilience. 
The case of AI is one of the first examples at the JRC 
of considering a persistent structural change, which 
calls for an adjusted conceptual and measurement 
approach. It provides an interesting example of the 
need to think about different capacities and inter-
ventions at different time horizons. It emphasises 
the role of power relationships, and the issue of po-
tential updates of the ‘social contract’. Finally, it calls 
for steering the future path of AI to the benefit of 
humankind, and thereby coming out stronger from 
the adoption of AI.
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We are only at the beginning of a rapid period of 
transformation of our economy and society due 
to the convergence of many digital technologies. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is central to this change 
and offers major opportunities to improve our lives. 
The recent developments in AI are the result of in-
creased processing power, improvements in algo-
rithms and the exponential growth in the volume 
and variety of digital data. Many applications of AI 
have started to appear in our everyday lives, from 
machine translations, to image recognition, and 
music generation, and are increasingly deployed in 
industry, government and commerce. Connected 
and autonomous vehicles, and AI-supported med-
ical diagnostics are areas of application that will 
soon be commonplace.
There is strong global competition on AI among the 
USA, China and Europe. The USA leads for now but 
China is catching up fast and aims to lead by 2030. 
For the EU, it is not so much a question of winning or 
losing the race but of finding a way to embrace the op-
portunities offered by AI in a way that is human-cen-
tred, ethical, secure, and true to our core values. 
The EU Member States and the European Com-
mission are developing coordinated national and 
European strategies, recognising that we can only 
succeed together. We can build on our areas of 
strength, including excellent research, leadership 
in some industrial sectors like automotive and 
robotics, a solid legal and regulatory framework, 
and very rich cultural diversity also at the regional 
and sub-regional levels. 
It is generally recognised that AI can flourish only if 
supported by a robust computing infrastructure and 
good quality data: 
•  With respect to computing, we have identified 
 a window of opportunity for Europe to invest 
 in the emerging new paradigm of computing 
 distributed towards the edges of the net- 
 work, in addition to centralised facilities. This 
 will also support the future deployment of 
 5G and the IoT.
•  With respect to data, we argue in favour of 
 learning from successful internet companies, 
 opening access to data and developing 
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 interactivity with the users rather than just 
 broadcasting data. In this way, we can devel- 
 op ecosystems of public administrations, 
 firms, and civil society, enriching the data 
 to make it fit for AI applications responding 
 to European needs. 
We should embrace the opportunities afforded by 
AI but not uncritically. The black box characteristics 
of most leading AI techniques make them opaque 
even to specialists. AI systems are currently limited 
to narrow and well-defined tasks, and their tech-
nologies inherit imperfections from their human 
creators, such as the well-recognised bias effect 
present in data. We should challenge the short-
comings of AI and work towards strong evaluation 
strategies, transparent and reliable systems, and 
good human-AI interactions. 
Ethical and secure-by-design algorithms are 
crucial to build trust in this disruptive technology, 
but we also need the broader engagement of civil 
society in the values to be embedded in AI and the 
directions for future development.
This social engagement should be part of the ef-
fort to strengthen our resilience at all levels from 
local, to national and European, across institutions, 
industry and civil society. Developing local ecosys-
tems of skills, computing, data and applications 
can foster the engagement of local communities, 
respond to their needs, harness local creativity and 
knowledge, and build a human-centred, diverse, 
and socially driven AI.  
We still know very little about how AI will impact 
the way we think, make decisions, relate to each 
other, and how it will affect our jobs. This uncertain-
ty can be a source of concern but is also a sign of 
opportunity. The future is not yet written. We can 
shape it based on our collective vision of what 
future we would like to have. But we need to act 
together and act fast. 
  We need 
to act together  
and act fast.
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 1  We define players as research centres, academic institutions, and companies which have participated in one or more  
 of the following economic activities: R&D processes, industrial production and marketing, specific AI-related services 
 (see Box 5).
 2  Technically, this diagram mainly refers to supervised learning.
 3  Neural network models for computing were introduced in the 1950s and 60s inspired by neurobiology. Learning  
 is modelled as a gradual change in the (computing) network connections in analogy to the synaptic modifications 
 taking place in the biological neural network.
 4  https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd 
 5  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-artificialintelligence/trump-administration-will-allow-ai-to-freely-develop 
	 -in-u-s-official-idUSKBN1IB30F	
 6 https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-09-07






 12 http://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/ 
 13 https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/	
 14		https://www.slideshare.net/AIFrontiers/jeff-dean-trends-and-developments-in-deep-learning-research	
 15 https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/google-alphabet/google-switching-self-driving-data-center- 
	 management-system	
 16 https://www.contino.io/insights/whos-using-aws 
 17 https://www.cifar.ca/ai/pan-canadian-artificial-intelligence-strategy
 18 In this version, the TES analysis of the AI ecosystem is based on data coming from more than 20 data sources,  
 which include Arxiv, Asgard, CBInsights, Crunchbase, DowJones, EU CORDIS, EPO Patstat, Bureau Van Dijk Orbis,  
 Statista, and other minor ones.
 19 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-member-states-sign-cooperate-artificial-intelligence
 20 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4043_en.htm
 21  On this subject, see also Chapter 11 in this report.
 22  A unicorn is a privately-held start-up company valued at over US$ 1 billion.
 23 https://www.statista.com/statistics/255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/	
 24 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/2XOIRqVO1SKJSLBLwimL7A	
 25 Floridi (2018) makes a distinction between hard and soft digital ethics, where hard precedes the formulation  
 of new regulations or challenges the existing ones, and soft comes after the compliance by considering what  
 could be done ‘over and above the existing regulation’. Thus, soft ethics is a good approach where a normative  
 framework, such as respect of human rights, is already in place.
 26 This section has considered strategies and public policy documents released by EU institutions and public entities 
 in France and the UK. 
  27 As codified in Art. 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,  




 These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,  
 justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ The European Charter of Fundamental  
 Rights, recognises, among others, the right to human dignity, privacy, protection of personal data, freedom 
 of expression and information, equality, no discrimination, the rights of the child and the elderly and persons  
 with disabilities as well as the rights to consumer protection, good administration and a fair trial.
 28 Note that even if Art. 22.2 GDPR recognises exceptions to this right, the data subject will always keep the right  
 “to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest  
 the decision”.
 29 http://www.algoaware.eu/ 
 30 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative  
 provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210. 
 31 Among the problematic categories are the scope (reference to products and B2C relations) as well as  
 the requirements upon the consumer to benefit from the strict liability regime (notably the burden of the proof  
 concerning the defect of the product, the actual damage and the causal link between those). 
 32 Call for applications for the selection of members of the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies.
 33 For a detailed overview of the legal challenges concerning liability, see Staff Working Document on liability  
 for emerging digital technologies (SWD(2018) 137) accompanying the Communication on Artificial intelligence  
 for Europe COM(2018) 237; EC 2018b. Directly connected to the discussion on liability, it must also be noted  
 that, in its Resolution, the EP invites the EC to consider a specific legal status for robots, which could lead  
 to recognising legal personality for autonomous robots (EP 2017).
 34 At the sectoral level, the EP has called on the Commission to publish a legislative proposal on access to in-vehicle 
 data (EP 2018a). With the release of the Third Mobility Package, the Commission has announced a Recommenda- 
 tion that, among other things, will deal with ‘a data governance framework that enables data sharing, in line with  
 the initiatives of the 2018 Data Package, and with data protection and privacy legislation.’
 35 The proposal is now being discussed by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. It must be noted that 
 both the EP and the Council have proposed to enlarge the scope to cultural institutions and to create 
 a new optional exception in addition to that proposed by the EC. 
 36 See Council of Europe, Explanatory report, Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals  
 with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108), Ad hoc Committee on Data Protection  
 (CAHDATA), 128th Session of the Committee of Ministers (Elsinore, Denmark, 17-18 May 2018). The Exploratory 
 Report reads: “The notion of ‘identifiable’ refers not only to the individual’s civil or legal identity as such, but also  
 to what may allow to ‘individualise’ or single out (and thus allow to treat differently) one person from others.  
 This ‘individualisation’ could be done, for instance, by referring to him or her specifically, or to a device or  
 a combination of devices (computer, mobile phone, camera, gaming devices, etc.) on the basis of an identification  
 number, a pseudonym, biometric or genetic data, location data, an IP address, or other identifier. The use  
 of a pseudonym or of any digital identifier/digital identity does not lead to anonymisation of the data as the data 
 subject can still be identifiable or individualised. Pseudonymous data is thus to be considered as personal data  
 and is covered by the provisions of the Convention. The quality of the pseudonymisation techniques applied should 
 be duly taken into account when assessing the appropriateness of safeguards implemented to mitigate the risks  
 to data subjects.”
 37 https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines2018/e/g_ii_3_3_1.htm.	
 38 Se UK Government’s response to the Lords Select Committee AI report, June 2018.
 39 Approaches designed to test the boundaries of computer programming language design, as a proof of concept.
 40 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-07/just-how-shallow-is-the-artificial-intelligence-talent-pool
 41 https://www.elementsofai.com
 42 See, for example, Hoekstra and van Slujis (2003). 
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 43 Readers may also be interested in ‘HUMAINT’, an interdisciplinary JRC project aiming to understand the impact  
 of machine intelligence on human behaviour, with a focus on cognitive and socio-emotional capabilities  
 and decision-making (see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/communities/community/humaint).
 44 For a more comprehensive overview and assessment of the relevant research literature and an empirical  
 investigation into changing occupational patterns in Europe, see the JRC’s forthcoming report on the future of work.
 45 Although the scale of redistribution for economic growth to continue at a steady pace would have to be truly  
 enormous, so enormous as to fully compensate the (almost) complete substitution of human labour by machines.
 46 Singularity refers to the scenario of self-learning and self-programming machines starting a runaway spiral  
 of improvements that overtake human intelligence with catastrophic consequences. 
 47 A general–purpose technology refers to a key enabling technology bringing major changes to society,  
 such as electricity or IT.
 48 The term cyber-physical systems refers to physical objects, often interconnected over digital networks,  
 that are partly controlled by software algorithms and are capable of interacting with the physical world  
 (e.g. autonomous vehicles).
 49 In ISO standards, the ratio between the total data centre input power and the IT power is defined as power  
 utilisation effectiveness (PUE). Typical data centres have a PUE of 2, while the most efficient ones have 
 a PUE of 1.1
 50 http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/DigitalizationandEnergy3.pdf	
 51 https://eta.lbl.gov/publications/united-states-data-center-energy
 52 This is a European initiative managed by the JRC, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/energy-efficiency/code-conduct/ 
 datacentres
 53 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus Ab (C-46/02, 9/11/2004), Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Svenska Spel Ab  
 (C-338/02, 9/11/2004) British Horseracing Board Ltd v. William Hill (C-203/02, 9/11/2004) Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. 
 OPAP (C-444/02, 9/11/2004) 
 54 https://www.europeandataportal.eu/sites/default/files/edp_creating_value_through_open_data_0.pdf	
 55 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_sovereignty 
 56 This chapter is based on Duch-Brown, Martens and Mueller-Langer (2017). For more in-depth discussion  
 on the issues raised please refer to that publication.
 57 Examples include the Rome Declaration of 2017, the Reflection paper on Harnessing Globalisation, the Joint  
 Communication on ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action’.
 58 They are usually indicated as resilience indicators. The forthcoming report on Resilience refers to  
 them as ‘expert based indicators’, and offers a more in-depth discussion.
 59 Government policies were evaluated by using the average ranking across the 10 sub-aspects of the three main  
 dimensions (readiness, implementation and impact, see https://opendatabarometer.org/leadersedition/ 
 methodology/ for details). The education fields proxy the concept of STEM by considering natural sciences,  
 mathematics and statistics, information and communication technologies, database and network design  
 and administration, and software and applications development and analysis. The shares were averaged over 
 the years 2013-16. 
 60 For each variable, a value of one indicates that the underlying measure is above the cross-country average, while 
 a minus one means that it is below. The series are then stacked next to each other. Therefore, a value of -3  
 means being below average on all three variables.
 61 Defined as having either successfully completed a tertiary-level education, or not formally qualified but employed  
 in an S&T occupation where tertiary level qualifications are normally required.
 62	 http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/digital-innovation-hubs
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